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Abstract 
The human cognitive system is severely capacity limited. As such, only a select 
subset of visual input to the retina is fully processed by the cognitive system at any 
one point in time. To compensate, mechanisms of visual attention allow us to 
distribute these limited resources throughout the visual field according to properties 
of the visual input and our goals and intentions. Establishing the exact criteria by 
which visual input is selected to undergo further processing is central to 
understanding the processes that determine visual selection; processes that 
ultimately contribute to our conscious experience of the world. In this thesis, I focus 
on stimulus novelty and the role that task-expectancies play in determining visual 
selection. It is well documented that that which is new and unexpected often appears 
to standout in the environment and can attract visual attention (Horstmann, 2005; 
Meyer, Niepel, Rudolph & Schűtzwohl, 1991; Ranganath & Rainer, 2003; Yantis & 
Jonides 1990). However, the conditions under which this is the case and the 
mechanism by which we come to be sensitive to novel stimuli require some 
elucidation. 
 Here I present 3 empirical chapters that explore the conditions under which 
novel and unexpected stimuli attract visual attention. In Chapter 2, I investigated 
whether attentional capture by unexpected stimuli reflects a form of stimulus driven 
capture and occurs contrary to the immediate goals on an observer. Across a series 
of experiments I found that an infrequent (~3-6% of trials) and irrelevant motion cue 
captured attention when observers had an active set for a specific target color. 
Critically, this effect was not observed when the same motion stimulus was 
presented frequently. Thus, task goals appear to modulate capture by stimuli that 
broadly conform to contextual expectations, while stimuli that violate these 
expectations appear to guide visual attention involuntarily. 
In chapter 3, I examined what it means for a stimulus to be ‘unexpected’. The 
first presentation of an unexpected stimulus during visual search has been 
associated with large RT cost. In chapter 3, I independently varied prior exposure to 
an unexpected and irrelevant motion distractor and explicit knowledge of its 
occurrence to assess the contributions of each of these factors in determining the 
unexpectedness of the stimulus. Neither prior exposure, nor knowledge of 
occurrence served to attenuate the response to the unexpected motion distractor. 
 ii 
 
These results suggest that the task expectations, which deviant stimuli are evaluated 
against, are highly context specific and derived from a process of implicit learning 
about stimulus relevance, and are a not shaped by explicit top-down knowledge 
about the likelihood of occurrence.  
In Chapter 4, I examined the time-course of attention shifts to unexpected 
stimuli. Previous authors (e.g., Horstmann, 2005; 2006) have made the claim that 
shifts of attention to unexpected stimuli are delayed relative to expected stimuli and 
that this may suggest a dedicated orienting system for novel and unexpected events. 
In Chapter 4, I used eye-movements as a proxy for attentional selection to evaluate 
this claim. Across two experiments I found oculomotor capture by an unannounced 
colour singleton that was rapid, and large RT costs that emerged once the eyes 
selected the unexpected colour singleton, but not before. This pattern of eye-
movements and RT costs is not consistent with accounts that posit a delay in 
orienting to explain performance decrements that have been associated with 
unexpected stimuli. I propose an interference account whereby attention is deployed 
rapidly to an unexpected stimulus and performance decrements reflect the 
engagement of decision level processes that are recruited to resolve expectation 
violations.  
In summary, I present 3 empirical chapters that show consistent effects of 
stimulus novelty on search performance. Based on these results I have proposed 
that the attentional set reflects a set of contextually specific expectations that 
describe both the target defining properties and the to-be-ignored properties of 
distractors. Sensitivity to stimulus novelty is born of a process whereby salient 
irrelevant stimuli are inhibited over repeated and frequent exposure in order to be 
ignored. Stimuli that occur infrequently cannot be inhibited and consequently capture 
visual attention. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction and Overview
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Perhaps the only unsatisfying aspect of a PhD spent studying visual search, is that  
after nearly four years of doing so, I am no more adept at locating my office keys on 
my desk as I prepare to head home of an evening. I am consoled, however, by an 
understanding of why this is the case, which, if you will indulge me, I would like to 
share with you in the pages that follow. 
I will continue for the moment with the clichéd, though apt example of a 
disorganized graduate student’s desk to outline the problem at hand. My desk is 
cluttered. It is littered with academic papers, journals, textbooks, coffee mugs, pens 
and pencils, gym gear, a copy of the New York Times, my phone, my laptop, 
yesterday’s coke can, last week’s coke can, a Rubik’s Cube and the list goes on. 
Buried in this sea of objects are my office keys. At this point you could argue that the 
arduous search task I routinely engage in for my keys is self-inflicted and I’d have 
little recourse to object. What’s remarkable to me though, and perhaps you agree, is 
that I’m able to find them at all. Indeed, we all have experience with trying to locate 
objects of interest from within cluttered environments; whether you’re searching for 
personal items from amidst the mess that hides your desk or perhaps searching for a 
friend at a crowded intersection. The visual world throws at the retina a plethora of 
visual information, much of which is relevant to our immediate goals, however the 
vast majority of which often is not. The question of how we distinguish and extract 
relevant information from the sea of distracting and irrelevant information that 
presents to the visual system in any given scene has been, and remains, a question 
of principal interest to vision and cognitive scientists. Your ability to locate your 
favourite sweater in a closet full of clothes is obviously something you can do and 
probably with relative ease; however, this ability is not trivial. 
 The problem at hand is that the quantity of visual information that exists in 
any given scene far exceeds what can be processed by the human cognitive system 
at any one point in time. Consequently, we are limited to fully processing only a 
select subset of the available information from moment to moment. One way the 
brain compensates for this capacity limitation is to “discard” information at very early 
stages of visual processing. For example, visual acuity drops off markedly as you 
move from the fovea to peripheral vision. This is thought to be related to decreasing 
photoreceptor density and an increase in the size of retinal ganglion cell receptive 
fields as you move from central to peripheral vision (Banks, Sekuler & Anderson, 
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1991; Curcio, Sloan, Kalina & Hendrickson, 1990). Moreover, the magnification of 
visual input from central vision continues as it reaches early cortical visual areas 
such as the primary visual cortex (V1) and extrastriate cortex area V2 (Holmes, 
1945; Horton & Hoyt, 1991) – eye-movements allow us to foveate items that require 
more fined grained discrimination. In addition to these structural ‘filters’, the visual 
system further compensates for capacity limitations by sampling visual information 
from the environment selectively. Visual processing is guided by selective attention 
mechanisms that allow us to prioritise the processing of a restricted number of 
events or objects in the visual world on the basis of their visual salience and our task 
goals. For example, the knowledge that your favourite sweater is blue and the fact 
that it happens to be flanked by white garments in your closet will, among other 
factors, influence whether the visual input from the sweater is selected to undergo 
further processing along the visual pathway. To a large degree, our awareness of the 
world is determined by the objects and events that we come to attend to, thus, how 
attentional selection mechanisms are controlled and the information they are 
sensitive to has important consequences for how we interact with our environment. 
Unsurprisingly then, the question of what determines the events and objects in the 
world to which we orient and attend has been extensively studied in the fields of 
perception and cognition, and is the focus of this thesis. 
To elaborate on the example used above, your ability to locate your favourite 
sweater in a closet full of clothes will be related to your knowledge of what the 
sweater looks like (i.e., its colour, shape and size etc.) and it’s likely location (e.g., 
Posner, 1980), but also to the context in which it is embedded (e.g., Becker, 2010). 
For example, if your sweater shares its colour with proximally located garments of 
similar shape and size, then your search may be slowed due the similarity between 
items (e.g., Becker, 2010; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989). If your sweater is the only 
blue item though, then you may find that colour in this instance can be used to 
rapidly locate your sweater (e.g., Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Wolfe, 1994). This 
simple and perhaps intuitive observation, that some searches are slow while others 
are highly efficient, is actually quite revealing about how visual attention is deployed 
throughout visual scenes and the stimulus properties that guide visual processing. In 
this thesis I will focus on one particular stimulus property that has received relatively 
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little attention within the visual search literature - stimulus novelty, or the extent to 
which a given stimulus can be expected to appear in a given context.  
Imagine that your sweater came to be in your refrigerator rather than your 
closet. You might find that upon opening the refrigerator that you quickly become 
aware of your oddly placed sweater, despite having a goal at the time of searching 
for the milk. No doubt we all have encountered objects and events in the world that, 
at the time, seemed unexpected or out of place in the context in which they were 
experienced. Anecdotally, such events seem to capture our attention and are often 
stored in memory; this experience is supported by experimental evidence 
demonstrating a cascade of physiological and cognitive changes that occur in 
response to unexpected events (see Ranganath & Rainer, 2003 for a review). 
Indeed, from an ecological perspective, the ability to detect and respond to 
unexpected events in the environment would seem fundamental to survival. 
However, a relatively small amount of experimental work has explicitly explored the 
sensitivity of attentional control mechanisms to unexpected events and traditional 
theories of visual search have, to a degree, neglected to model this process.  
In this thesis I present three experimental chapters that explore the sensitivity 
of attentional selection mechanisms to unexpected stimuli across varying search 
conditions. In Chapter 2, I establish that indeed stimulus novelty can guide visual 
attention, even when observers are set to search for another salient stimulus 
property. In Chapter 3, I examine what it might mean to the cognitive system for a 
stimulus to be novel or unexpected by examining the effect of top-down expectation 
and prior exposure on the response to an infrequently presented stimulus. Finally, 
there is a suggestion in the literature that there may be a separate underlying 
mechanism of control for unexpected and expected events. This is evidenced by an 
apparent shift in the time course of attentional capture by unexpected events relative 
to expected events. In Chapter 4, I investigate this claim by studying the temporal 
profile of attentional capture by unexpected events using eye-movements. The 
findings from these three chapters are discussed in the context of the ‘attentional 
control’ literature and converge on the conclusion that early selection mechanisms 
are sensitive to certain classes of novel stimuli.  Moreover, my results suggest that 
attentional guidance mechanisms prioritize novel stimuli ahead of task relevant 
information, at least very early on in visual processing. Whether there is a dedicated 
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selection mechanism for novelty detection remains unclear. I will argue that current 
models of visual search can accommodate the findings presented here and thus, 
there may be no need to postulate a dedicated novelty detection system.  
Although each of the experimental chapters has a different focus, each is 
motivated by the same central question - what determines the events in the visual 
world to which we orient and attend. As such, similar themes and concepts to those 
discussed in this introductory chapter will reappear at the beginning of subsequent 
chapters. To minimize redundancy throughout the thesis, in this introductory chapter 
I will focus on a more general overview of current and influential models of visual 
search and introduce the broader conceptual questions currently of interest to the 
field, while leaving some of the more detailed discussion of experimental 
methodologies and empirical findings to the introduction sections of the respective 
chapters. I will begin by briefly outlining some of the prominent and influential models 
of visual search that have been used to frame much of the work in the field over the 
past few decades. 
 
Visual Search  
Sensory input to the retina is processed in parallel by the visual system. 
However, capacity limitations imposed on the visual system mean that not all 
sensory input can be processed to its full extent at any one point in time. In what 
manner then are these limited resources distributed across the visual field? It is clear 
from experience as well as experimental work that the process is not random. 
Rather, selection mechanisms control the distribution of processing resources based 
on the properties of visual stimuli (e.g., highly salient stimuli) and the intentions and 
goals of the observer (e.g., look for red). However, the relative contribution of each of 
these factors in determining early visual selection has been the focus of much 
debate. Studying how visual attention is deployed throughout the visual field is 
central to understanding the processes that determine visual selection and the 
perceptual units that the human nervous and cognitive systems are tuned to.   
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Feature Integration theory   
Treisman and Gelade’s (1980) highly influential Feature Integration Theory 
(FIT) represents one of the earliest attempts to describe the selection mechanisms 
involved in visual search and the perceptual units that guide visual processing. FIT is 
conceptually similar to earlier two-stage models of visual processing, specifically, 
Broadbent’s (1958) filter theory and Neisser's (1967) proposed division of visual 
processing into pre-attentive and attentive stages. According to FIT the visual 
features of a scene such as orientation, colour and spatial frequency are extracted 
automatically without the need for serial scrutiny (attention) and are represented 
along separate spatially organized feature maps. Focused attention is then used to 
serially scan across feature maps and integrate features that share common spatial 
coordinates. That is, attention serves as the binding agent to integrate initially 
separate features to form single objects. The serial nature of this second feature 
binding stage contributes to our inability to perceive in detail an entire scene at once.     
Much of the support for FIT has come from visual search experiments which 
have been used as a tractable adaptation of the real world problem of searching 
through cluttered environments. The typical visual search experiment involves 
searching for a target, such as a red ‘T’, embedded amongst an array of non-targets, 
such as green ‘T’s, and making a judgment about the target’s presence or absence, 
or its features. What is typically found in these experiments is that search 
performance – generally measured using response time (RT) and or response 
accuracy – varies systematically with the nature of the search stimuli. For example, 
when the target is defined by a single feature and embedded amongst an array of 
homogenous non-targets (pop-out search), such as the example above, subjectively, 
the target can appear to ‘pop out’ of the display and search performance is generally 
found to be independent of the number of non-targets in the search array (set size) 
(Treisman, 1982; Treisman & Gelade, 1980). In contrast, if the target is defined as a 
conjunction of features (conjunction search), such as a red ‘T’ amongst and array of 
green ‘T’s and red ‘L’s, search performance has been shown to vary as a function of 
set size; as the set size increases search performance tends to decrease, and often 
linearly (Wolfe, 1994). Such a relationship between search performance and search 
mode is consistent with the central idea of FIT – that elementary features are 
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encoded in parallel and used to guide selection, while the integration of features 
represents a higher-order computation requiring a serial attentive process.  
However, despite the ability of this relatively simple two-stage model of early 
visual processing to account for a number of effects reported in the visual search 
literature and beyond (see Treisman & Schmidt, 1982 on illusory conjunctions) the 
strict dichotomy that FIT proposes between parallel and serial search for single 
features and conjunctions, respectively, has been challenged by a number of studies 
demonstrating seemingly parallel processing of conjunctions (e.g., Cohen & Ivry, 
1991; Egeth, Virzi & Garbart, 1984; Kaptein, Theeuwes & van der Heijden, 1995; 
Mcleod, Drive & Crisp, 1988; ) as well as other higher order properties of shapes and 
surfaces (e.g., Davis & Driver, 1994; He & Nakayama, 1992). Critically though, 
Wolfe, Cave and Franzel (1989) also noted that FIT allows for minimal influence of 
the parallel stage on the subsequent serial stage of processing. If the parallel stage 
fails to derive the target location on the basis of a single feature then the serial stage 
must scrutinize the output of each feature map to locate possible targets. That is, 
search proceeds in an unguided fashion. However, a number of studies have 
demonstrated that information accrued during parallel processing can be used to 
guide the serial mechanism (Bundesen & Pedersen, 1983; Egeth et al., 1984; 
Farmer & Taylor, 1980; Kaptein et al., 1995). For example, Egeth et al. (1984) found 
that when searching for a red ‘O’ amongst red ‘N’s and black ‘O’s, participants who 
attended to red performed the search more efficiently than participants who were told 
to attended to ‘O’, demonstrating that attending to a specific feature (red) could 
restrict search to items containing the relevant feature. Finally, attention has been 
shown to affect the perception of simple features, casting doubt on the notion that 
attention is not involved at the early stage of feature registration (Prinzmetal, Presti, 
& Posner, 1986).  
Guided Search   
It is a testament to the influence of FIT that many of the subsequent and 
current theories of visual search have retained a number of its key insights, namely 
the separate coding of different feature domains and the serial selection mechanism 
that integrates over the output of early parallel processes. One of the most 
successful derivatives of FIT is Wolfe et al.’s (1989) Guided Search (GS) model of 
visual search. Since its inception the theory has undergone a number of revisions 
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(see Wolfe, 2007), though at its core the theory has remained relatively unchanged. 
Similar in its structure to FIT and other two-stage models of visual processing 
(Neisser's, 1967; Hoffman, 1979), GS proposes that visual input is initially coded in 
parallel by the visual system then fed through to object recognition centres of the 
brain via a mandatory selection bottleneck. Access to the selection bottleneck is 
governed by selective attention (Wolfe, 2007). At the core of GS models (1.0 to 4.0) 
though is the notion that the output of early parallel processes can be used to guide 
the selective attention mechanism. For example, if the target is a red ‘O’ amongst 
red ‘N’s and black ‘O’s, then selective attention can be tuned to the output of early 
colour processes and guided, in this instance, to the red stimuli in the display (Egeth 
et al. 1984). That is, GS was the first model of visual search to describe explicitly 
how top-down processes that prioritize visual input according to the goals or 
intentions of an observer and bottom-up factors such as stimulus salience, or feature 
contrast interact to guide visual attention (see also, Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Itti 
& Koch, 2000; Treisman & Sato, 1990); processes that were earlier identified by 
Posner (1980).  
More specifically, GS proposes that the output from early visual processes is 
filtered through coarse categorical channels and represented along spatially 
organized feature specific maps. Top-down selectivity works by tuning attention 
toward a particular channel (e.g., red or horizontal) and modifying its gain. The 
activation along specific feature maps reflects a weighted sum of the bottom-up 
signal and any top-down activity through the channels plus some noise (Wolfe, 
2007). The guidance signal is derived from integrating over all feature maps to form 
an overall saliency map, otherwise referred to as the “activation map”. The selection 
mechanism is then guided serially to the highest peak activations along the saliency 
map and selects input for processing through the bottleneck. Whether these peak 
activations correspond to highly salient inputs (e.g., a rose in a bed of weeds) or 
features that match the goals of the observer (e.g., your blue sweater amongst a 
rainbow of different coloured garments) depends on the weights applied to the 
respective channels. In the latest iteration of the GS, GS4, the weights are 
constrained to values between zero and one, such that a weight of one for a given 
feature or dimension means that all others will have a weight of zero. A bottom-up 
weight of zero is the formal version of the claim that salient but irrelevant stimuli do 
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not determine attentional selection independent of top-down processes. Although GS 
does not actually allow the bottom-up weight to be set to zero, it remains a topic of 
debate as to whether or not stimuli can capture attention involuntarily by virtue of 
their saliency alone. In the next section I will examine and summarize the existing 
literature concerning this debate.  
 
Attentional Control 
Although not all models of visual search adhere to the two-stage architecture 
found in models such as FIT (Treisman & Gelade, 1980) and GS (Cave & Wolfe, 
1990; Wolfe, 1994, Wolfe 2007) (see Duncan & Humphreys, 1989), most theories of 
visual search model visual selection as an interaction between bottom-up factors, 
namely stimulus salience or local feature contrast, and top-down processes that 
prioritize inputs in accordance with the goals or intentions of the observer (Cave & 
Wolfe, 1990; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Itti & Koch, 2000; Treisman & Sato, 
1990). However, the extent to which either of these factors predominates over 
attentional selection has been widely debated.  
It is generally well accepted that visual selective attention can be shifted to 
locations in space while keeping the eyes fixated (Hoffman, 1975; Posner, 1980). 
This ability to prioritize input on the basis of spatial information is referred to as 
spatial attention and reflects the enhancement of performance for signals presented 
at a restricted region in space at the expense of other locations (Posner, 1980). Most 
theories of visual attention recognize that the deployment of spatial attention across 
the visual field can be controlled in one of two ways, either endogenously – 
voluntarily and in accordance with the immediate goals of an observer – or 
exogenously – involuntarily and in response to stimuli in the environment that may 
be of potential importance, though not necessarily related to ongoing tasks.  
Support for the endogenous control of spatial attention comes from spatial 
cueing experiments demonstrating improved search performance when observers 
are given information about the location of an upcoming target or stimulus (Carrasco, 
Ling, & Read, 2004; Erikson & Hoffman, 1973; Posner, 1980; Posner, Snyder, & 
Davidson, 1980; Remington, 1980; Remington, Johnston, & Yantis, 1992). For 
example, Posner et al. (1980) showed that observers were faster to detect the 
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presence of a stimulus when they were cued correctly (80% valid) in advance to its 
likely location by a centrally presented arrow relative to when they were cued away 
from the location of the target. A similar pattern of results was observed when a task 
was to report the location (above or below fixation) of the stimulus. These results are 
consistent with the idea that the locus of visual attention can be shifted in a top-down 
fashion in accordance with the intentions of the observer and can result in enhanced 
signal processing at the attended location.  
Posner et al. (1980) also demonstrated that a peripheral cue with no 
predictive value as to the target location could attract spatial attention when it was 
presented briefly and prior to the target presentation (see also, Jonides, 1981; 
Yantis, 1993; Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994; Yantis & Jonides 1988; Yantis & Jonides 
1990; Theeuwes, 1991). In this case, responses to the target were impaired when a 
luminance onset appeared at a location that did not correspond with the subsequent 
target and were facilitated when the onset occurred at the same location as the 
subsequent target. This result demonstrates that spatial attention can also be shifted 
in an involuntary manner to visual stimuli in the environment. A question that has 
intrigued those interested in the structure and functionality of attentional selection 
processes is what happens when the demands of these two control mechanisms 
conflict?  
Yantis and Jonides (1990) showed that when participants had accurate 
information about the location of an upcoming target, a peripheral luminance change, 
which otherwise was found to interfere with search (slow RTs), had no effect on 
search performance (see also Theeuwes, 1991; see though Christ & Abrams, 2006). 
However, the effect was abolished when the information given to participants about 
the target location was probabilistic rather than certain (Muller & Rabbitt, 1989; 
Yantis & Jonides, 1990). These results represent an example of how top-down 
information can negate the influence of bottom-up processes on attentional 
selection.  Although there is general agreement that the efficiency of early selection 
is enhanced by spatial information about a stimulus, there is less agreement 
regarding the extent to which the visual system can take advantage of non-spatial 
information about a stimulus to enhance selection efficiency. More specifically, there 
has been considerable debate regarding the extent to which exogenous shifts of 
attention are modulated by top-down processes that reflect the goals and intentions 
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of an observer (e.g., looking for ‘red’). Indeed, implicit in most models of the visual 
attention - if not stated explicitly - is the notion that highly salient and irrelevant 
stimuli can guide selection (Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Itti & Koch, 2000; 
Theeuwes, 2007; Wolfe, 1994), however, the conditions under which this can be the 
case have been debated. Resolving this issue is central to understanding how visual 
input is treated by early visual processes prior to attentional selection. 
The ability of a non-predictive cue to attract spatial attention in the absence of 
reliable target location information has been interpreted by some as evidence that 
exogenous cueing reflects a bottom-up process that occurs automatically and largely 
independent of top-down processes (Theeuwes, 1991, 1992; Yantis & Jonides 
1988). Such an interpretation is consistent with models of visual attention which 
propose that early selection is determined by the initial feed-forward sweep of 
information through the visual system, where only saliency information (e.g., feature 
contrast) is extracted and represented along a saliency map. Top-down processes 
are modelled as re-entrant signals that modulate inputs only after saliency 
information has been extracted from a scene and used to guide early visual 
processes (Itti & Koch, 2000; Theeuwes 1991; 2007). Proponents of bottom-up 
models of visual attention have traditionally cited two key observations to support the 
claim that early selection is governed by saliency-based mechanisms: The first is the 
observation that targets that are sufficiently dissimilar from their non-targets (e.g., 
have a high feature contrast) can appear to ‘pop-out’ of the display and produce 
efficient search (Treisman, 1985; Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Gormican, 
1988; Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Wolfe, 1994). As Yantis and Egeth (1999) and 
others have pointed out though (see also Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992; 
Yantis, 1996), efficient search for salient targets (i.e., feature singletons) does not 
necessarily imply that salient items guide attention automatically and in a stimulus-
driven fashion. When an item or feature is task relevant (i.e., relates to or defines the 
target) then it is likely that any resulting attentional effects elicited by the target are, 
at least in part, related to top-down or task driven processes. To warrant the 
conclusion that salient items capture attention automatically, they must do so in a 
way that is independent of the task demands (Yantis & Egeth, 1999). 
This criticism is thought to be addressed by the second observation that 
salient distractors can interfere with search performance even when they are 
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seemingly unrelated to the immediate task at hand (e.g., colour singletons: 
Theeuwes, 1991, 1992; 1994, 2004; abrupt onsets: Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Yantis & 
Jonides 1984; Yantis & Jonides 1990; Lamy & Egeth, 2003; Theeuwes, Kramer, 
Hahn, & Irwin, 1998; Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, Irwin & Zelinsky, 1999; motion 
onset: Abrams & Christ, 2006; new objects: Hillstrom & Yantis, 1994). For example, 
Theewues (1992) showed that when searching for a shape amongst a circular array 
of homogenous non-targets, response times (RTs) were elevated by a colour 
singleton presented on 50% of trials. The same was not true when the roles of the 
colour and shape singletons were reversed (i.e., a colour singleton target and a 
shape singleton distractor). Theeuwes (1992) reasoned that this asymmetric result 
pattern reflects the perceptual experience of pop-out for colour singletons that is 
attenuated for form singletons and concluded that selection primarily depends on the 
bottom-up activations produced by feature contrast, irrespective of whether the input 
relates to the target or an irrelevant distractor.  
In contrast to bottom-up models of visual attention are top-down models that 
place a degree of emphasis on the task demands and the intentions of the observer 
in determining attentional guidance (Ansorge & Heumann, 2003; Becker, 2010; 
Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Folk & Remington, 1998; Folk et al., 1992; Treisman & 
Sato, 1990; Wolfe, 1994, 2007). Top-down models of visual attention propose that 
the selection mechanism can be tuned in a top-down manner to specific non-spatial 
properties of a stimulus (e.g., ‘red’ or ‘bright’) biasing the selection mechanism 
toward stimuli that possess task relevant features (see earlier discussion of Wolfe’s 
Guided Search model). Proponents of top-down models point to the observation that 
irrelevant distractors appear to capture attention to the extent that they resemble the 
target (Ansorge & Heumann, 2003; Becker, Ansorge, & Horstmann, 2009; Eimer, 
Kiss, Press & Sauter, 2009; Folk et al., 1992; Folk & Remington, 1998; Folk, 
Remington & Wright, 1994; Ludwig & Gilchrist, 2002, 2003). For example, Folk & 
Remington (1998) found that a non-predictive colour singleton presented prior to the 
target in a spatial cueing paradigm had a differential effect on search performance 
depending on its featural relationship with the target. When the colour singleton 
matched the colour of the search target (e.g., both were red) search performance 
was found to vary as a function of the location of the colour singleton; when the 
colour singleton occurred at the same location as the target RTs were short relative 
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to when it occurred at a non-target location. The same relationship between search 
performance and cue location was not observed when the colour singleton was not 
the same colour as the search target (e.g., red target, green colour singleton). This 
similarity effect suggest that top-down processes can be tuned toward non-spatial 
properties of a stimulus and the ability to do so can have an effect on the efficiency 
of visual selection.  
One of the more influential top-down accounts is the contingent capture 
hypothesis proposed by Folk and colleagues (Folk et al., 1992; Folk & Remington, 
1998). According to contingent capture, guidance is determined by the configuration 
of task-driven selection mechanisms that select stimuli according to the task 
demands. Salient stimuli are predicted to capture attention only to the extent that 
they match the ‘attentional control settings’ of the observer. Salient features that do 
not share task defining properties with the target can be ignored, even when they are 
highly salient. For example, Folk et al. (1992) showed that an abrupt onset presented 
immediately prior to the target in a spatial cueing paradigm had a differential effect 
on performance according to the target of search. When the task was to search for a 
colour singleton, only matching-colour distractors affected search performance; 
abrupt onsets did not capture attention. These results support the notion of a feature-
specific attentional system that guides attention in accordance with the goals of the 
observers. 
How then do we reconcile this similarity effect with bottom-up models of visual 
attention that cite interference from task irrelevant salient items as evidence for a 
saliency based guidance mechanism?  Proponents of top-down models have 
suggested that reports of saliency-based guidance may be the result of search 
strategies that inadvertently render distractors task relevant (Bacon & Egeth, 1994; 
Wu & Remington, 2003). Indeed, using a similar experimental design to Theeuwes 
(1992), Bacon and Egeth (1994) found that an irrelevant distractor only interfered 
with search performance in conditions that encouraged participants to search for an 
odd-man out (any feature singleton) rather than a specific feature. Consistent with 
Theeuwes (1992), when the task was to search for a shape singleton (e.g., a square 
target amongst an array of circle non-targets) an irrelevant colour distractor 
presented on 50% of trials produced RT interference. However, when participants 
were forced to search for a specific shape (e.g., a square target amongst an array of 
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circles and diamonds) an irrelevant colour singleton did not produce RT interference. 
Bacon and Egeth (1994) argued that when the target of search is a singleton, 
participants adopt a ‘singleton search’ mode to find the target. In this mode any 
salient singleton will guide attention, explaining why they observed interference from 
the irrelevant colour singleton in this condition. The fact that the same interference 
was not observed when the target was not a singleton demonstrates that participants 
were able to tune attention in a top-down manner to the specific feature value of the 
target (see also Wu and Remington, 2003). 
Related to this point, Gibson and Kelsey (1998) have noted that other more 
subtle methodological incentives can lead to effects that resemble stimulus-driven 
guidance. Often in visual search experiments the appearance of the search array is 
signaled by a display-wide onset or colour change. Gibson and Kelsey (1998) have 
suggested that such signals can induce broad display-wide attentional sets that 
render otherwise irrelevant distractors task-relevant. Gibson and Kelsey (1998) 
demonstrated this by showing a contingency between display-wide visual features 
(i.e., features that signal the appearance of the search display) and the features that 
guide attention. When colour and onset were used to signal the appearance of a 
search array both task irrelevant colour and onset distractors affected search 
performance. However, when the search array was signaled only by onset, colour 
distractors had no effect on search performance (Gibson & Kelsey, 1998).  
Finally, claims of stimulus-driven capture are often based on the observation 
that the presence of an irrelevant distractor can produce a slowing of RTs. However, 
irrelevant salient distractors have been shown to produce RT interference without 
producing the pattern of spatial costs and benefits associated with capturing 
attention (Becker, 2007; Folk & Remington, 1998). Folk and Remington (1998) found 
that an irrelevant colour distractor produced RT costs (i.e., an elevation of baseline 
RT) despite not observing a spatial validity effect – an RT difference between valid 
and invalid presentations of a distractor – associated with the distractor. They 
attributed this general RT slowing to a filtering cost, a form of distraction that is 
distinct from orienting attention away from a target toward a distractor (see also 
Kahneman, Treisman, & Burkell, 1983). Thus, without demonstrating a clear spatially 
specific effect, such as a validity effect or saccades directed towards the distractor, it 
can be difficult to make a strong case for attentional capture. 
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In summary, though stimulus factors clearly play a role in determining visual 
selection, the claim that attentional guidance reflects a purely bottom-up process 
where inputs are prioritised, at least initially, on the basis of visual salience has 
proved difficult to validate experimentally. Conceptually, the position also seems 
problematic; given the dynamic nature of real-world environments an orienting 
system at the mercy of bottom-up processes seems poorly suited to executing goal 
directed behaviours. However, equally problematic is a system that prioritises only 
those inputs that are immediately relevant to the observer. Environments are often 
dynamic and occasionally unpredictable, and instances can arise where it becomes 
necessary to interrupt goal directed behaviours and prioritize signals that fall outside 
the scope of an observer’s task set. The observation that top-down processes can 
act to attenuate or even prevent distraction from irrelevant sources suggests the 
need for an interrupt system that guides visual attention to items and events of 
potential importance, independent of the immediate priorities of the observer. Many 
have argued that luminance transients serve this role (e.g., Yantis & Jonides 1990; 
Theeuwes et al., 1998; Abrams & Christ, 2006), though as I have discussed, in many 
instances these claims are disputed on methodological grounds (e.g., Bacon & 
Egeth, 1994; Gibson & Kelsey, 1998) and in other cases transients have been 
shown not to capture attention when the participant’s goal is to search for a feature 
value from another stimulus dimension (e.g., Folk et al, 1992). What then is the 
mechanism that reliably brings to our awareness stimuli and events that require rapid 
responding to but that may initially be task-irrelevant?  
 
Stimulus Novelty 
“A considerable number of writers have expressed, and more or less fully developed, 
the view that what is heterogeneous, in some respect or another, with the 
simultaneous or the more immediate foregoing contents of consciousness, with 
previous experience in general, or with expectation, attracts or holds attention” ~ 
Wilcocks, R. W. (1928) 
The typical visual search experiment requires participants to complete 
hundreds of search trials in one experimental session. Performance indices such as 
RT and accuracy scores that are used to compare behaviour across experimental 
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conditions are generally computed by averaging performance across a large number 
these experimental trials. Basing an estimate of performance on multiple 
observations has its obvious benefits, however as Gibson and Jiang (1998) have 
pointed out, you can lose sensitivity to effects that may vary as a function of time or 
presentation number. It is also true that over the course of a typical visual search 
experiment stimuli are presented repeatedly and frequently, and often with a degree 
of predictability. Gibson and Jiang (1998) suggested that task related expectations 
may contribute to the control of exogenous attention and that failures to observer 
saliency based effects in the past might be related to the rapid habituation of 
orienting processes to salient stimuli across multiple presentations.  
Indeed, the view that the human perceptual system has an appetite for the 
unexpected and novel dates back to the early psychological literature and even 
before (Darwin, 1872/1965; Descartes, 1649/1984; Wilcocks, 1928) and is 
expressed by models of perception and cognition that emphasize the role played by 
expectations in determining our conscious percept of the world (Horstmann, 2005; 
Meyer, Niepel, Rudolph & Schűtzwohl, 1991; Sokolov, 1963). One of the earliest 
theoretical accounts of human orienting behaviour was proposed by Sokolov (1963) 
who described the behaviour as a reflex that is triggered by objects and events in the 
world that violate a set of contextually specific expectations labeled the neuronal 
model. According to Sokolov (1963) a stimulus or event will continue to capture 
attention and demand the resources of the perceptual system until the neuronal 
model is updated – a process that occurs over repeated exposure to a novel input. 
Whether it is accurate to describe attentional orienting as a reflex is perhaps 
debatable, however, the broader notion of an orienting mechanism that directs 
processing resources toward stimuli that do not ‘fit’ with some internal predictive 
model of the world, whether this be nervous or otherwise, is also central to many 
schematic theories of cognition and perception (Neisser, 1976; Rumelhart, 1984; 
Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986; Meyer, Niepel, Rudolph & 
Schűtzwohl, 1991).  
Models of perception and cognition that emphasize the role of expectation 
and prediction in attentional selection and conscious perception are supported by the 
observation that unexpected stimuli evoke distinct patterns of neural activity 
(Asplund, Todd, Snyder, Gilbert & Marois, 2010; Heslenfeld, 2003; Näätänen, 1992 
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Yamaguchi, Hale, D’Esposito & Knight, 2004; for a review, see Ranganath & Rainer, 
2003) and are associated with numerous perceptual and behavioural phenomena 
(Czigler, Weisz & Winkler, 2006; Horstmann 2005; Meyer, Niepel, Rudolph & 
Schűtzwohl, 1991). For example, within the auditory domain, the presentation of an 
infrequent and physically deviant (oddball) auditory stimulus in a sequence of 
otherwise homogeneous stimuli has been found to evoke an early negative going 
event related potential (ERP) in the electro-encephalogram (EEG) which coincides 
with increased memory recall for the oddball stimulus (Näätänen, 1992, 1995). This 
negative component is referred to as the mismatch negativity (MMN) and is thought 
to reflect a neural mismatch processes that contributes to shifting attention to salient 
changes in the environment (Näätänen, Paavilainen, Rinne, & Alho, 2007). Critically, 
the effect arises independent of whether an observer is attending to the audio stream 
containing the deviant stimulus or not (Näätänen et al., 1993).  
An analogous ERP component has been observed in the visual modality in 
response to visual oddballs (Alho et al., 1992; Tales et al., 1999; Czigler, Balazs, & 
Pato, 2004; for a review see: Pazo-Alvarez et al., 2003), and visual oddballs have 
been found to induce robust dilations in time perception (Pariyadath & Egleman, 
2007; Tse et al., 2004; Schindel, Rowlands, & Arnold, 2011). For example, Tse et al., 
(2004) showed that an infrequent red disk presented in an otherwise homogenous 
sequence of black disks was perceived by observers to be presented for longer than 
its objective presentation duration. Tse et al., (2004) labelled this effect time’s 
subjective expansion (TSE) and have attributed it to the engagement of attentional 
processes with the oddball that influence the amount of perceptual information 
processed per unit time. 
Within the visual search literature unexpected stimuli have been associated 
with increased memory recall (Meyer et al., 1991; Niepel et al., 1994; Meyer, 
Reisenzein & Schűtzwohl, 1997; Schűtzwohl, 1998), behavioural interference 
(Asplund, Todd, Snyder, Gilbert & Marois, 2010; Geyer, Muller, & Krummenacher, 
2008; Horstmann, 2005; Neo & Chua, 2006; Schűtzwohl, 1998) and increases in 
discrimination accuracy when an unexpected stimulus coincides with the target 
location (Horstmann, 2002, 2005, 2006). Taken together, these results are 
consistent with the notion of a selection mechanism that is sensitive in some 
capacity to unexpected and novel stimuli. The vast majority of studies that have 
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demonstrated attention shifts to unexpected items have done so during inefficient, 
serial search (e.g., search for the letter H or U among heterogeneous non-target 
letters, S, E, F, P, L; Horstmann, 2005). Hence, it is currently unknown whether 
attentional capture by novel, unexpected stimuli would still dominate visual selection 
when we are engaged in ‘guided search’ (e.g., searching for a red stimulus), and the 
target competes for attention with the novel object. 
Interestingly, Neo and Chuo (2006) showed that an infrequently presented 
onset distractor can interfere with search even when participants know in advance 
where the search target will appear. Using a spatial cuing paradigm, Neo and Chua 
(2006) had participants report the identity of a target (E or U) that appeared at a pre-
specified location in the search array. Prior to the target onset an onset distractor 
could appear at a non-target location on either 75% of trials or just 19% of trials. 
When the onset distractor was frequent (75% condition) they replicated the results of 
Yantis and Jonides (1990) by showing that the onset distractor did not slow RTs 
when participants knew with certainty the location of the target. However, when the 
distractor was infrequent (19% condition) RTs on the distractors trials were 
significantly elevated relative to the no distractor trials. This result is important 
because it demonstrates that presentation frequency can influence search efficiency 
even when participants are able to shift spatial attention in advance to the location of 
the target; whether this is also true when observers have a top-down set for non-
spatial features (e.g., red) is not known. That is, can an attentional set for a specific 
feature prevent distraction from a salient task-irrelevant but unexpected stimulus or 
do unexpected events represent a true form of saliency based capture that occurs 
independent of top-down processes?  
Determining the answer to this question has important consequences for 
models of visual selection that seek to explain how we are able to ignore much of the 
irrelevant information that presents to the visual system while simultaneously guiding 
the selection mechanism to task relevant input. In Chapter 2 I focus on establishing 
that indeed unexpected and salient task-irrelevant distractors can guide visual 
attention independent of an observer’s goals or intentions. In Chapters 3 and 4 I 
present work that is focused on revealing the mechanism by which we come to be to 
be sensitive to unexpected events in the world. My results are discussed in the 
context of contemporary models of visual attention.
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2 - An Effective Attentional Set for a 
Specific Colour Does Not Prevent Capture by 
Infrequently Presented Motion Distractors
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Summary 
In Chapter 2, I investigate the extent to which task-expectancies can modulate 
attentional capture and the role of top-down control in this process. Several studies 
have demonstrated that unexpected salient stimuli can draw attention involuntarily 
and that this form of capture is distinct from purely stimulus driven capture. Yet, the 
extent to which top-down control can modulate capture by this class of stimulus 
remains unclear. What follows is a series of experiments that test whether an 
attentional set for a specific colour can prevent capture by an infrequently presented 
motion distractor. 
 
Abstract  
An organism’s survival depends on the ability to rapidly orient attention to 
unanticipated events in the world. Yet, the conditions needed to elicit such 
involuntary capture remain in doubt. Especially puzzling are spatial cueing 
experiments, which have consistently shown that involuntary shifts of attention to 
highly salient distractors are not determined by stimulus properties, but instead are 
contingent on attentional control settings induced by task demands. Do we always 
need to be set for an event to be captured by it, or is there a class of events that 
draw attention involuntary even when unconnected to task goals? Recent results 
suggest that a task-irrelevant event will capture attention on first presentation, 
suggesting that salient stimuli that violate contextual expectations might 
automatically capture attention. Here, we investigated the role of contextual 
expectation by examining if an irrelevant motion cue that was presented only rarely 
(~3-6% of trials) would capture attention when observers had an active set for a 
specific target colour. The motion cue had no effect when presented frequently, but 
when rare produced a pattern of interference consistent with attentional capture. The 
critical dependence on the frequency with which the irrelevant motion singleton was 
presented is consistent with early theories of involuntary orienting to novel stimuli 
(Sokolov, 1963). We suggest that attention will be captured by salient stimuli that 
violate expectations, whereas top-down goals appear to modulate capture by stimuli 
that broadly conform to contextual expectations. 
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Lower layers of our visual system receive far more stimulation from the external 
world than is possible for our cognitive system to fully process. To compensate, 
mechanisms of selective attention allow us to focus cognitive processing on a small 
number of events or objects in the world. As a result, our conscious awareness 
consists primarily of those objects and events to which we have attended, and 
attended objects come to have a much greater force in determining our behaviour 
than do unattended items. It is not surprising then that psychologists have devoted 
much effort to understand how attention is controlled and what determines the 
events in the visual world to which we orient and attend. 
 Modern theories of attention recognise two forms of attentional control: 
endogenous control that allows us to voluntarily direct our attention to task-relevant 
objects and events, and exogenous control that directs attention involuntarily toward 
objects and events of possible importance that are not necessarily related to the 
ongoing task (Posner, 1980; Remington, Johnston, & Yantis, 1992; Theeuwes, 1991; 
Yantis & Jonides, 1984, 1990). The control mechanisms by which attention is 
involuntarily directed to objects and events have been the topic of much debate, 
particularly the degree to which involuntary orienting (attentional capture) can be 
modulated by top-down mechanisms (Yantis, 1993). Theories positing stimulus-
driven (bottom-up) attentional capture argue that salient stimuli can automatically 
draw attention to their corresponding locations, in virtue of their bottom-up saliency 
and independent of the goals and intentions of the observers (Theeuwes, 1992; 
1994; 2004; Theeuwes & Burger, 1998). Any modulation of attention by top-down 
mechanisms is presumed to occur late in processing, after attention has been shifted 
towards a stimulus (“de-allocation hypothesis”; see Belopolsky, Schreij & Theeuwes, 
2010; van Zoest, Donk, & Theeuwes, 2004). In contrast, theories positing top-down 
modulation of attentional capture, such as contingent attentional capture (Folk, 
Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994), posit that 
involuntary attention shifts are contingent on the task demands and the goals of the 
observer. A salient, task-irrelevant item ("distractor") is presumed to capture 
attention only when it shares the task-relevant feature(s) of the search target. For 
example, Folk et al. (1992) showed that when the target was defined by an abrupt-
onset, an abrupt-onset cue but not a salient colour cue captured attention. In 
contrast, in search for a colour target, only a colour cue with the same colour as the 
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target but not an abrupt-onset cue captured attention. Subsequent studies showed 
that a red cue captured attention when observers were searching for a red target, but 
not when they searched for a green target, and vice versa for the green cue (Folk & 
Remington, 1998; see also Ansorge & Heumann, 2003), indicating that attention can 
be set for specific feature values within a stimulus dimension. Capture contingent on 
task goals has been found for eye movements (e.g., Becker, Ansorge & Horstmann, 
2009; Ludwig & Gilchrist, 2002; Wu & Remington, 2003) and EEG (e.g., Eimer, Kiss, 
Press & Sauter, 2009; Lien, Ruthruff, Goodin, & Remington, 2008; Wykowska & 
Schuboe, 2009). Further support for the role of top-down goals comes from evidence 
that target-similar distractors are more effective in capturing attention than target-
dissimilar distractors across a range of different stimulus dimensions (e.g., size: 
Becker, 2010; onsets: Ludwig & Gilchrist, 2002). 
Evidence for bottom-up saliency capture.  
The evidence for top-down modulation of capture raises the question of how 
we become aware of events that are not tightly bound to ongoing task goals. The 
need for an interrupt system to protect us against predation, at the very least, 
suggests that some property of external events should be capable of triggering a 
purely stimulus-driven shift of attention. Such a claim has been made for stimuli 
presented with an abrupt luminance onset (Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Ludwig & 
Gilchrist, 2002; Yantis & Jonides 1984; Yantis & Jonides 1990; Lamy & Egeth, 2003; 
Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, & Irwin, 1998; Theeuwes, Kramer, Hahn, Irwin & Zelinsky, 
1999), for the presentation of a new object (Hillstrom & Yantis, 1994), for motion 
onset (Abrams & Christ, 2003; Pratt, Radulescu, Guo, & Abrams, 2010), and for 
stimuli that have a high feature contrast in other dimensions, such as colour 
(Theeuwes, 1991, 1992; Itti & Koch, 2000). However, the evidence for stimulus-
driven capture by all of these has been disputed.   
Capture is often inferred when the presence of an irrelevant distractor results 
in elevated visual search times compared to no-distractor studies. It has been shown 
that such increases can be associated with a broadly defined target template that 
included the distractor attributes and can be eliminated when care is taken to insure 
a precise feature set (see Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Wu & Remington, 2003). For 
example, Bacon and Egeth (1994) found that irrelevant colour singletons only 
interfered in a visual search paradigm when the task encouraged a strategy of 
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searching for a singleton. When the task required that observers search for a specific 
feature (form), irrelevant colour singletons no longer interfered with search 
performance. Similarly, Wu and Remington, (2003) found that erroneous eye 
movements to an irrelevant distractor ('oculomotor capture') in visual search are 
largely contingent on the task demands and the attributes of the search target. When 
the goal was to saccade to a colour singleton in the display, an irrelevant onset 
distractor produced oculomotor capture. However, when the task required 
participants to search for a specific feature (colour), oculomotor capture by the same 
irrelevant onset was significantly attenuated.  
In addition to such strategic biases that arise from explicit task demands, 
search performance can also be influenced by more subtle incentives of the method 
that can go unnoticed. Gibson and Kelsey (1998) demonstrated that apparent 
stimulus-driven effects in visual search paradigms can be explained by a match 
between the visual characteristics of distractors and display-wide attentional settings. 
They argued that the onset of the visual search display can serve as a trigger to 
begin searching and thus, induce an attentional set for onsets. Indeed, Gibson and 
Kelsey (1998) found that onset distractors could capture attention when the search 
display was abruptly onset, but not otherwise. 
  Interference by task-irrelevant distractors in visual search has also been 
shown to arise from general, non-spatial forms interference without eliciting an 
attention shift to its location ('filtering hypothesis'; e.g., Folk & Remington, 1998; see 
also Becker, 2007). Critically, these studies identify an issue with inferring attentional 
capture solely from a general slowing of response times to the presence of a task-
irrelevant distractor.  The possibility of non-spatial interference not associated with 
attention highlights the need for a measure that more clearly reflects the spatial locus 
of attention. In spatial cueing studies, for example, cues that cause a spatial 
reallocation of attention will lead to faster response times in conditions in which the 
cue occurs at the subsequent location of the target (valid) compared to those that 
occur at a non-target location (invalid).  
Novelty and unexpected stimuli. 
A characteristic of virtually all disputed findings is that distractors, like targets 
and non-targets occurred regularly and could be said to conform to contextual 
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expectations. That is, even though distractors do not occur on every trial, nor is their 
location predictable, they occur frequently enough to be part of the contextual 
expectancies of the sequence of events. This raises the possibility that top-down 
control might be restricted to stimuli conforming to contextual expectancies and, 
correspondingly, that stimulus-driven capture may be a product of stimulus 
expectations, rather than its specific physical properties. The role of expectations, 
including the importance of novelty, is a central feature of the Orienting Reflex 
proposed by Sokolov (1963). The Orienting Reflex refers to a constellation of 
physiological and cognitive changes in response to novel stimuli whose appearance 
violates contextual expectations (Sokolov, 1963). According to the theory a stimulus 
will elicit a reflexive orienting response only when it generates a sufficient mismatch 
between the input from the environment and the established neuronal model or 
schema of that environment. Repeated exposure to a stimulus adjusts the neuronal 
model to incorporate the once-novel stimulus and it no longer causes reflexive 
orienting.  
The idea a neural model that ultimately governs orienting behaviour is 
consistent with the observation that novel and unexpected stimuli elicit distinct 
patterns neural activity (Asplund, Todd, Snyder, Gilbert & Marois, 2010; Friedman, 
Cycowicz & Gaeta, 2001; Heslenfeld, 2003; Näätänen, 1992 Yamaguchi, Hale, 
D’Esposito & Knight, 2004; for a review, see Polich, 2007; Ranganath & Rainer, 
2003). Specifically, the P300 - a positive going ERP component thought to reflect 
numerous brain processes associated with memory and attention – has a robust 
association with the detection of new or rare events/stimuli (Friedman, Cycowicz & 
Gaeta, 2001; Knight & Nakada, 1998; Polich, 2007). Often referred to as the P3 
novelty potential, it is thought to be a signature of neural processes involved in 
updating the contents of working memory following the detection of a new or 
unexpected stimulus. Furthermore, functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
and electrophysiology studies have mapped these signals to a distributed network in 
the brain which includes areas such as the hippocampus (Kiehl et al., 2001; Strange 
& Dolan, 2001; Yamaguchi et al., 2004), the temporal parietal junction (TPJ) 
(Asplund, Todd, Snyder & Marois, 2010; Halgren et al., 1995; Yamaguchi et al., 
2004) and select regions of the pre-frontal cortex (Asplund et al., 2010; Clark et al., 
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2000; Baudena, Halgren, Heit, & Clarke, 1995; Yamaguchi et al., 2004) - regions 
which are important for memory and learning (Ranganath & Rainer, 2003). 
One plausible inference from the Orienting Reflex is that contingent capture 
only extends to events within a given schema or set of task-expectancies. That is, 
our ability to ignore irrelevant salient distractors could depend on contextual 
expectations that describe the characteristics of distractors to be inhibited (e.g., 
Becker, 2007; Folk & Remington, 1998; Treisman & Sato, 1990). Support for this 
comes from a study by Horstmann (2005) who had observers search for the letter L 
or R in an array of 4 or 12 different letters. After familiarization trials, the target letter 
was unexpectedly presented in a different colour (e.g., red, among all-green items). 
Search times for these “changed” targets were very fast and independent of the 
number of non-targets (3 or 11), suggesting that the first presentation of an 
unexpected salient item attracted attention in the absence of any intentions to either 
attend to the item or ignore it. After repeated presentations of the unannounced 
stimulus, observers will quickly adapt their search strategy; viz. they will actively 
attend to the unannounced salient stimulus when it is predictive of the target 
location, and ignore it when it is not predictive (e.g., Horstmann & Becker, 2008). 
Horstmann (2005) accounted for the elevation of visual search times for the first 
occurrence of an unexpected stimulus by a new mechanism of surprise capture, 
distinct from capture by the salience or feature value of the new object. 
Further evidence for the ability of unexpected items to capture attention 
comes from spatial cueing experiments by Neo and Chua (2006) who examined 
whether irrelevant distractors would interfere with search when observers had prior 
knowledge of the target location. Participants reported the identity of a target letter (E 
or U) in a search display, the location of which was pre-specified by a central arrow 
cue. In separate blocks, an irrelevant onset distractor was presented either 
frequently (75%) or infrequently (~19%) 200 ms prior to the onset of the target. 
Performance on the letter identification task was impaired when the onset distractor 
was presented infrequently, but no effect of the distractor was observed when it was 
presented frequently. Neo and Chua (2006) argued that the onset distractor captured 
attention when it was presented infrequently because it was not integrated into the 
neuronal model or schema expectations. Though suggesting that unexpected stimuli 
can capture attention, these results are at odds with the findings of Yantis and Egeth 
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(1999) and Horstmann and Ansorge (2006) that rare singletons (20% and 4%, 
respectively) are attended when they are predictive of the target location, whereas 
singletons that are non-predictive are ignored. Moreover, the design used by Neo & 
Chua left open the possibility of display-wide settings for abrupt onsets, as subjects 
could not set for a specific property of the target, but could only monitor for the 
luminance change that signalled the presentation of the target display. Similarly, it is 
not entirely clear whether the onset distractor indeed captured attention, or whether it 
interfered in a spatially non-specific way with later processes, concerning, for 
example, target identification, or the response. 
An effect of distractor frequency has also been observed on the number of 
erroneous first saccades to distractors in visual search, referred to as oculomotor 
capture. Geyer et al. (2008) monitored observers’ fixation pattern as they searched 
for a shape singleton (diamond embedded amongst circle non-targets; see 
Theeuwes, 1991) in distractor and no-distractor conditions. The proportion of first 
saccades to a colour singleton distractor presented at a non-target location was 
greatest when the distractor was presented on 20% of the trials relative to conditions 
in which the same distractor was presented on 50% and 80% of trials. However, a 
consequence of varying the distractor presentation frequency in separate blocks was 
to also vary the percentage of trials in which the target was a singleton in each block. 
When the distractor was presented on 20% of trials, the target was a singleton on 
the remaining 80% of trials, and vice versa (see also Sayim, Grubert, Herzog, & 
Krummenacher, 2010). Therefore it is possible, if not probable, that observers’ task-
set varied across conditions, such that in the low frequency condition observers 
adopted a strategy to search for any singleton item (e.g., singleton detection mode; 
Bacon & Egeth, 1994) rather than to a feature-specific set, leading to capture by 
more salient colour distractor (e.g., Theeuwes, 1991).  
Aim of the present study. 
The studies of Horstmann (2005), Neo & Chua (2006), and Geyer et al. 
(2008) support the principle assumption of the Orienting Reflex of Sokolov (1963) 
that attention will be involuntarily captured by salient events that violate contextual 
expectations. However, to demonstrate that a stimulus attribute, even its novelty, is 
sufficient to produce stimulus-driven involuntary capture attention it is necessary to 
satisfy two conditions: 1) that attention is in fact reallocated to the location of the 
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stimulus; and, 2) that there are no incentives in the design that would have led 
subjects to adopt strategies for singletons or properties other than the desired set for 
the target feature. As discussed above, the existing demonstrations of the effects of 
infrequent distractors are open to criticism in failing to satisfy one or both of these 
two conditions. In particular, the Geyer et al. (2008) study, which does show spatial 
reallocation, leaves open the possibility of a singleton detection mode strategy.  
The aim of the present study was to examine the ability of unexpected events 
to involuntarily capture attention under conditions that satisfy both the requirement of 
spatial reallocation and the requirement that subjects are set for a specific feature 
property. To do this we used the modified spatial cueing paradigm of Folk et al. 
(1992), in which an irrelevant distractor ('cue') is presented prior to the target display. 
If the cue captures attention, response times (RTs) will be faster when the target is 
presented at the cued location (valid trials) than on when it is presented at a non-
cued location (invalid trials), as on valid trials attention will already be at the target 
location. This cueing effect is positive evidence that the cue has drawn attention to a 
specific spatial location. In our spatial cueing paradigm, participants searched for a 
red target embedded among three white non-targets and were instructed to ignore 
irrelevant red and green cues presented prior to the target frame. Cue location was 
independent of target location and, thus, uninformative as to target location. Previous 
studies have shown a cueing effect for red cues – faster RTs to valid than invalid red 
cues –when participants search for a red target, but not for green cues, evidence for 
contingent capture by target-matching red cues, but not by green cues (e.g., 
Ansorge & Heumann, 2003; Folk & Remington, 1998). An effect of cue validity to 
cues that match the target, but not those that do not, suggests an active set for the 
target property. If a corresponding pattern can be observed in the present study, we 
can infer that attention was biased to the target feature value (red), not to other 
attributes of the target or search display (e.g., singleton status or display-wide 
features; Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Gibson & Kelsey, 1998). By showing such an effect, 
we can ensure that any capture associated with infrequent cues takes place in the 
presence of an active set for the target property. 
To examine the effects of contextual expectations we included a motion cue 
that was presented frequently (Exp. 1) or infrequently (Exp. 2–5). The motion cue 
was created by rotating four white dots around a placeholder box in a clock-wise 
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fashion. Motion cues have been shown to capture attention in the spatial cueing 
paradigm when they are similar to the target but not when they were dissimilar to the 
target (e.g., Remington, Folk & McLean, 2001; Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994). In 
Experiment 1, we presented the red, green and motion cue equally often, on 1/3 of 
all trials. To examine contextual expectations subsequent experiments limited the 
presentation of the motion cue to a small fraction of trials. The underlying logic is that 
frequently presented motion cues would be incorporated into the general 
experimental context and thus not constitute a violation of expectations, whereas 
rarely observed motions cues would violate expectations. Involuntary capture by 
salient stimuli that violate contextual expectations predicts two important outcomes: 
1) a cueing effect for red, but not for green cues; and, 2) a cueing effect for 
infrequent motion cues, but not for frequently presented motion cues. 
 
Experiment 1 
Before a claim can be made about the role of stimulus novelty in driving shifts 
of spatial attention, it is necessary to establish that the same stimulus presented 
regularly does not capture attention. In Experiment 1 subjects responded to a red 
target in the search display. A cue frame preceding the target frame consisted of 
either a red, green or motion cue presented with three white non-cues at the other 
locations. According to contingent orienting (Folk & Remington, 1998) the red cue 
should capture attention, but not the others. This should be reflected in the presence 
of a cueing effect for red, but not for the green or motion cues (Folk et al., 1992, Folk 
et al., 1994).   
 
Method 
Participants 
Fifteen participants (9 female) aged 17 - 24 (M = 19.6, SD = 2.3) from the 
introductory psychology course at the University of Queensland participated for 
course credit.  All reported normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Apparatus  
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 Experiments 1 - 4 were conducted using the computer software package 
Presentation (Neurobehavioural Systems). Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch CRT 
monitor attached to a (Pentium 4) personal computer. Responses were recorded 
using a two-button mouse.  
Stimuli  
Each trial consisted of a fixation display, a cueing display and a target display. 
The fixation display was comprised of a central white fixation cross (0.4o x 0.4o) 
surrounded by four peripheral boxes (2.1o x 2.1o) with white borders positioned (3.3o) 
above, below, to the left and to the right of fixation. The cueing display was 
comprised of the same stimuli as the fixation display with the addition of four filled 
circles (0.4o) in a diamond configuration surrounding each location ('four-dot cue'; 
e.g., Folk et al., 1992). On every trial the four-dot cue was coloured either red (RGB 
= 255, 0, 0), green (RGB = 0, 255, 0) or rotated clockwise around the box to create 
the perception of motion. The motion cue consisted of a 90° rotation of the diamond 
in three 30 o clockwise increments at 40ms intervals (see Figure 1). The circles 
comprising the motion singleton were coloured white (RGB = 255, 255, 255). All 
stimuli were displayed on a black background (RGB = 0 0 0).   
The target display was comprised of the same stimuli as the fixation display 
with the addition of a tilted bar presented in each of the four peripheral boxes (see 
Figure 1). The bars were tilted either 45 o to the left or to the right and subtended 0.7o 
of visual angle vertically and 0.7o of visual angle horizontally. On every trial three of 
the titled bars were white while one, the target, was coloured red (RGB = 255, 0, 0). 
All stimuli were presented against a black (RGB = 0, 0, 0) background. 
Design  
Presentation of the cues (red, green and motion) was randomised across the 
experiment with each cue occurring an equal number of times. The location of the 
cue was not correlated with the location of the target. On valid trials (25%), the target 
and the cue were presented at the same location. On invalid trials (75%), they were 
presented in different locations. Participants were informed of the three cue types 
prior to commencing the experiment and instructed to do their best to ignore the 
stimuli in cueing frame as the cue was uncorrelated with the target location. The 
target and the cue occurred at each location equally often. The orientations of the 
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non-target tilted bars that appeared at the three non-target locations were 
randomized.  
 
 
   
Figure 1. A) Example trial sequence from Experiment 1. All cues were non-
predictive of the target location. B) Time-course of the motion cue. Each frame was 
presented for 40ms for a total duration of 160ms.  
 
Procedure  
Each trial began with the presentation of the fixation display for 500ms. 
Following this, the fixation cross offset for 50ms. Then the fixation display 
reappeared for a randomly determined interval of 500, 600, 700, 800 or 900ms. The 
500ms
500 - 900ms
160ms
50ms
50ms
100ms
0ms
40ms
80ms
120ms
30o
B.
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cueing display was then presented for 160 ms followed by the fixation display again 
for 100 ms and then the target display for 50ms. Following the target display the 
fixation display was presented and remained on screen until a response was made. 
Trials ended only when a response was registered. After each response participants 
were given feedback in the form of a tone. If the response was correct an 800 Hz 
tone sounded for 100ms followed by a 900 Hz tone for 100ms followed by 1000hmz 
for 100ms. Alternatively if the response was incorrect a 600 Hz tone sounded for 
150ms, followed by a 400 Hz tone for 150ms. The next trial began 1,000 ms after a 
response had been recorded 
 Prior to the experiment, participants were instructed to search for the red 
target bar and to respond to its orientation by pressing one of two response buttons 
(left tilted target: left mouse button; right tilted target: right mouse button). Moreover, 
participants were told that the cues were non-predictive of the target location and 
were instructed to ignore the cues. Participants were told to respond as quickly as 
possible whilst minimizing errors. It was emphasized that they should remain fixated 
on the central fixation cross during the entire trial and that eye movements would be 
detrimental to their performance.  
Participants completed 12 practice trials, followed by 384 experimental trials. 
The experiment was divided into four blocks of 96 trials and between blocks 
participants were given the opportunity to rest. See Figure 1 for an illustration of a 
trial.    
 
Results 
Mean RTs and error rates for Experiment 1 are shown in Figure 2 and Table 1 
respectively. RTs exceeding 1200ms and errors were excluded from the RT 
analysis. One participant was excluded from all analyses due to an unacceptably 
high average error rate of 19.8%. Across the remaining 14 subjects the exclusion 
criteria resulted in a loss of 3.8% of experimental trials. 
RT analysis 
A 2 (cue validity: valid, invalid) x 3 (cue type: red, green, motion) repeated 
measures ANOVA of RTs revealed a main effect of cue type, F(2, 13) = 5.52, p = 
.020, η2 = .48 as well as a main effect of cue validity, F(1, 13) = 73.33, p = < .001, η2 
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= .85. Both main effects were qualified by a two-way interaction between cue type 
and cue validity, F(2, 13) = 67.94, p < .001 η2 = .92. This interaction was due to the 
fact that the red (target matching) cue captured attention more strongly than green 
(target-non-matching) cue, F(1, 13) = 146.94, p < .001, η2 = .91, or motion cue, F(1, 
13) = 57.99, p < .001, η2 = .87. Importantly, a pairwise comparison revealed no 
cueing effect for motion cues, with the difference between RTs associated with valid 
and invalid motion cues failing to reach significance, t(13) = 1.59, p = .14. However, 
there was a small but significant cueing effect associated with the green cue, t(13) = 
4.48, p = .003, suggesting perhaps a broad set for colour on some trials (see, e.g., 
Folk & Anderson, 2010).  
 
 
Figure 2. Mean RT as a function of cue type and validity for Experiment 1. Error bars 
depict the standard error of the mean.   
 
Error analysis 
The results of an error analysis were consistent with the pattern of results 
observed for RTs. The same 2 x 3 ANOVA on error rates revealed a main effect cue 
validity, F(1, 13) = 27.40, p < .001,  η2 = .68, and a two-way interaction between cue 
type and cue validity, F(1, 13) = 6.52, p = .012, η2 = .52. Pairwise comparisons 
correcting for multiple comparisons revealed a significant validity effect for the red 
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cue, t(13) = 4.60, p < .001 though not the green cue, t(13) = 1.30, p = 0.44 and 
importantly, not the motion cue t(13) = 1.20, p = .25.  
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Percent of Errors in each of the conditions in Experiments 1 – 5. 
                                          Red Cue                               Green Cue                                 Motion 
Cue 
     Valid      Invalid      Valid        Invalid       Valid               Invalid 
Experiment 1 0.89 6.03 2.90 3.79 2.01 2.83 
Experiment 2 1.32 6.86 2.64 3.68 3.13 3.75 
Experiment 3 1.16 5.69 4.03 4.15 3.13 2.73 
Experiment 4 2.41 5.92 2.31 3.18 0.42 1.25 
Experiment 5  6.29 9.15 2.46 7.36 5.80 10.90 
 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 were consistent with contingent capture in 
showing a significant cueing effect for target-matching red cues, less for green cues, 
and no significant effect for motion cues (e.g., Folk et al., 1992; Folk et al., 1994). 
Similarly, as shown in Figure 2, the motion cue also did not produce elevated 
baseline RT that would be indicative of filtering costs or other forms of spatially non-
specific interference (e.g., Folk & Remington, 1998). The cueing effect for green is 
consistent with previous studies showing capture by target non-matching colours, 
which has been attributed to the adoption of a broader attentional set for the task-
relevant dimension on a proportion of trials (dimension-specific setting, e.g., Muller, 
Heller & Ziegler, 1995; Folk & Anderson, 2010). Nonetheless, the results clearly 
indicate that the motion cue produced no discernible evidence of capture.   
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Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 tested the role of contextual expectations by presenting the 
motion cue on only ~3% of all trials. To increase the likelihood that the motion cue 
would not be part of the contextual expectations, subjects were not informed about 
its occurrence. To provide the maximum opportunity to adapt to the validity of the 
infrequent motion cue, one group of participants was always presented with a valid 
motion cue while another group of participants was always presented with an invalid 
motion cue. Involuntary capture by stimuli violating contextual expectations would 
predict a cueing effect for the infrequent motion cues, but not for the green (non-
target colour) cues. Because motion-cue validity is between subjects we assessed 
two measures: the group difference for valid and invalid motion normalized for group 
differences in overall RT, and comparisons of valid and invalid motion cues with 
invalid non-target colour cues. If the infrequent motion cue captured attention, then 
RTs for invalid motion cues would be expected to be slower than those for invalid 
non-target colour cues while valid motion cues would be expected to be faster than 
invalid non-target colour cues.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 Forty-three participants (31 female) aged between 17 and 36 years (M = 20.4, 
SD = 2.3) were recruited from introductory psychology classes at the University of 
Queensland and received course credit for participation. None of them had 
participated in Experiment 1 and all participants reported normal or corrected to 
normal vision.  
Apparatus  
The apparatus and stimuli used in Experiment 2 were identical to those used 
in Experiment 1. 
Stimuli, Design and Procedure  
The stimuli, design and procedure of Experiment 2 were identical to 
Experiment 1, with the following exceptions: First, the motion cue was presented on 
only 8 trials (~3%), and second, the validity of the motion cue varied between 
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subjects. Participants completed twelve practice trials followed by nine blocks of 32 
trials. No motion cue was presented in the first block. In each of the subsequent 8 
blocks the motion cue occurred once with its position in the block determined 
randomly, with the limitation that it could not occur within five trials of the preceding 
motion cue. Across the experiment the motion singleton was presented twice at each 
location and replaced an equal number of red and green cues, that is, four red and 
four green. Participants were not informed of the motion cue prior to the experiment. 
All other aspects of the design and procedure were identical to Experiment 1. 
 
Results 
 Mean RTs for the valid-motion group are shown in Figure 3a, the invalid-
motion group in Figure 3b. Error rates are shown in Table 1. Response times 
exceeding 1200ms and errors were excluded from the RT analysis. A hard RT cut-off 
was chosen in favour of one based on standard deviations as we have good reason 
to suspect that RTs associated with the rare motion cue will cluster towards the top 
(slow) end of the RT distribution. Given the very small number motion cue 
presentations we want to avoid excluding these trials. Three participants’ data were 
excluded from all analyses due to unacceptably high average error rates of 18% or 
greater in one or multiple conditions. Across the remaining 20 subjects the exclusion 
criteria resulted in a loss of 4.7% of experimental trials.  
RT analysis 
Colour Cues 
A 2 (motion-cue group: valid motion, invalid motion) x 2 (cue type: red, green) 
x 2 (cue validity: valid, invalid) mixed model ANOVA (motion-cue group entered as a 
between-subjects factor) on mean RTs revealed a main effect of cue type, F(1, 39) = 
4.42, p < .042, partial η2 = .10 as well as a main effect of cue validity, F(1, 39) = 
164.00, p < .001, partial η2 = .81. There was no main effect of motion-cue group, nor 
were there any interactions with motion-cue group. As such, we collapsed across 
motion-cue group when computing planned follow up comparisons. Pair-wise 
comparisons revealed that validly cued targets were responded to faster than 
invalidly cued targets for both red cues, t(39) = 12.65, p < .001 and green cues t(39) 
= 6.59, p = .03. However this validity effect was significantly larger for the red cue 
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than for the green cue, as reflected by a two-way interaction between cue validity 
and cue type, F(1, 39) = 62.92, p < .001, η2 = .62. These results replicate the 
findings of Experiment 1 and indicate that participants largely adopted a feature-
specific setting in search for the red target (see Figures 3a & 3b).  
 
 
 
  
Figure 3. Mean RT as a function of cue type and validity for the valid-motion group 
(a.) and the invalid motion group (b.) in Experiment 2. Error bars depict the standard 
error of the mean.   
 
Motion Cue 
Figures 3a shows RTs on motion cue trials for subjects in the valid-motion 
group and Figure 3b the invalid-motion group. We asked two questions regarding the 
effect of the infrequent motion cue; first, whether RTs on trials with a motion cue 
differed from RTs associated with invalid non-target (green) colour cues, and, 
second, whether subjects with valid motion cues produced faster RTs than those 
with invalid motion cues. Unexpectedly, both valid and invalid motion cue RTs were 
significantly elevated relative to invalid-green RTs, t(19) = 2.50, p = .022 and t(19) = 
5.43, p < .001, respectively. Furthermore, there was no significant difference 
between valid and invalid motion cue RTs, t(38) = 0.72, p = .33 . 
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The elevation of RTs for the invalid rare motion cue is consistent with the 
hypothesis that novel events capture attention, however, elevated valid motion RTs 
and the failure to find a validity effect associated with the motion cues challenges the 
claim that the elevated RTs are due to the reallocation of attention to the location of 
the motion cue. In his treatment of “Surprise Capture”, Horstmann (2005) identifies 
the first presentation of a novel event as the trigger for Surprise and notes the 
habituation of surprise capture over presentations. It is possible, therefore, that the 
failure to find a validity effect for the rare motion cue arises because our results 
reflect two convolved effects, surprise and reallocation. In Figure 4 we plot the effect 
of each of the 8 presentations separately for the valid-motion and invalid-motion cue. 
Rather than depict raw RTs, we compensate for possible temporal effects (e.g., 
practice, fatigue) and baseline RT differences between the groups by computing the 
difference between the RT on motion cue trials and the mean of temporally nearby 
green cues. The green cues in this case serve as a proxy for a neutral baseline. For 
each participant we computed the motion effect by subtracting the average RT for 
(valid and invalid) green cue trials in the 32 trials prior to each presentation of the 
motion cue from its respective motion cue. That is, we normalised the motion cue 
RTs to the respective green cue (valid and invalid) RTs. An independent-samples t-
test revealed no difference between RTs associated with the first presentation of a 
valid and invalid motion cue, t(36) = .86, p = .40.  
Two further analyses were conducted to determine if a cueing effect emerged 
with repeated presentation of the motion cue as Figure 4 might suggest. First, we 
computed the average effect in Figure 4 separately for the first and second half of 
the experiment (presentations 1-4, and 5-8). An independent-samples t-test revealed 
a significant effect of cue validity for presentations 5-8, t(38) = 2.41, p = .021, but not 
for presentations 1-4, t(38) = .08, p = .94 . Second, we fit linear functions to the data 
in Figure 4 separately for the valid and invalid motion cue. Consistent with the split 
half analysis above, a linear trends analysis revealed a significant linear decrease of 
the normalised RT for valid motion cue trials, F(1, 16) = 15.83, p = .001, η2 = .511, 
but not for the invalid motion cue trials, F(1, 15) = 1.99, p = .18, η2 = .12.  
                                               
1
 We are not suggesting that the dissipation of RTs across presentations is necessarily linear. In fact, 
Figure 4 would suggest that there is a non-linear trend in the decline of the valid RTs that may be 
better characterized by an exponential or power function. This is also true of data presented in 
subsequent experiments (see Figures 8 & 11). However, our primarily interest was in identifying 
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Inspection of Figure 4 shows that the RT elevation on valid motion cue trials 
dropped to the level of performance seen with the green cue, whereas this was not 
the case with the invalid rare motion cue. A pairwise comparison between the last 
four occurrences of the invalid motion cue and the average RT to green cues (valid & 
invalid) from the second half of the experiment revealed a significant interference 
effect associated with the invalid motion cue, t(19) = 4.68, p < .001. These results 
indicate that the invalid rare motion cue continued to interfere with search throughout 
the experiment, whereas the valid motion cue showed substantial reduction in RT.  
  
Figure 4. The RT difference score reflects a comparison of motion cue RT to the RT 
average of valid and invalid green cue trials that preceded the presentation of a 
given motion cue trial. The results are depicted separately for valid and invalid 
motion cue trials, together with a linear function fitted to both conditions. Error bars 
depict the standard error of the mean.    
 
Errors analysis 
The results of an error analysis were consistent with the pattern of results 
seen for RTs (see Table 1). A 2 (motion-cue group: valid motion, invalid motion) x 2 
                                                                                                                                                  
changes in RTs across motion cue presentations. To this end, linear functions are sufficient to 
illustrate the different trends that are present in the valid and invalid motion cue data.   
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(cue type: red, green) x 2 (cue validity: valid, invalid) mixed model ANOVA (motion-
cue group entered as a between-subjects factor) on error rates revealed a main 
effect of cue type, F(1, 39) = 4.88, p= .033, η2 = .11, of cue validity, F(1, 39) = 29.68, 
p < .001, η2 = .43, and a significant two-way interaction between cue validity and cue 
type, F(1, 30) = 32.59, p < .001, η2 = .45. There was no main effect of motion-cue 
group, nor were there any interactions with motion-cue group. Pair-wise comparisons 
revealed that only when the cue was red did it have an effect on response accuracy, 
t(39) = 6.54, p <.001. There was no effect of validity on error rates when the cue was 
green, t(39) = 1.73, p = .09. Given the pattern of errors across all conditions, the 
differences in response times reported above are not attributable to any speed 
accuracy trade-offs. 
An independent groups t-test revealed no significant difference in error rates 
associated with valid and invalid rare motion singletons, t(38) = .31, p = .76. 
 
Discussion 
In Experiment 2 observers adopted top-down settings for red, as evidenced 
by the significantly larger cueing effect for red than green cues (see Figure 3). 
Despite this set, RTs were significantly elevated by the presentation of an 
unexpected, irrelevant motion singleton cue. Across the second half of the 
experiment, RTs associated valid motion cues were significantly faster than RTs 
associated with invalid motion cues, consistent with the motion cue having captured 
attention. It is clear from a comparison of Experiments 1 & 2 that the frequency of 
presentation of the motion cue modulated target RTs, as in all other respects the 
motion cue was the same as that in Experiment 1. This observation is consistent with 
previous research demonstrating that frequency-of-presentation modulates distractor 
inference (Neo & Chua, 2006; Geyer, Muller & Krummenacher, 2008; Horstmann, 
2002, 2005) and extends the previous studies by demonstrating that this 
phenomenon occurs even when participants have an active top-down attentional 
setting for a specific colour.  
Our analyses of the individual presentations revealed significant costs for both 
valid and invalid cues in the first half of the experiment, which did not differ 
significantly from each other. Across presentations valid RTs declined linearly, 
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whereas invalid RTs remained relatively flat and elevated. This difference in pattern 
led to a significant validity effect in the second half of the experiment. We argue that 
this pattern cannot be easily explained either by the spatial reallocation of attention 
or surprise alone. If attention were simply being captured by the motion cue then a 
validity effect should have been present in all presentations. Conversely, if the 
interference were due solely to surprise, with no reallocation of attention, then valid 
and invalid RTs should have shown the same pattern of habituation from surprise 
over presentations, which was clearly not the case. Instead, our data suggest that 
the first few presentations of the motion cue gave rise to surprise. As surprise 
habituated the motion cue retained its ability to capture attention and the cueing 
effect emerged. We shall deal further with the relationship of surprise to reallocation 
in subsequent experiments and discuss it at length in the general discussion. 
In Experiment 2 we manipulated the validity of the motion cue between 
subjects. It is possible that the observed differences between valid and invalid 
motion cue in Figure 4 are due to the development of different strategies specific to 
the valid and invalid conditions. In Experiment 3 we use a within-subjects 
manipulation of cue validity to preclude the development of differential strategies for 
attending to the motion cue. This should provide a more stringent test of whether the 
validity of the motion cue reflects attention capture.  
 
Experiment 3 
In Experiment 3 each participant saw both valid and invalid motion cues. 
Given the small number of motion cues and the potential for sequence effects (see 
Experiment 2) we alternated the presentation of valid and invalid motion cues and 
assigned each participant to one of two presentation orders that differed in whether 
the first motion cue was valid or invalid. This alternating pattern controlled for 
position within the sequence so that both valid and invalid cues would be presented 
at equivalent practice levels. Since observers have no incentive to actively attend to 
or actively inhibit motion, better performance on valid relative to invalid motion cue 
trials can be safely attributed to involuntary capture by the rare motion singleton. If 
the motion cue captures attention then we expect to see RTs to valid cues faster 
than to invalid cues. 
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Method 
Participants 
 An independent sample of thirty-two participants (21 female) aged 17 – 25 (M 
= 19.3, SD = 2.1) from the introductory psychology course at the University of 
Queensland participated for course credit. All reported normal or corrected to normal 
vision. 
Apparatus  
The apparatus was identical to the one used in the Experiments reported 
above. 
Stimuli, Design and Procedure  
The stimuli, design and procedure of Experiment 3 were identical to 
Experiment 2, with the exception that valid and invalid cues alternated within 
subjects. To obtain sufficient observations for a comparison between initial and latter 
presentations of the rare motion cues, the frequency of rare motion cues was 
increased to ~6% of trials. Eight valid and eight invalid motion cues were presented 
either in the order valid-invalid-valid-invalid, etc., or vice versa, in the order invalid-
valid-invalid-valid, etc. The order of presentation was counter balanced across 
participants. The experiment was divided into nine blocks of 32 trials. No motion 
cues occurred within the first 32 trials. Each of the eight subsequent blocks 
contained one valid and one invalid presentation of the motion cue.  
After the experiment, participants were probed as to whether they had been 
aware of any pattern regarding the presentation of the motion cue with the following 
question – “Did you notice any pattern with respect to where the motion stimulus 
occurred in the display?” None of the participants reported being aware of an 
alternating valid-invalid order.   
 
Results 
Mean response times and error rates for Experiment 3 are shown in Figures 5 
and 6 and Table 1 respectively. RTs exceeding 1200ms and errors were excluded 
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from the RT analysis. Participant 5 was excluded from all analyses due to an 
unacceptably high average error rate of 20.8%. Across the remaining 31 participants 
the exclusion criteria resulted in a loss of 4.8% of experimental trials.     
RT analysis  
A 3 (cue type: red, green, motion) x 2 (cue validity: valid, invalid) repeated 
measures of RTs revealed a main effect of cue type, F(2, 29) = 13.94, p < .001, η2 = 
.49, of cue validity, F(1, 30) = 54.47, p < .001, η2 = .65, and a significant two-way 
interaction between cue validity and cue type, F(2, 29) = 38.28, p < .001, η2 = .73. 
The two-way interaction of cue validity and cue type reflected a significantly greater 
validity effect for the red cue, t(30) = 12.66, p < .001, than for the green cue, which 
also showed a significant validity effect, t(30) = 2.90, p = .018 (see Figure 5). Follow 
up analyses for the motion cue are presented in the next section.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean RT as a function of cue type and validity for Experiment 3. Error bars 
depict the standard error of the mean. 
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In Experiment 3 we again asked whether RTs were elevated on trials with a 
motion cue, and, secondly whether there was a validity effect associated with the 
motion cue. Planned pairwise comparison confirmed that RT on both valid and 
invalid motion cue trials were elevated relative to the target non-matching cue 
(green), t(30) = 2.59, p = .015, and t(30) = 3.96, p < .001, respectively (see Figure 5). 
Consistent with Experiment 2, an analysis of mean RT across all presentations of the 
motion cue revealed no cueing effect associated with the motion, t(30) = .52, p = .60.
 As was done in Experiment 2 we conducted two further analyses to determine 
if a cueing effect emerged with repeated presentation of the motion cue. First, we 
computed the cueing effect associated with the motion cue separately for the first 
and second half of the experiment (presentations 1-4, and 5-8). A 2 (exposure: first-
half vs. second-half) x 2 (cue validity: valid vs. invalid) repeated measures ANOVA 
comparing RT on valid versus invalid trials in the first and second half of the 
experiment revealed a main effect of exposure, F(1, 29) = 16.32, p < .003, η2 = .35, 
and a significant two-way interaction between cue validity and exposure, F(1, 29) = 
5.20, p = .031, η2 = .15. The interaction was due to the fact that the motion cue did 
not produce a significant validity effect in the first half of the experiment, t(30) = -
1.09, p = .57. However, in the second half of the experiment, valid cue RT were 
significantly faster than invalid cue RTs, t(30) = 2.94, p = .015, consistent with 
attentional capture by the motion cue in the second half of the experiment2.  
Secondly, we fitted linear functions to the data in Figure 6 separately for the 
valid and invalid motion cue. Consistent with the split-half analysis above, the linear 
trends analysis revealed a significant linear component to the decrease in RT 
associated with the valid rare motion cue, F(1, 22) = 7.64, p = .011, η2 = .26, but not 
the invalid rare motion cue, F(1, 20) = 1.43, p = .25, η2 = .07. This result replicates 
the effect found in Experiment 2. 
 
                                               
2
 This spatial validity effect held when the comparison between valid and invalid cues was expanded to include 
the latter ten presentations (presentations 4-8) of the rare motion cue t(30) = 2.17, p = .03, as well as when it was 
restricted to the latter six presentations (presentations 6-8)  of the rare motion cue, t(30) = 3.24, p = .003.  
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Figure 6. Mean RT for each presentation of the motion cue in Experiment 3. The 
data have been separated into valid and invalid conditions and a linear function fitted 
to both. 
Errors 
The results of an error analysis conformed to the pattern of results observed 
for RTs. A 3 (cue type: red, green, motion) x 2 (cue validity: valid, invalid) repeated 
measures ANOVA on error rates revealed a main effect of cue validity, F(1, 29) = 
7.34, p = .011, η2 = .20, and a significant two-way interaction between cue validity 
and cue type, F(2, 28) = 12.61, p < .001, η2 = .47. Pair-wise comparisons revealed a 
significant validity effect for the red cue t(29) = 6.75, p <.001, but not for the green 
cue, t(29) = .16, p = .99. 
A separate ANOVA of the error rates associated with the motion cue condition 
revealed no main effects or interactions. Given the pattern of errors across all 
conditions, the differences in response times reported here are not attributable to 
any speed accuracy trade-offs. 
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Discussion 
The elevated RTs associated with the rare motion cue in Experiment 3 
provide further evidence of interference that was not observed in Experiment 1 when 
the motion cue was presented frequently. Moreover, in Experiment 3, the spatial 
validity effect associated with the motion cue emerged under conditions that 
precluded the development of different strategies to attend to motion, evidence of the 
involuntary capture of attention by rare motion cues. This result supports the 
contention that frequency-of-presentation is a contributing factor in producing 
capture from a transient (motion) stimulus. However, it should be noted that the 
mixed design employed in Experiment 3 did not rendered the motion cue non-
predictive. The motion cue was 50% valid where chance was 25%; it is possible that 
participants were sensitive to this relationship and biased attention according. 
However, we suggest that this is highly unlikely for two reasons. Firstly no 
participants reported noticing any regularities associated with the presentations of 
the motion cue when probed after the experiment. That is, there does not appear to 
be any evidence that participants developed any explicit strategies to attend to 
motion in response to the predictiveness of the motion cue. Secondly, participants 
saw only 16 motion cue presentations distributed across 288 trials. It seems unlikely 
that participants could have learnt, either implicitly or explicitly, the predictive nature 
of the motion cue over so few and distributed presentations. We discuss this in more 
detail in the general discussion.   
 
Experiment 4 
In Experiments 2 & 3 we found evidence that attention is captured by an 
unexpected cue with transient properties (i.e., motion). Our data also led us to 
conclude that initial presentations were dominated by surprise, which only later gave 
rise to a standard cueing effect. However, surprise has been invoked post hoc to 
explain this pattern and it remains unclear why the RT interference associated with 
valid motion cues dissipates across presentations while remaining elevated for 
invalid motion cues. If our conjecture of surprise habituating to more typical validity 
effects is correct then we should expect a very specific pattern of results when 
exposing participants to runs of valid and invalid motion cues. Firstly, we should 
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observe no surprise (elevated RTs) for valid motion cues following exposure to a 
series of invalid motion cues. Critically, if habituation is affecting valid and invalid 
cues equally, then there should be a robust validity effect in the transition from 
invalid to valid motion cues. Secondly, we should continue to observe interference 
associated with invalid motion cues following a pattern of habituation to valid motion 
cues. Alternatively, it remains a possibility that the rare motion cue produces only a 
non-spatially specific cost which habituates more rapidly for valid than invalid motion 
cues. In this scenario we would predict no interference from invalid motion cues 
following habituation to valid motion cues. Additionally we would expect to observer 
interference associated valid motion following exposure to invalid motions cues. 
To test this, in Experiment 4 the presentation order of valid and invalid motion 
cues was systematically varied, such that one group of the participants was 
presented first with five valid rare motion cues, followed by five invalid rare motion 
cues, while a second group of participants received the reverse ordering (i.e., first 
five invalid rare motion cues, followed by 5 valid motion cues or vice versa). If 
habituation occurs selectively for valid motion cues but not for invalid motion cues, 
then RT should be elevated on valid motion cue trials even when these are preceded 
by a series of invalid motion cues. In this instance, the experiment should also fail to 
yield any evidence for capture by the motion cue, because RT on valid motion cue 
trials should be elevated both in the first and second half of the experiment. If, on the 
other hand, habituation occurs also for invalid motion cues, and elevated RT on 
invalid motion cue trials were due to attentional capture, then RT on valid motion 
trials should show an immediate benefit following the presentations of the invalid 
motion cues. Moreover, we would expect to find evidence for capture by the motion 
cue in condition in which invalid motion is followed by valid. 
 
Method 
Participants 
 An independent sample of thirty-two participants (23 female) aged 17 – 23 (M 
= 18.2, SD = 1.89 from the introductory psychology course at the University of 
Queensland participated for course credit. All participants reported normal or 
corrected to normal vision. 
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Apparatus  
The apparatus and stimuli used in Experiment 4 were identical to those used 
in the experiments reported above. 
Stimuli, Design and Procedure 
  The stimuli, design and procedure of Experiment 4 were identical to those of 
Experiment 3, with the exception that the frequency of the motion cue was reduced 
to ~3% of trials, and that the presentation order of valid and invalid motion cues 
differed. One group of participants were first presented with five valid motion cues, 
followed by five invalid motion cues, while this presentation order was reversed for 
the other group of participants. The experiment consisted of 11 blocks of 32 trials 
and 12 practice trials. Presentation of the motion cue was distributed across blocks 
two to eleven such that each block contained one presentation of the motion cue. No 
motion cue was presented in the first block. As in Experiment 3, participants were 
probed following the experiment as to whether they had been aware of any pattern 
regarding the presentation of the motion cue, using the same question. As in 
Experiment 3, none of the participants correctly reported that the motion cues had 
been presented in a systematic order.   
 
Results 
Mean response times and error rates for Experiment 4 are shown in Figures 7 
and 8 and Table 1 respectively. RTs exceeding 1200ms and errors were excluded 
from the RT analysis. This resulted in a loss of 6.6% of experimental trials across all 
30 participants. Again, none of the 30 participants reported identifying any pattern 
associated with the presentation of the motion cue.  
RT analysis 
Colour Cues. 
The mean results for the colour cues are shown in Figure 7. A 2 (motion-cue 
group: valid motion, invalid motion) x 2 (cue type: red, green) x 2 (cue validity: valid, 
invalid) mixed model ANOVA (motion-cue group entered as a between-subjects 
factor) on mean RTs revealed a main effect of cue type, F(1, 28) = 11.65, p < .002, 
partial η2 = .29, as well as a main effect of cue validity, F(1, 28) = 72.44, p < .001, 
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partial η2 = .81. These main effects were qualified by a significant two-way 
interaction between cue validity and cue type, F(1, 2) = 58.87, p < .001, η2 = .68, 
reflecting that the red cue showed stronger cueing effects than the green cue. Follow 
up comparisons confirmed that there was a significant validity effect for the red cue, 
t(29) = 9.74, p < .001, as well as a small but significant validity effect for the green 
cue, t(29) = 2.61, p = .014.  
Motion Cues 
Figure 7 also plots the mean RTs across presentations for the motion cue 
conditions. As with previous experiments, all within-subjects analyses were 
computed on the raw RT data while all between-subjects analyses were computed 
on normalised data. We first report the within-subjects comparisons.  
Within-subject comparisons: A 2 (exposure-order: valid-first vs. invalid-first) x 
2 (cue validity: valid vs. invalid) mixed model ANOVA (exposure-order entered as a 
between-subjects factor) revealed a significant two-way interaction between 
exposure and cue validity, F(1,28) = 30.37, p < .000, η2 = .52. The interaction was 
due to the fact that the motion cue produced a significant inverse validity effect when 
valid motion cues preceded invalid motion cues, t(14) = -3.22, p = .006. However, 
when invalid motion cues were presented first, valid cue RTs were significantly faster 
than invalid cue RTs, t(14) = 4.92, p < .001. The main effect of cue validity was non-
significant (p = .74). Critically, a pair-wise comparison revealed a significant validity 
effect between the last invalid cue and the first valid cue in the invalid-first condition, 
with RTs significantly reduced for the valid cue, t(14) = 3.33, p = .006 (see Figure 8 
points ‘Invalid 5’ and ‘valid 6’). 
Finally, comparing RTs associated with the invalid motion cue trials to RTs 
associated with the invalid green cue showed that RTs were significantly higher in 
the presence of the invalid motion cue compared with the invalid green cue, both 
when invalid motion cues occurred first, t(14) = 4.60, p < .001, and second, t(14) = 
3.89, p = .002. 
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Figure 7. Mean RTs as a function of colour cue type and validity for Experiment 4 
(valid motion cues followed by invalid motion cues, and vice versa). Mean RTs for 
colour cues reflect data from both motion conditions. Error bars depict the standard 
error of the mean. 
  Between-subjects comparisons: To test for the presence of a cue validity 
effect we conducted a between-subject analysis comparing valid and invalid motion 
cues. A 2 (exposure: first-half vs. second-half) x 2 (cue validity: valid vs. invalid) 
revealed a significant two-way interaction, F(1,56) = 8.55, p = .005, η2 = .13. This 
interaction was qualified by follow up comparisons which revealed a significant 
between-subjects validity effect associated with valid and invalid motion cues in the 
second-half condition, t(28) = 2.34, p = .027 (see Figure 8 points 6-10). The inverse 
validity effect associated with the valid and invalid motion cues in the first-half 
condition did not reach significance (p = .083), although on the first unannounced 
presentation of the motion cue, valid RTs were significantly elevated over invalid RTs 
(reverse validity effect), t(28) = 2.45, p = .021.    
A linear trends analysis that revealed a significant linear component to the 
decline in RTs associated with valid rare motion cues, F(1, 14) = 15.71, p = .001, η2 
= .53. No such linear decreasing trend was seen for targets cued by invalid rare 
motion cues, F(1, 12) = .32, p = .59, η2 = .03.          
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Figure 8. RT difference score reflects a comparison of the motion cue RT to the RT 
average of valid and invalid green cue trials that preceded the presentation of a 
given motion cue trial. The data have been separated into valid and invalid 
conditions and a linear function fitted to both. Error bars depict the standard error of 
the mean. 
Error analysis   
Error rates across the different conditions were consistent with the pattern of 
results seen for RTs. A 2 (motion-cue group: valid motion, invalid motion) x 3 (cue 
type: red, green, motion) x 2 (cue validity: valid, invalid) mixed model ANOVA 
(motion-cue group entered as a between-subjects factor) on error rates revealed a 
main effect cue, F(2, 27) = 11.67, p < .001, η2 = .46, and a main effect of cue 
validity, F(1, 28) = 16.69, p < .001, η2 = .37. These main effects were qualified by a 
significant two-way interaction between cue validity and cue type, F(2, 27) = 3.57, p 
= .049, η2 = .20, reflecting that the red cue showed stronger cueing effects than the 
green cue. Pair-wise comparisons revealed that more errors occurred on invalid red 
cue trials than on valid red cue trials, t(29) = 3.51, p <.005, and this was also true of 
green cue trials, t(29) = 2.11, p = .043. There was no difference in error rates 
between valid and invalid motion cues, t(29) = 1.00, p = .33. There was no effect of 
group.   
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Discussion 
The results of Experiment 4 are consistent with those of Experiment 2 and 
Experiment 3. Initial presentation of the unexpected motion cue led to elevation of 
both valid and invalid RTs when compared to the green cue. With subsequent 
presentations RT to valid cues showed a linear decline, while RT to invalid cues 
remained elevated. Importantly, there was a significant validity effect for the first 
presentation of a valid cue when compared to the previous invalid cue. This indicates 
that adaptation to the motion cue was occurring for both valid and invalid cues, ruling 
out the possibility that elevated RT on invalid motion cue trials were due to a failure 
to habituate to the invalid motion cue. These results provide strong support for the 
view that rare motion captures attention independent of task goals.  
An unusual feature of the data was the presence of a reverse validity effect – 
valid RTs greater than invalid RTs – over the first few presentations. This, in fact, 
has been a pattern in Experiments 2 & 3 as well, though it is somewhat stronger in 
Experiment 4. While this appears to conflict with the standard cueing effect observed 
robustly in spatial cueing studies, it is important to emphasize that our results reflect 
performance on the first presentation of a new stimulus. In a typical spatial cueing 
task subjects are given several trials of practice on the exact stimuli they will 
encounter in the experimental session, or alternatively the first few trials are 
excluded from analysis. Even if included, the contribution of the first presentations is 
negligible when data from the entire experiment, or even over a block, is averaged. 
Our results are showing a new and apparently robust pattern in which valid motion 
cues produce more interference than invalid when presented first. 
The reverse validity effect does seem at odds with results showing additive 
effects of cue validity and surprise in visual search (Horstmann, 2002, 2005; 
Horstmann & Becker, 2008; Gibson & Jiang, 1998). Since we have argued that the 
initial presentations of the motion cue elicit surprise, we investigate the source of the 
reverse validity effect in Experiment 5 to better understand why our results differ 
from those of previous surprise capture studies.       
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Experiment 5 
According to current models of surprise capture, surprise-induced costs 
should be additive with capture (Horstmann, 2002, 2005; Horstmann & Becker, 
2008; Gibson & Jiang, 1998), because the RT delay that characterises surprise is 
thought to reflect a disruption of decision-level processes that are separate from 
processes responsible for controlling orienting (Horstmann, 2005; Sternberg, 1967). 
How then can we explain the greater RT elevation for the initial presentations of valid 
compared to invalid motion cues? 
One notable difference between the experiments reported here and previous 
studies is that in the present experiments the target was always a colour singleton. 
The presence of a significant cueing effect for colour cues indicates that participants 
were set for the target colour. Thus, for invalid motion cues the feature for which 
attention was set was always present in a location other than that of the motion cue. 
If, as our evidence suggests, the motion cue captures attention, then on invalid trials 
the presence of the target feature provides a perceptual cue to facilitate disengaging 
from the motion cue. That is, perceptual processing of the target properties can 
proceed in parallel with disengagement from the motion cue. For valid trials, on the 
other hand, there is no spatially distinct perceptual signal to facilitate disengagement. 
If the process of disengaging from the surprise stimulus involves inhibition of the 
interfering distractor then it is easy to see this would interfere with parallel perceptual 
processing of the target, and how the cost could be very high for a valid surprise 
stimulus. 
In contrast, previous studies of surprise capture have used predominately a 
conjunction search in which the target was not marked by a unique feature 
(Horstmann, 2002, 2005; Horstmann & Becker, 2008, 2011). Feature singletons are 
pre-attentively available whereas conjunctions of features are not and mostly require 
an effortful serial search (e.g., Treisman & Gelade, 1980; Treisman & Sato, 1990; 
Wolfe, 1994). In conjunction, the target would not compete as strongly for attention 
with the unexpected singleton as in the target feature in present study.  
We examined this in Experiment 5 defining the target to be a conjunction of 
colour and orientation, more closely mirroring previous studies of surprise capture 
that observed additive effects of surprise and cue validity. A target defined by a 
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conjunction of features should not facilitate disengagement from the motion cue. If 
our reasoning is sound, then Experiment 5 ought to find an RT-elevation that is now 
additive with attentional capture (as indexed by the cueing effect).  
To increase the difficulty of the search task, the number of possible search 
stimuli was increased to six, and participants were instructed to search for a red bar 
that could be either horizontal or vertical, among differently coloured bars that were 
either oriented horizontally, vertically, or tiled left or right by 45°. Each display 
contained two red bars, two green bars and two blue bars.  Targets could only 
appear on four out of the six possible positions. Eye position was monitored to 
ensure that participants maintained fixation on the central fixation cross during the 
entire trial.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 A new sample of seventy participants (53 female) aged 17 – 47 (M = 20.7, SD 
= 2.7) from the introductory psychology course at the University of Queensland 
participated for course credit. All reported normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Apparatus 
Experiment 5 was conducted using the computer software package Matlab 
(2010a) and the Psychophysics Toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). 
Participants’ eye movements were measured using a video-based infrared eye-
tracking system (Eyelink 1000, SR Research, Ontario, Canada) with a spatial 
resolution of 0.1 and a temporal resolution of 500 Hz. 
Stimuli 
 The fixation display and target display contained six boxes positioned in a 
circular array around fixation. The size of each box and distance of each from 
fixation was the same as in the previous experiments. The cueing display consisted 
of a set of four dots around all six boxes. On colour cue trials one set of four dots 
around one location was always coloured either red or green (four-dot cue). The 
motion cue was rendered by a 90° rotation of the diamond cue configuration in six 15 
o clockwise increments at 22ms intervals.  
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The target display consisted of an oriented, coloured line in each of the six 
peripheral boxes. The bars could be oriented horizontally, vertically, or rotated 45 o to 
either the left or right. Three of the bars were oriented either horizontally or vertically 
and three were oriented either 45 o to the left or to the right. Two of the bars in the 
display were red (RGB = 255, 0, 0), two were green (RGB = 0, 255, 0) and two were 
blue (RGB = 0, 0, 255). The distribution of colours was such that each orientation 
(horizontal/vertical and 45 o left/right) appeared in each colour. That is, the bars in the 
display varied across two features, orientation and colour, and no single bar in the 
display could be differentiated from the other bars by a single feature alone.  
Design and Procedure  
As in Experiment 2 subjects were randomly assigned either to the group that 
received valid motion cues, or the invalid motion group. Target and singleton cues 
never appeared at the position directly above or below fixation (see Figure 9), only at 
the remaining four locations. Participants were required to respond with the left and 
right arrow key when they saw either a red horizontal or a red vertical bar, 
respectively. The experiment was divided into six blocks of 32 trials and one block of 
32 practice trials. Neither the practice block nor the first block of experimental trials 
contained a motion cue. Each of the five subsequent blocks contained either one 
valid or one invalid presentation of the motion cue. Incorrect responses resulted in 
the word “wrong!” being displayed on the screen for 1000 ms.  
 
 
Figure 9. Example target display from Experiment 5. The target in this example is 
the red horizontal bar. 
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Results 
Mean RTs and error rates for Experiment 5 are shown in Figures 10 and 11 
and Table 1, respectively. RT exclusion criteria were relaxed to compensate for the 
increased difficulty of the search task. RTs exceeding 1500 ms and errors were 
excluded from the RT analysis. Six participants’ (two from the invalid condition) data 
were excluded from all analyses due to unacceptably high average error rate of 20% 
or greater in one or multiple conditions. Across the remaining 64 participants the 
exclusion criteria resulted in a loss of 8.6% of experimental trials. 
Eye movement data were analysed online and trials were aborted if 
participants did not remain fixated throughout the trial. Participants were deemed to 
be fixating if their gaze fell within a region of 1.3 degrees of visual angle from the 
centre of the fixation cross. 
 
RT analysis 
Colour Cues  
A 2 (motion-cue group: valid motion, invalid motion) x 2 (cue type: red, green) 
x 2 (cue validity: valid, invalid) mixed model ANOVA (motion-cue group entered as a 
between-subjects factor) on mean RTs revealed a main effect of cue validity, F(1, 
62) = 29.30, p < .001, η2 = .32, and a significant two-way interaction between cue 
validity and cue type, F(1, 61) = 46.92, p < .001, η2 = .43. There was no two-way 
interaction between motion-cue group and cue type, p = .23, or motion-cue group 
and cue validity, p = .52. There was also no three-way interaction between motion-
cue group, cue type and cue validity, p = .43. As such, we collapsed across motion-
cue group when computing planned follow up comparisons. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed a significant validity effect associated with the red cue, t(62) = 9.49, p < 
.001 and a small but significant inverse validity effect associated with the green cue, 
t(62) = -3.75, p < .001 (see Figure 10). 
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Figure 10. Mean RT as a function of cue type and validity for the valid-motion group 
(a.) and the invalid motion group (b.) in Experiment 5. Error bars depict the standard 
error of the mean.   
 
Motion Cues 
To assess the effect of the motion cue we firstly compared RTs associated 
with the motion cue to the non-target invalid green cue. Pairwise comparisons 
revealed that both valid and invalid motion cue RTs were significantly elevated 
relative to invalid-green RTs, t(29) = 3.04, p = .005 and t(31) = 6.81, p < .001, 
respectively. To test for between-subject differences in RT between valid and invalid 
motion cue trials we first normalised data for valid and invalid motion cues. 
Normalisation of the motion cue data was computed as before by subtracting RTs 
from surrounding green cues from the RT to the motion cue3. An independent-
samples t-test revealed that invalid motion RTs were significantly elevated relative to 
valid, t(60) = 2.96, p = .004.  
As with previous experiments we looked at the effect of the motion cue across 
repeated presentations by computing the cueing effect associated with the motion 
cue separately for the first and second half of the experiment (presentations 1-2, and 
4-5). Independent-samples t-tests revealed a significant effect of cue validity for 
presentations 1-2, t(60) = 2.76, p = .008, but not for presentations 4-5 though the 
effect approached significance, t(60) = .1.97, p = .054. Furthermore, Mean RT on the 
first unannounced presentation of the motion cue was significantly faster for valid 
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than for invalid cue, t(55) = 2.28, p = .027. Note that this pattern of results is in stark 
contrast to those observed in Experiments 2 – 4.    
Figure 11 shows the normalised RT data for each presentation of the motion 
cue. Linear functions fitted to both the valid and invalid data sets showed a linear 
trend towards decreasing RT with repeated presentations for both with valid and 
invalid cues. Due to an increase in the number of errors on motion trials a linear 
trend analysis on the RT data was not appropriate for either of the rare motion cue 
conditions. However, comparing RTs across the first two (1st & 2nd) presentations of 
the motion cue with RTs on the last two (4th & 5th) presentation of the rare motion 
cue within each condition revealed that RTs were significantly slower across the first 
two presentation of the motion cue than the last two presentation for invalid motion 
cues, t(30) = 3.22, p < .03 and marginally significant for the valid motion cue 
condition, t(28) = 1.90, p = .067.  
 
 
 
Figure 11. RT difference score reflects a comparison to the RT average of valid and 
invalid green cue trials that preceded the presentation of a given motion cue trial. 
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The data have been separated into valid and invalid conditions and a linear function 
fitted to both. 
Error analysis   
Error rates across the different conditions were largely consistent with the 
pattern of results seen for RTs. A 2 (motion-cue group: valid motion, invalid motion) x 
2 (cue type: red, green) x 2 (cue validity: valid, invalid) mixed model ANOVA (motion-
cue group entered as a between-subjects factor) on error rates revealed a main 
effect of cue validity, F(1, 62) = 7.44, p < .008, η2 = .11, such that more errors were 
associated with invalid than valid cues. A significant two-way interaction between 
cue type and cue validity, F(1, 63) = 8.19, p = .006, η2 = .12 reflects that there was a 
validity effect associated with red cue, t(63) = 3.65, p < .001, but not the green cue (p 
= .65. A cue type by motion-cue group interaction revealed that error rates were for 
the red cue condition were slightly high in the invalid motion condition compared to 
the valid motion condition, F(1, 62) = 11.59, p = .001, η2 = .16, (see table 1).  
There was no difference in error rates between the valid and invalid motion 
cue, t(62) = 1.41, p = .16.  
 
Discussion 
Experiment 5 provides the first decisive evidence for the hypothesis that top-
down guided search for a pre-attentively available feature markedly changes the 
dynamics of capture by unexpected and rare stimuli. Standard cueing effects were 
observed on all presentations. Unlike the Experiments 2-4, Experiment 5 showed 
significantly elevated RT for the initial presentations of the invalid motion cue that 
decreased linearly over repeated presentations. The validity effect was observed 
across repeated presentations of the motion cue, with consistently faster RT for the 
valid than invalid cues. This pattern of attentional capture and surprise-related RT-
elevation is consistent with the two effects having combined in an additive manner.  
These results support our hypothesis that the failure to observe additive 
effects in the previous experiments was due to the fact that the target competed 
more strongly for attention with the unexpected motion cue, which facilitated 
disengagement from the motion cue and led to a fast re-allocation of attention to the 
target. We argue that this reallocation prevented the propagation of surprise to 
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higher, decision-related processes reducing its impact on invalid RTs. The additive 
effects of surprise and spatial cueing observed in Experiment 5 conforms to the 
pattern of results predicted by current models of surprise capture (Horstmann, 2002, 
2005; Horstmann & Becker, 2008, 2011; Gibson & Jiang, 1998). The discrepancy 
between the results of Experiments 2 - 4 and previous reports of surprise hinges on 
the presence versus absence of a pre-attentively available signal in the target 
display to guide attention away from the location rare motion cue. According to this 
explanation, the absence of readily available information to match the top-down 
controlled attentional settings appears to be critical for the (full) manifestation of 
surprise. In the absence of strong competition by a preattentive feature and/or an 
effective bias that draws attention away, the unexpected item is then processed in 
sufficient depth to modulate decision- and response-related processes.  
 
General Discussion 
The influence of top-down mechanisms on the orienting of attention has been 
well documented with the general conclusion that the capture of attention by salient 
events is modulated by their relevance to ongoing task goals (Bacon & Egeth, 1994; 
Eimer & Kiss, 2008; Eimer, Kiss, Press, & Sauter, 2009; Folk & Remington, 1998; 
Folk et al., 1992; Folk et al., 1994; Wu & Remington, 2003). In the present series of 
experiments, we tested whether unexpected stimuli would capture attention even 
when attention is demonstrably set for a specific colour. The present series of 
experiments found that a rare task-irrelevant motion signal captured attention even 
when observers had adopted a top-down setting for a particular colour (red). As 
shown by Experiment 1, this effect was not due to the bottom-up saliency of the 
motion stimulus, as it could be successfully ignored when it was presented 
frequently. These findings support the view that novelty can override the top-down 
attentional control settings and prompt an attention shift toward rare and unexpected 
events. Importantly, these results were obtained in the modified spatial cueing 
paradigm used by Folk et al. (1992), which allowed us to confirm that participants 
had indeed adopted a feature-specific attentional bias for the target colour, and not a 
broader search for a discontinuity in the displays (e.g., singleton search mode or 
display-wide features; Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Gibson & Kelsey, 1998). In our 
experiments, the presence of a feature set (red) was demonstrated by the 
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consistently larger cueing effect for the cue of the target colour (red) than for the 
non-target colour (green), as well as by a frequently presented motion singleton. The 
observation of capture by infrequent events under conditions of an active top-down 
set for a specific target feature provides strong support for capture by novel stimuli 
and extends previous research showing attentional capture by infrequent task-
irrelevant abrupt-transients (Neo & Chua, 2006).  
Top-Down Control of Attention 
Our claim that attentional capture is sensitive to frequency of presentation, not 
the onset transient itself is supported by the presence of interference from rare 
motion cues (Experiments 2, 3, & 4) compared to the absence of capture to the 
same motion cue presented more frequently in Experiment 1. This failure to find 
capture by motion cues in Experiment 1 is consistent with the results of other spatial 
cueing studies that have failed to find evidence of capture by onsets or motion cues 
when attention was set for a specific colour (Folk at el., 1992; Folk et al., 1994).  
Capture by the same motion cue when it was presented on only a small number of 
trials is strong evidence that the salient transient of the motion cue per se was not 
instrumental in capturing attention, as has previously been maintained (Abrams & 
Christ, 2003; Abrams & Christ, 2006; Lamy & Egeth, 2003; Belopolsky et al., 2010; 
Franconeri, Simons & Junge, 2004; Theeuwes & Van der Burg, 2007). Evidence 
supporting theories of stimulus-driven capture by salient onsets or motion come 
largely from visual search or irrelevant singletons (Theeuwes, 1991; Theeuwes, 
1994; Schreij, Owens & Theeuwes, 2008) in which both targets and distractors are 
presented simultaneously. The simultaneous presentation pits the sensory 
processing of targets against that of distractors and, as a result, is more sensitive to 
physical attributes, such as intensity or salience. Evidence supporting the role of top-
down modulation has come instead from spatial cueing studies, like ours, in which 
the distracting stimulus (cue) is presented in isolation prior to the target. The 
sequential presentation minimizes that perceptual interaction of cue and target, thus 
allowing more scope for top-down control. In this respect, our finding of capture by 
unexpected motion stimuli in a spatial cueing paradigm is strong support for the 
ability of novel events to generate stimulus-driven capture.  
Our experiments are the first to demonstrate stimulus-driven capture by 
infrequent transient stimuli in the presence of an active top-down set for colour. Our 
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design incorporated measures that not only encouraged a strong set for the target 
colour, but that also allowed us to detect if that set were active. Previous studies 
showing capture by infrequent stimuli have not employed such stringent controls on 
attentional set. Presenting cues in a non-target colour encouraged a strong set for 
the target colour (red), as witnessed by the consistent and strong cueing effects for 
target-matching (red) colour cues. The weak but consistent cueing effect for the non-
target colour cue (green) suggests that on some trials subjects may have adopted a 
set for colour rather than a specific colour value (Folk & Anderson, 2010).  
The capture by rare motion cues seen in experiments 2, 3 and 4 is, thus, in 
violation of top-down settings and strong evidence for stimulus-driven capture by 
novel events. The results force a re-examination of the mechanisms for top-down 
control described by the theory of contingent capture (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 
1992; Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994; Folk & Remington, 1998). According to a 
strong version of contingent capture a positive setting for a stimulus property would 
be necessary for it to capture attention. This cannot be the case in our experiments 
as subjects could not have a positive set for a stimulus they did not know would be 
presented. Even after the first presentation the motion cue continued to capture 
when presented infrequently, suggesting that whatever expectation was generated 
by each presentation was no longer active on the next presentation. How is it that 
top-down control can prevent capture by frequently presented events, but not novel 
events? 
One way to account for the range of findings is to consider the neural model 
of the world posited by Sokolov (1963) to explain the orienting response. According 
to Sokolov the brain maintains a model of the world that incorporates the recent 
history of processing. The orienting response is triggered by stimuli that fall outside 
that model. This suggests that the rare motion cue captured attention because its 
frequency of presentation did not support incorporation into this world model. When 
presented frequently, however, the same stimulus was updated regularly and 
incorporated into the model. This leads to a view of top-down control that is more 
than simply a positive set for the relevant target feature. Instead, it suggests that 
effective top-down control is the result of general contextual expectation for the 
properties of both targets and distractors (see Theuuwes, 1996: A. Kramer, M. 
Coles, & G. Logan (Eds.), Converging Operations in the Study of Visual Attention.) 
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This is consistent with classical theories of attention that assume that salient 
irrelevant stimuli have to be filtered out or inhibited (Becker, 2007; Folk & Remington, 
1998; Treisman & Sato, 1990). Such filtering or inhibition of irrelevant features would 
depend on the prior exposure to these stimuli and implicit learning about their 
relevance. The effectiveness of inhibition or filtering would depend on an active set 
for distractor properties maintained by repeated occurrence and the probability that it 
indicates the target location or misguides attention to a non-target location (e.g., 
Geyer et al., 2008; Yantis & Egeth, 1999). In fact, Vaterott and Vecera (2012) found 
that, in search for a shape target, an irrelevant colour singleton interfered with search 
only in the first half of a block, but not in the second half. This pattern was observed 
for all blocks in which the colour of the singleton was changed from the previous 
block. These results show that top-down control included suppression of irrelevant 
salient stimuli, not just a positive setting for a target feature (which did not change in 
the study of Vaterott and Vecera, 2012). Alternatively, the present results as well as 
the results of Vaterott and Vecera (2012) are consistent with the existence of 
dedicated novelty-detection mechanisms that detect a mismatch between a neuronal 
model and the visual input, and guide attention to items that violate expectations 
(e.g., Horstmann, 2002; Sokolov, 1963).  
The present experiments cannot distinguish between these two different 
views: Models proposing a dedicated novelty detection mechanism also predict RT 
to be elevated, due to fact that an unexpected stimulus elicits surprise (e.g., 
Horstmann, 2005), or that the visual system has not habituated to the stimulus (e.g., 
Sokolov, 1963). The new finding of the present study - that the existence of a top-
down controlled attentional control setting for the target colour and the pre-attentive 
availability of the target feature can attenuate the surprise response - also seems 
consistent with both accounts. Of note, current surprise capture accounts do not 
deny the existence of top-down controlled attentional mechanisms, or their ability to 
modulate capture by novel stimuli (e.g., Horstmann 2002, Neo & Chua, 2006). 
Similarly, classical theories would not deny that top-down controlled attention shifts 
can interrupt visual processing of a rare motion singleton. Since the two models both 
propose that attention shifts to rare and unexpected stimuli are governed by a 
mechanism that is separate from the top-down controlled mechanism that guides 
attention to the target (i.e., filtering vs. expectation mismatch), it may very well be 
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impossible to distinguish between the two accounts experimentally. However, one 
important finding of the present study is that stimulus novelty does not completely 
dominate early visual processing: when the target feature was pre-attentively 
accessible and strongly competed for attention with the unexpected stimulus, the 
unexpected stimulus was apparently not fully processed. Instead, attention was 
quickly re-allocated to the target, preventing large RT costs when the target was 
presented at a different location than the motion singleton. These results indicate 
that task-related attentional settings can alter attentive processing of unexpected 
items, if the conditions permit immediate localization of the target feature. 
Predictivity of color cues vs. motion cue. 
In Experiment 1, the red and green color cues and the motion cue were all 
non-predictive of the target location, as they coincided with the target on 25% of all 
trials. In the subsequent experiments, the colour cues were still non-predictive; 
however, in most instances (Exp. 3–4), the motion cue coincided with the target 
location on half of all trials, and thus, was positively correlated with the target. Is it 
hence possible that attention shifts to the motion cue were not completely 
involuntary? Yantis and Egeth (1994) showed that the amount of attention allocated 
to a nominally irrelevant singleton depends on its predictiveness of the target 
location: Is it possible that a similar mechanism guided attention to the motion 
singleton in the present experiments? We consider this highly unlikely, for the 
following reasons: First, in Experiments 3 and 4, participants were probed directly 
after the experiment regarding whether they had noticed any regularities associated 
with the presentations of the motion cue, and none of the participants correctly 
reported that the motion cue had been presented in a regular foreseeable sequence 
(i.e., of ABAB… or AA.. BB..). This negative result would seem to rule out that 
participants developed an explicit strategy in response to the predictiveness of the 
motion cue. More importantly, Experiments 2 and 5 tested effects of motion cues that 
were always valid versus always invalid for different participants, and the results 
were very similar to the results of the mixed presentations of the motion cue (Exp. 3) 
and presenting first all valid and then all invalid motion cues or vice versa (Exp. 4; 
compare Fig. 4, 6 and 8). The failure to find any differences in response to these 
manipulations indicates that the predictiveness or non-predictiveness of the motion 
cue did not change the results.  
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This negative finding is consistent with previous results with the spatial cueing 
paradigm, showing that presenting always valid cues and always invalid cues in 
different blocks yields very similar results patterns as presenting valid and invalid 
cues mixed within a block of trials (e.g., Folk et al., 1992). Possibly, the 
predictiveness of the distractor only has an effect in visual search tasks such as 
used by Yantis and Egeth (1999), where the distractor feature (e.g., color) is an 
attribute of the target itself and a more salient attribute than the target-defining 
feature, so that it can aid search when it is predictive. In any case, the finding that 
capture by the motion cue was not modulated by the cue's predictiveness rules out a 
top-down strategic account of capture by the motion singleton and indicates that 
attention shifts to the motion singleton were mediated by a different mechanism than 
the mechanism that guides attention to the target.  
Surprise Capture 
In discussing the experiments we made the point that our results appear to 
reflect the presence of both a standard cueing effect and surprise. There was clearly 
something about the initial presentations of a valid motion cue that elevated RTs 
more significantly than an invalid motion cue, resulting in a reverse validity effect in 
the case of Experiment 4. In all our studies save Experiment 5 RTs for valid motion 
cue trials decreases linearly over presentations, whereas RTs for invalid trials 
remained relatively constant. A standard cueing effect emerged around the third or 
fourth presentation and was significant in the last half of all experiments. We 
hypothesized that RTs for the first few presentations reflected both an orienting of 
attention to the cue as well as initial surprise effect, which resulted in attention 
dwelling at the location and engaging response selection mechanisms for the cue.  
As surprise diminished over presentations the orienting of attention remained and a 
cueing effect emerged. Further, in Experiment 5 we provided evidence that the 
greater elevation with valid motion cue RTs resulted from the presence of a feature 
singleton with invalid cues that facilitated disengagement from the motion cue. In the 
absence of a singleton target feature in Experiment 5 RTs for both were elevated on 
first presentation with valid RTs faster than invalid, as expected. The effect of 
surprise was additive with the cueing effect as has been previously found. Our 
results are also consistent with the hypothesis that the effect of surprise is not only to 
draw attention to the cue, but to engage response and decision mechanisms as well.  
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 Theoretical Implications 
The principle theoretical implication of the present study is that a top-down 
setting for a particular colour does not prevent the capture of attention by a novel or 
rare salient stimulus4. The present study provided the first evidence that unexpected 
stimuli can capture attention even when attention is firmly biased to the target feature 
value. This finding is inconsistent with the original contingent capture hypothesis that 
a stimulus has to be similar to task-relevant features in order to capture attention 
(Folk et al., 1992). We conclude that salient (transient) novel stimuli, by which we 
mean stimuli outside the current neural model of the world, will capture attention 
regardless of top-down attentional control settings. A second implication is that top-
down modulation of capture is not accomplished simply by setting for a target 
property. In our account, both target and distractor properties must be actively in 
mind. Together with the study of Vaterott and Vecera (2012), the present study 
provides the compelling evidence that top-down control involves both target and 
distractor modulation.  
The present results also extend on our knowledge of capture by unexpected 
and rare stimuli. Here we show, for the first time, that surprise capture and a 
surprise-induced RT elevation can also be obtained in the spatial cueing paradigm, 
in a task similar to Folk and Remington (1998), where the target is identified by a 
unique, constant feature. Although the present experiments yielded results similar to 
those found previously in difficult visual search tasks, they also showed some 
deviations from previous results; specifically, the non-additively of RTs for the first 
(few) presentation(s) of the unannounced motion cue. This results pattern deviates 
from previous reports where surprise-induced RT elevation has been reported to be 
additive with capture effects (e.g., Horstmann, 2005). Naturally, it is possible that the 
invalid motion cue did not capture attention and therefore did not lead to a surprise-
induced RT-elevation. However, this hypothesis is difficult to reconcile with the facts 
(1) that we found significant capture by motion in the second halves of the 
experiments, and (2) that RT to valid motion cues were not elevated when they were 
presented after a series of invalid motion cues (see Exp. 4). The latter finding was 
                                               
4
 Note that this does not rule out the possibility of some other type of top-down attentional setting that 
may be effective in preventing capture by novel stimuli.  
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taken to show that participants had habituated to the invalid motion cue, which is 
difficult to explain if we assume that it was never attended.  
We noted in Experiment 5 that a key feature distinguishing our displays in 
Experiments 2 - 4 from earlier studies of surprise is that on invalid trials the critical 
target feature is visible at an uncued location immediately following the briefly 
presented cue. Indeed when the target was defined as a conjunction of features and 
consequently rendered less distinguishable from the non-targets in Experiment 5, the 
observed RT costs appeared to combine with attentional capture in an additive 
manner. We have suggested that the under-additively observed in Experiments 2-4 
is the result of an ability to disengage with the motion cue when it was invalid due to 
the presence of a the feature singleton (the target) in subsequent target-display. 
Such an account is consistent with previous reports showing a slowed time-course of 
surprise. A signature of Surprise Capture, at least with respect to colour singletons, 
is that surprise does not appear to propagate in the system until at least ~300 ms 
after stimulus onset, with pronounced effects found for targets 400 and 600 ms 
following the surprise stimulus (Horstmann, 2002, 2005, 2006). Furthermore, 
surprise capture has not been observed at SOAs of 200ms or less (Horstmann, 
2006; Horstmann & Becker, 2008). As we employed an SOA of 210ms, it may be 
that in the case of the invalid rare motion cue attention was not held at the location of 
the surprising stimulus long enough for surprise to manifest and affect RTs. In 
Experiment 5 spatial attention was able to linger at the location of an invalid rare 
motion cue due to the attenuated target signal in the proceeding target frame. This 
additional time may have been sufficient for surprise to propagate through the 
system. In the case of the valid rare motion cue, attention is drawn to the location of 
the motion cue and is held at that location by the presentation of the target. The time 
for which attention is focused at the location of a valid rare motion cue is thus 
lengthened sufficiently to allow for further processing of the motion cue, which 
interferes with the task. Note that an implication of this interpretation is that surprise 
not only requires just ‘time’ to manifest but some sustained period of spatial attention 
directed at the location of surprising stimulus. There is some evidence to suggest 
that this is indeed the case (see Horstmann, 2008).  
Although our disengagement hypothesis certainly warrants further 
investigation, it is clear that the involvement of effective top-down attentional 
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guidance significantly alters the results for unexpected and rare irrelevant singletons. 
Specifically, the ability to quickly locate the target in the spatial cueing paradigm 
interrupts further processing of the motion singleton, which in turn causes these 
costs to combine with capture effects in an under-additive manner. These results are 
important, in that they show that top-down controlled processes can dominate 
attention and alter our response to the unexpected. 
Our account of the inverse cueing effect observed for initial presentations is 
also consistent with the theory of ‘biased competition’ (Desimone & Duncan, 1995). 
According to the biased competition model, stimuli within in the same receptive field 
of neurons compete more strongly with one another than stimuli that are represented 
by different neuronal populations (Moran & Duncan, 1985; Desimone & Duncan, 
1995; Desimone, 1998). The novel and/or unexpected stimuli would have a 
competitive advantage over the subsequent target given evidence of increased 
neural responses observed for novel and or unexpected stimuli (Fahy, Riches & 
Brown, 1993; Li, Miller & Desimone, 1993). The invalid motion cue is outside the 
receptive field of the neurons processing the target and therefore would not directly 
compete with it for attention. The two explanations are not mutually exclusive. The 
absence of a target feature at a location outside the receptive field encompassing 
the motion cue would fail to provide the necessary trigger for disengaging attention 
from the novel stimulus, allowing surprise to develop, giving the rare motion cue its 
competitive advantage over the target. It is worth noting that such an account would 
explain the decline in response time on valid trials with successive presentations of 
the motion cue as a reduced neural response to the unexpected, but no longer novel 
motion cue. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 - Previously Seen and Expected 
Stimuli Elicit Surprise in the Context of Visual 
Search
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Summary 
  The series of experiments presented in chapter 2 show that an unexpected 
salient task-irrelevant stimulus can capture attention even when there is an 
established attentional set for a specific feature (colour). Based in this observation, I 
proposed an account of attentional control whereby top-down goals modulate 
capture by stimuli that conform to contextual expectations, whereas stimuli that 
violate these expectations involuntarily attract attention. In this view, the “attentional 
set” is not simply a setting for relevant target properties, but rather the result of 
expectations / a neuronal model that forms for both target and distractor properties. 
The ability to ignore task-irrelevant distractors reflects an active set for distractor 
properties that is learned and maintained through repeated exposure.   
  In Chapter 3, I explore in more detail the factors that determine the formation 
of task-expectancies. Specifically, how context specific is the learning of distractor 
properties and to what extent task-expectancies are shaped by top-down knowledge 
about the likelihood of a given event or stimulus. To address these questions I focus 
predominately on the initial presentation of an unexpected visual stimulus which has 
been shown to induce a surprise response during visual search (Hortsmann, 2002; 
Meyer, Niepel, Rudolph & Schűtzwohl, 1991). Here I test whether the magnitude of 
the surprise response can be modulated by pre-exposing participants to an 
unexpected stimulus and / or explicitly informing participants about an impending 
unexpected stimulus. Modulation of the surprise response to either of these 
manipulations would suggest a shift in the underlying task-expectancies / neuronal 
model that govern orienting toward novel stimuli.      
 
Abstract 
  In the context of visual search surprise is the phenomenon by which a 
previously unseen and unexpected stimulus exogenously attracts spatial attention. 
Capture by such a stimulus occurs, by definition, independent of tasks goals and is 
thought to be dependent on the extent to which the stimulus deviates from 
expectations (Horstmann, 2005). However, the relative contributions of prior-
exposure and explicit knowledge of an unexpected event to the surprise response 
have not yet been systematically investigated. Here observers searched for a 
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specific colour while ignoring irrelevant colour cues presented prior to the target 
display. After a brief familiarization period, we presented an irrelevant motion cue to 
elicit surprise. Across conditions we varied prior exposure to the motion stimulus – 
seen versus unseen - and top-down expectations of occurrence – expected versus 
unexpected - to assess the extent to which each of these factors contributes to 
surprise. We found no attenuation of the surprise response when observers were 
pre-exposed to the motion cue and or had explicit knowledge of its occurrence. Our 
results show that it is neither sufficient nor necessary that a stimulus be new and 
unannounced to elicit surprise and suggest that the expectations that determine the 
surprise response are highly context specific. 
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There is more information present in any given visual scene than the human 
cognitive system is capable of fully processing at any one point in time. A challenge 
for the human visual system then is to construct a stable and functional percept of 
the world from only a select subset of the available visual input. Mechanisms of 
selective attention allow us to prioritise the processing of certain visual input so that 
our conscious percept is one constructed from information in the environment that is 
functionally pertinent. How these selection mechanisms are controlled and the 
information they are sensitive to has important consequences for how we interact 
with our environment. In everyday life, the visual system is frequently challenged to 
decide whether to attend to information that is relevant to our immediate goals or to 
prioritize signals that might be unexpected and signal a threat.  
Much of the debate in the literature over attentional control has focussed on 
the nature of control of the exogenous attentional system – a system that reflexively 
shifts the focus of attention to signals of potential importance in the environment. At 
issue is the degree to which bottom-up factors, namely stimulus saliency, 
automatically capture attention and to what degree top-down, namely task goals, 
modulate the effect of salient stimuli (Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Posner, 1980; 
Remington, Johnston, & Yantis, 1992; Theeuwes, 1991; Yantis & Jonides, 1984). 
Previous studies investigating orienting, especially in natural scenes, suggest that 
salience may in fact be a weak determinant of attentional selection: Although stimuli 
may need to be salient in order to attract attention, saliency in and of itself is not 
always sufficient to guide attention. In contrast, top-down models of attentional 
guidance propose that shifts of attention are contingent on the configuration of task-
driven selection mechanisms, that select stimuli according to the current task (e.g., 
Einhäuser, Rutishauser, & Koch, 2008; Einhäuser, Spain & Perona, 2008; Foulsham 
& Underwood, 2008; Stirk & Underwood, 2007; Tatler, Hayhoe, Land & Ballard, 
2011; Valuch, Becker & Ansorge, 2013). Whether a stimulus will attract attention has 
been shown to depend on whether the stimulus matches the 'attentional set' of the 
observer, which describes the set of relevant stimuli or features that we need to 
attend to in order to successfully complete the current task (Folk, Remington & 
Johnston, 1992; Folk, Remington & Wright, 1994; Folk & Remington, 1998). Indeed 
there are examples in the literature where task-driven processes have been shown 
to modulate attentional capture even when highly salient stimuli are presented. Folk, 
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Remington & Johnston (1992) showed that a salient distractor presented 
immediately prior to the target in a spatial cueing paradigm produced differential 
effects on performance according to its relationship with the target. When 
participants’ task was to search for a colour singleton in the display, only matching-
colour distractors and not abrupt onset distractors had an effect on search 
performance. The opposite was true when the target of search was an abrupt onset 
(though see Belopolsky, Schreij & Theeuwes, 2010; van Zoest, Donk, & Theeuwes, 
2004). The equivocal support in the literature for purely bottom-up capture leaves 
open the question of how we become aware of stimuli and events in the world that 
are not directly relevant to our immediate tasks and or goals.  
 A commonality across much the research that informs the debate over 
attentional control is that stimuli in these paradigms are presented repeatedly, 
frequently and often with a degree of predictability. Yet outside of the laboratory the 
environments we encounter are rarely static and predictable in this way; rather, they 
are typically dynamic and can be unpredictable. Critical to the function and ultimately 
to the survival of any organism is the ability to effectively respond to and adapt to 
changes in its environment signaled by these unexpected events. This ability 
requires a mechanism for detecting new information (novelty) in the environment that 
operates largely independently of task-driven control and an observer’s attentional 
set.   
Several researchers have proposed that humans possess an orienting 
mechanism tuned to detecting novelty in the environment. An early theoretical 
account by Sokolov (1963) proposes that our tendency to reflexively orient towards 
stimuli in the environment is dependent on a mismatch between stimulus input and a 
set of contextual expectations that he labeled the ‘neuronal model’. Over repeated 
exposure to a novel stimulus the neuronal model is updated to incorporate the novel 
stimulus, consequently dampening the orienting response to subsequent 
presentations of the stimulus ('habituation'). A similar mechanism for responding to 
novelty in the environment is derived from schema theories of perception and 
cognition where a schema is conceptualized as an organized knowledge structure 
used to generate predictions about the nature of objects and events in the 
environment (Rumelhart, 1984; Rumelhart, Smolensky, McClelland, & Hinton, 1986; 
Meyer, Niepel, Rudolph & Schűtzwohl, 1991). Unexpected events in the environment 
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generate prediction errors due to the mismatch that arises between the stimulus 
input and a set of expectations generated by the schema. Prediction errors signal 
that there is new information in the environment and the system responds by 
interrupting ongoing processes and devoting attentional resources to process this 
new information. This process is presumed to underlie the subjective impression of 
surprise (Meyer et al., 1991; Niepel, Rudolph, Schűtzwohl and Meyer, 1994; Meyer, 
Reisenzein & Schűtzwohl, 1997). Once an unexpected stimulus has been reconciled 
and incorporated into a schema it will no longer elicit surprise as it is no longer 
expectation discrepant (Niepel et al., 1994). It is through this mechanism that 
schemas are thought to be updated and maintained as accurate accounts of one’s 
environment. Indeed, a novelty selection mechanism has been proposed as the 
necessary complement to dynamic and efficient goal-driven selection mechanisms to 
ensure adaptive action in natural environments (Horstmann, 2006). 
The role of task-expectancies in determining the allocation of cognitive 
resources is supported by experimental evidence demonstrating numerous 
physiological and behavioural changes in response to unexpected events (Asplund, 
Todd, Snyder, Gilbert & Marois, 2010; Becker & Horstmann, 2011; Czigler, Weisz & 
Winkler, 2006; Forster & Lavie, 2011; Horstmann, 2002, 2005, 2006; Horstmann & 
Becker, 2008; Kazmerski & Friedman, 1995; Meyer, et al., 1991; Niepel et al., 1994; 
Schűtzwohl, 1998; Neo & Chua, 2006). For example, in a study by Meyer et al. 
(1991) participants had to respond to the location of a dot that appeared briefly 
(0.1secs) either above or below two vertically arranged words. For the first 29 pre-
critical trials of the experiment the words appeared as black against a white 
background. On the 30th 'surprise' trial, the colour of one of the words and its 
background was inverted (white letters on a black background). Recall for the 
inverted word on the surprise trial was significantly better relative to a control 
condition in which the word was presented in the same way as in the pre-critical 
trials, suggesting that the expectation-discrepant word had attracted attention. 
Furthermore, RTs to the dot on the surprise trial were significantly elevated relative 
to a control condition, suggesting that additional processing resources were recruited 
to process and integrate the expectation-discrepant event.  
Subsequent work by Schűtzwohl (1998) and more recently by Horstmann 
(2005) has demonstrated that the magnitude of the surprise response to a new and 
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unannounced stimulus indeed varies with varying task-expectancies. Using the same 
paradigm as Meyer et al. (1991), Schűtzwohl (1998) varied the number of pre-critical 
trials between 3, 13, 23 and 33 to modulate the strength of stimulus expectations 
prior to the exposure to the surprising stimulus. In line with the predictions, the four 
conditions showed a differential response to the surprising stimulus. RTs on the 
surprise trial were significantly longer in the 13 trials condition than the 3 trials 
condition and significantly longer again in the 23 trials condition relative to the 13 
trials condition. No difference in RTs was found between the 23 and 33 trials 
conditions. These results indicate that more practice leads to the formation of 
stronger expectancies, which, when violated, produce a heightened surprise 
response. 
 In a separate experiment Schűtzwohl (1998) established that the variability of 
the stimulus array presented in the pre-critical trials can also modulate the surprise 
response. In one condition the word stimuli in the pre-surprise trials were presented 
in a uniform font (homogenous stimulus array) while in a second condition the font of 
one of the two words was varied in each of the pre-critical trials (heterogeneous 
stimulus array). Presenting a novel combination of font colours in the surprise trial 
led to RTs that were significantly shorter in the heterogeneous condition relative to 
the homogenous condition. These results show that the formation of task-
expectancies are influenced by experience and the distribution of events and objects 
that occur prior to a novel stimulus. When a set of expectations is weakly established 
and/or broadly defined, broad expectations are formed and new and unannounced 
stimuli are less likely to violate them. Conversely, repeated exposure to relatively 
homogenous stimulus arrays leads to narrowly defined task-expectancies with 
seemingly less tolerance for new unannounced deviants.  
Common across all the experiments investigating surprise is that the 
surprising stimulus is always new and unannounced. It is clear from the work of 
Schűtzwohl (1998) and Horstmann (2005) that novelty or “unexpectedness” per se 
are not sufficient to elicit a strong surprise response, because the context plays an 
important role in shaping our expectancies, which in turn determine the surprise 
response. However, it is less clear to what proportions prior exposure versus top-
down expectations shape our task-expectancies and whether either one of them or 
both are necessary to elicit surprise. That is, if participants have prior exposure to a 
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stimulus and/or are informed about its occurrence, would it still be unexpected in the 
sense that it still elicits surprise? We know that both the behavioural and 
neurophysiological markers of surprise dissipate across successive presentations of 
an unexpected stimulus within the visual domain (Retell, Becker & Remington, in 
press; Horstmann 2002, 2005, 2006; Schűtzwohl, 1998; Asplund et. al., 2010; 
Kazmerski & Friedman, 1995). In certain instances the surprise effect occurs on only 
the first presentation of a novel stimulus (Horstmann 2002, 2005, 2006). However, it 
is an open question whether the surprise response would be attenuated if 
participants had been exposed to the stimulus prior to performing a specific 
experimental task. Presumably, any exposure to a stimulus will render it familiar, and 
will therefore affect, almost by definition, its novelty. Thus, if surprise is related to the 
novelty of a stimulus in this sense then we should expect an attenuation of the 
surprise response when participants are pre-exposed to an “unexpected” stimulus. 
Similarly, if task-expectancies can be shaped by explicit knowledge about the nature 
of events and objects in an environment then we might expect that knowledge of a 
forthcoming “unexpected” stimulus should also result in an attenuation of the 
surprise response. An alternatively possibility is that task-expectancies are highly 
task- or context-specific and formed strictly through a processes of implicit learning. 
If this is the case, pre-exposure to and or explicit knowledge of an “unexpected” 
stimulus should have no effect on the subsequent response to such a stimulus.      
The present study addressed these open questions, by examining responses 
to an otherwise surprising stimulus when participants a) were instructed to expect it, 
b) had been pre-exposed to it, c) were exposed to both of these manipulations, or d) 
none (standard). 
 
Experiment 1 
We used a variant of the spatial cueing paradigm used by Folk and 
Remington (1998) to test surprise with respect to a task-irrelevant motion singleton 
distractor (cue). Participants had to report the orientation of a specific red target 
(e.g., red horizontal bar) that was embedded amongst six differently coloured and 
oriented non-target bars (i.e., red, green, blue, horizontal and vertical bars). Prior to 
the target display, a cueing display was presented that contained a to-be-ignored red 
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or green singleton cue.  The red and green cues were either presented at the same 
location as the target (valid trial) or at a different location (invalid trial), and were 
included to provide a baseline against which the effects of the surprising motion cue 
could be compared. According to the Contingent Orienting Hypothesis, the target-
similar red cue should attract attention because it is consistent with the goal of 
searching for red, which should lead to faster response times (RT) on valid than 
invalid trials. On the other hand, the green cue should not attract attention, because 
it did not match the task goals of searching for red (Folk, Remington & Wright, 1994; 
Folk and Remington, 1998), so there should be no effect of cue validity. The motion 
cue was always presented at an invalid location. Hence, if participants are able to 
ignore the motion cue in any of the conditions, there should be no performance 
differences between the invalid green cue and the motion cue in the RTs. On the 
other hand, if the motion cue attracts attention, RTs should be elevated. Indeed, if 
rare stimuli elicit a surprise response in addition to spatial reallocation of attention 
then RT could be elevated even more than on invalid red cue trials, due to the extra 
time needed to process the surprising stimulus (e.g., see Horstmann, 2005).  
If presenting an irrelevant motion cue generates surprise, then the RT 
elevation should moreover dissipate with repeated presentations of the motion cue. 
To gauge the RT elevation due to surprise, we presented the motion cue infrequently 
during the experiment (once every ~30 trials) after the first presentation, to a total 
number of eight motion cue trials. The core question of the present experiment was 
whether providing participants with prior information and/or exposing them to the 
“unexpected” stimulus prior to the experiment would modulate their surprise 
response. To that aim, we varied the amount of prior information and exposure to the 
motion singleton between different groups of participants. 
In the ‘expected’ condition participants were told immediately prior to the 
experiment that at some point during the experiment a new and unexpected stimulus 
would be presented but not what that stimulus would be. Additionally, they were told 
that the unexpected stimulus would occur at an invalid location and that it was 
designed to distract them from searching for the target and therefore they should do 
their best to ignore it. Moreover, participants in the ‘expected’ condition were 
informed that the fixation dot would turn blue when the new stimulus was about to 
occur, as a reminder to them that they were about to see a potentially distracting 
 76 
 
new stimulus and that they should do their best to ignore it. To summarise, 
participants in the ‘expected’ condition knew that an “unexpected” stimulus would be 
presented, but were naive to the specific attributes of the stimulus.   
In contrast, in the ‘exposed’ condition participants were shown an example of 
the motion cue immediately prior to the start of the experiment. However, 
participants were told a cover story to explain the presence of the motion cue, but 
were given no information regarding the presentation of this stimulus in the 
experiment. Participants in the ‘expected and exposed’ condition received the 
‘expected’ and the ‘exposed’ manipulations. Critically though, the two were linked. 
That is, participants were shown the motion cue prior the experiment and told that 
that would be the “unexpected” stimulus that would occur later in the experiment. 
Again, participants in this condition knew that the motion distractor would roughly be 
predicted by the fixation dot turning blue, and were instructed that attending to the 
motion cue would be detrimental to performance. 
Finally, in the ‘standard’ condition, participants were not informed about the 
appearance of the motion cue and not shown any stimulus examples of it. This 
condition served as a baseline condition to which the other three experimental 
conditions were compared.  
To ensure that RT elevations in response to the motion cue were not due to 
participants' gaze shifts instead of attention shifts, we used an eye tracker to monitor 
central fixation. All eye-movement analyses were conducted online and trials in 
which participants broke fixation during the cueing frame were coded as an error.  
 
Method 
Participants 
 Two-hundred participants (137 female) aged 17 – 42 (M = 19.9, SD = 3.1) 
from an introductory psychology course at the University of Queensland were 
assigned to one of the four conditions (standard, expected, exposed, expected and 
exposed) and participated for course credit. All participants reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. 
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Apparatus 
All experiments were conducted using the computer software package Matlab 
(2010a) and the Psychophysics Toolbox extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). 
Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch CRT monitor attached to a (Pentium 4) personal 
computer. Stimuli were presented with a resolution of 1280 * 1024 pixels and a 
refresh rate of 75Hz. Responses were recorded using a keyboard. Participants’ eye-
movements were measured using a video-based infrared eye-tracking system 
(Eyelink 1000, SR Research, Ontario, Canada) with a spatial resolution of 0.1 and a 
temporal resolution of 500 Hz and the Eyelink Toolbox extension (Cornelissen, 
Peters & Palmer, 2002). 
Stimuli 
 Each trial consisted of a fixation display, a cueing display and a target 
display. All displays contained a central fixation circle (0.2o x 0.2o) surrounded by six 
peripheral circular placeholders (2.6 o x 2.6o) positioned in a circular array around 
fixation and subtending 5o of visual angle from fixation. The cueing display consisted 
of a set of four filled circles (0.3 o) in a diamond configuration surrounding all six 
placeholders (see Figure 1). With the exception of motion cue trials, one set of four 
dots around one location was always coloured either red or green (four-dot cue). The 
motion cue was rendered by a 90° rotation of the diamond configuration in eight 
11.25 o clockwise increments at 13.33ms intervals.    
The target display was comprised of the same stimuli as the fixation display 
with the addition of six bars presented at each of the six placeholder locations. The 
bars could be oriented horizontally, vertically or 45 o to either the left or to the right. In 
the target display three of the bars were oriented either horizontally or vertically and 
three were oriented either 45 o to the left or to the right. Two of the bars in the display 
were coloured red (RGB = 255, 0, 0), two were coloured green (RGB = 0, 255, 0) 
and two were coloured blue (RGB = 0, 0, 255). The distribution of colours was such 
that each orientation (horizontal/vertical and 45 o left/right) appeared in each colour. 
The target was the red bar that could appear either horizontally or vertically and 
participants had to report its orientation (horizontal vs. vertical) with a button press 
(left arrow key for horizontal; right arrow key for vertical). All stimuli were presented 
against a black (RGB = 5, 5, 5) background.   
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Design 
 Experiment 1 consisted of 32 practice trials and 288 experimental trials, 
though this structure was not apparent to participants. Presentation of the red and 
green cues and the target was randomised across the experiment with each 
occurring at each location equally often. This design rendered the cues non-
predictive of the target location, thus providing no incentive to orient to the cues. 
Participants were informed of this and instructed not to attend to the cue throughout 
the experiment. On eight of the experimental trials the colour cue was substituted for 
a motion cue. The motion cue was presented once every 30-35 trials and was only 
ever presented at an invalid location. The colour cues, the motion cue and the target 
never appeared at the position directly above or the position directly below fixation 
(see Figure 1). That is, these stimuli could only occur at four of the six placeholder 
locations. The motion cue was presented twice at each of four possible locations and 
replaced an equal number of red and green cues – four of each. Five trials prior to 
the presentation of the first motion cue the fixation dot was presented as blue for one 
trial. The relevance of this signal varied across conditions and is explained in more 
detail below.  
We independently varied prior exposure to the surprising motion cue, with 
instructions to expect a surprising motion cue. This resulted in the four conditions 
outlined in Figure 2. Due to practical reasons, the first 100 participants were 
randomly assigned to the either the ‘standard’ condition or the ‘expected’ condition 
and these two conditions were run first. The second 100 participants were randomly 
assigned to either the ‘exposed’ or ‘expected and exposed’ condition.              
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Figure 1. Example trial sequences. Red and Green cues were non-predictive of the 
target location while the motion cue only ever occurred at invalid locations. The 
target and cues never occurred at the locations above and below fixation. 
Procedure  
Prior to the experiment, all participants were informed about the occurrence of 
the red and green cues and were instructed to ignore them as they were non-
predictive of the target. Moreover, all participants were briefed about the eye tracking 
procedure and instructed to maintain fixation on the central dot, while responding as 
fast and accurately as possible.  
Apart from this, the instructions differed for the 4 groups (standard, expected, 
exposed, expected and exposed). Participants in the standard condition were not at 
all informed about the appearance of the motion cue nor shown any examples of it.   
Participants in the expected condition were informed that a novel cue would 
be presented at an invalid stimulus location, of which they would be warned by the 
fixation dot turning blue, and they were instructed to ignore it. Participants in the 
exposed condition were presented with an exposure display that presented the 
motion cue at the location of one of the placeholders (see Figure 3). Participants 
were told that the motion stimulus in this context was related to the calibration of the 
eyetracker and were asked to maintain central fixation during its presentation. 
120 ms
53 ms
53 ms
Time
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Additionally, participants were told that the fixation dot would turn blue on some of 
the trials but that this was irrelevant for the purposes of the present experiment. In 
the expected and exposed condition, participants were fully informed about the 
appearance of the motion cue, shown the same example as the exposed group, and 
were informed about the significance of the blue fixation dot. Each trial began with a 
central fixation dot that was presented for 700ms. This was followed by the fixation 
display for 500ms or until the participant met the fixation criteria of the eye-tracker. 
Following this, the fixation dot offset for 50ms then the fixation display was presented 
for a randomly determined 200, 400 or 600ms, after which the cueing display was 
presented for 120ms. Following the cueing display there was an ISI of 53ms and 
then the target display was presented for 53ms (see Figure 1). At the offset of the 
target display, the fixation display was presented and remained on the screen until a 
response was recorded. That is, the trial ended only when a response was 
registered. If the response was correct and made in fewer than 1000ms then the 
next trial started after a 500ms delay. If the response was correct but made in over 
1200ms participants received the feedback “Too Slow!” and if the response was 
incorrect they received the feedback “Wrong!”. In both cases the feedback was 
presented for 1600ms and then the next trial commenced.  
The RT deadline of 1200ms with the specific feedback was employed to avoid 
that participants in the ‘expected’ and ‘exposed & expected’ conditions disengage 
from the search task and actively searching for the motion cue. By installing a soft 
response deadline we aimed to ensure that participants’ primary focus was on the 
search task.   
 
 
Standard Expected
Exposed Expected & Exposed
Unexpected Expected
Unseen
Seen
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Figure 2. Condition matrix for Experiment 1.  
Results 
Mean RTs and accuracies for Experiment 1 are shown in Figures 3 and 4, 
and Table 1, respectively. RTs exceeding 1,800ms and errors were excluded from 
RT analyses. Eye movement data were analysed online and trials coded as an error 
if participants did not remain fixated throughout the trial. Participants were deemed to 
be fixating if their gaze fell within a region of 1.3 degrees of visual angle from the 
centre of the fixation cross. This criteria lead to a loss of 7.94% of trials that was 
uniformly distributed across conditions. Data from four participants (1 Standard; 2 
Exposed; 1 Exposed & Expected) were excluded from all analyses due to 
unacceptably high errors of 25% or greater. In the report of results, we first present 
the results for the red and green cues, followed by the motion cue data for each 
condition, followed finally by the results of a between subjects analysis of the motion 
cue data. 
 
Table 1. Percent of errors for each condition in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. 
        Red Cue    Green Cue Motion Cue 
 Valid Invalid Valid Invalid Valid Invalid 
Exp 1: Standard  6.12 10.18 8.72 7.57  10.46 
Exp 1: Expected  5.75 9.58 7.81 7.42  10.75 
Exp 1: Exposed  5.38 9.71 7.00 6.88  6.94 
Exp 1: Expected 
& Exposed  
4.59 10.74 9.69 8.04  10.20 
Exp 2: Control 5.42 11.11 7.92 5.56 7.50 7.36 
 
Colour cues 
To ascertain whether the red and green cues shows a results pattern 
consistent with top-down controlled search for the red target, we first conducted four 
2 (cue colour: red versus green) x 2 (cue validity: valid versus invalid) repeated 
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measures ANOVAs and computed planned follow-up comparison. As shown in 
Figure 3, all four conditions (standard, expected, exposed, expected and exposed) 
showed significant validity effects for the red cue with faster RTs on valid than invalid 
trials for the red cue, and the reverse effect (of faster RT on invalid than valid trials) 
for the green cue.  
Standard: A main effect of cue validity, F(2, 47) = 24.47, p < .001, η2 = .34, 
was qualified by a significant interaction between cue colour and cue type, F(2, 44) = 
95.58, p < .001, η2 = .67. Follow-up pairwise comparisons revealed a significant 
validity effect associated with the red cue, t(47) = 8.51, p ≤.001 and a small but 
significant inverse validity effect associated with the green cue, t(47) = -3.80, p = 
.001     
Expected: A main effect of cue validity, F(2, 49) = 43.32, p < .001, η2 = .47, 
was qualified by a significant interaction between cue colour and cue type, F(2, 44) = 
121.72, p < .001, η2 = .71. Follow up pairwise comparisons revealed a significant 
validity effect associated with the red cue, t(49) = 11.12, p = <.001 and a small but 
significant inverse validity effect associated with the green cue, t(49) = -5.04, p < 
.001       
Exposed: A main effect of cue colour, F(2, 49) = 5.77, p = .02, η2 = .11 and a 
main effect of cue validity, F(2, 44) = 34.30, p < .001, η2 = .41, were qualified by a 
significant interaction between cue colour and cue type, F(2, 49) = 197.33, p < .001. 
Follow up pairwise comparisons revealed a significant validity effect associated with 
the red cue, t(49) = 12.51, p = <.001 and a small but significant inverse validity effect 
associated with the green cue, t(49) = -3.48, p = .001.       
 Expected and Exposed: A main effect of cue colour, F(2, 48) = 4.07, p = .049, 
η2 = .08 and a main effect of cue validity, F(2, 48) = 24.38, p < .001, η2 = .34, were 
qualified by a significant interaction between cue colour and cue type, F(2, 49) = 
169.85, p < .001. Follow up pairwise comparisons revealed a significant validity 
effect associated with the red cue, t(48) = 12.04, p = <.001 and a small but 
significant inverse validity effect associated with the green cue, t(48) = -6.16, p < 
.001. 
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Figure 3. Mean RTs as a function of cue type and validity for Experiment 1. RTs for 
the motion cue reflect the average of all 8 motion presentations. Error bars depict the 
standard error of the mean.  
Motion cue 
For each condition we computed the effect of the motion cue relative to the 
average of valid and invalid green cues trials. The logic of this is as follows: 
remembering that participants searched for a red target, both motion and green were 
task irrelevant. Thus, if the novelty of the motion cue had any effect on RTs it ought 
to be observable above and beyond any effect of the task irrelevant green cue. We 
chose to use the average of the valid and invalid green cues as a baseline rather 
than invalid green cues due to the inverse validity effect associated with the green 
cue. This method resulted in a more conservative estimate of the effect of the motion 
cue.  
To determine the interference effect associated with the first presentation of 
the motion cue we contrasted RTs on the first motion cue trial to the average of the 
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RTs associated with the green cue trials that were presented prior to the first 
presentation of the motion cue (16 observations per participant). In all four conditions 
we observed a significant interference effect5. Four pair-wise comparisons revealed 
that RTs associated with the first motion cue were significantly slower relative to RTs 
associated with the relevant green cue trials in the ‘standard’ condition, t(39) = 3.43, 
p =.001, the ‘expected’ condition, t(41) = 5.68, p <.001, the ‘exposed’ condition, t(41) 
= 3.66, p = .001, and the ‘expected and exposed’ condition, t(41) = 4.76, p <.001 
(see Figure 4).        
In addition to computing the interference associated with the first presentation 
of the motion distractor, we also computed the interference associated with 
presentations 2-8 of the motion distractor in each condition. Four pair-wise 
comparisons confirmed that RTs associated with the motion cue (averaged across 
presentations 2-8) were significantly slowed relative to RTs associated with the 
green cue  in the ‘standard’ condition, t(47) = 7.36, p = <.001, the ‘expected’ 
condition, t(49) = 6.90, p = <.001, the ‘exposed’ condition, t(49) = 6.95, p = <.001, 
and the ‘expected and exposed’ condition, t(48) = 7.41, p = <.001.       
To assess whether the RT interference associated with the motion cue 
dissipated with repeated exposure to the motion cue we used we ran the motion cue 
data from each condition through a Monte Carlo procedure. This involved randomly 
shuffling the position of the RT data within participants and calculating new group 
means for each presentation of the motion cue. We performed 10,000 iterations of 
this step, each time calculating a new group mean for each presentation of the 
motion cue. From these simulated distributions of means (one for each presentation 
of the motion cue) we calculated the 95% confidence interval around the mean of 
each distribution (see Fig. 4). This method allowed us to simulate the pattern of data 
that would result if exposure were having no effect on RTs. As shown in Figure 4, the 
empirical data deviated significantly from the simulated pattern of results in all four 
conditions. That is, in all four conditions we observed an effect of presentation order 
such that the RT were significantly slower than predicted by the null on the first 
presentation of the motion cue. Moreover, RT associated with the motion cue 
                                               
5
 These effects held when RTs on the first motion cue trial were compared to the respective invalid 
red cue trials for the ‘expected’ condition, p = <.001, the ‘exposed’ condition, p = <.001, and the 
‘expected and exposed’ condition, p = <.001. In the ‘standard’ condition the effect reached p = .06.   
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dissipated across repeated presentations of the motion cue, with lower-than-
predicted RT to the last presentation of the motion cue (8th presentation).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Average RT for each presentation of the motion cue in each of the four 
experimental conditions. The major dashed line in each plot shows the predicted 
pattern of RTs for the motion cue when presentation order has no effect, as 
determined by the permutation analysis (see Results section). The minor dashed 
lines define the 95% confidence interval around the permuted means, where data 
outside these boundaries indicate a significant change in RTs across presentations 
of the motion cue. 
Motion cue: Between-subjects analysis 
 Having found significant RT interference associated with the motion cue in 
each condition we sought to test whether these effects varied across our four 
conditions. To avoid the possibility that different result patterns could be due to 
baseline RT differences between the groups (e.g., with participants in one group 
responding generally faster and/or more accurately than participants in the other 
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group), the motion cue data were normalised for each participant by subtracting the 
average RT for (valid and invalid) green cue trials – calculated from the trials prior to 
each presentation of the motion cue – from the RT associated with the individual 
presentations of the motion cue. To analyse differences in the surprise response 
across conditions we compared normalised RTs to only the first motion cue 
presentation. The normalised data for all motion cue presentations is shown in 
Figure 5.     
A one-way between-subjects ANOVA computed over the first motion cue 
presentation revealed no significant differences between the four between-subjects 
conditions, F(3, 162) = 2.49, p = .062. As shown in Figure 5, however, RTs 
associated with the first motion cue in the ‘expected surprise’ condition appear 
elevated relative to the standard surprise condition. Correspondingly, a between-
subjects contrast revealed significantly elevated RT in the expected surprise 
condition compared to the standard surprise condition, t(80) = 2.48, p = .015.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Normalized RTs for the motion cue for all four conditions from Experiment 
1. RTs are normalized by subtracting the average RT for green cue (valid and 
invalid) trials – calculated from the trials prior to each presentation of the motion cue 
– from the RT associated with the individual presentations of the motion cue. 
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Figure 6. The data show the difference in RTs between the 5 trials prior to the blue 
fixation and the 5 trials prior to the surprising stimulus (the former subtracted from 
the latter) for each condition referenced to the standard surprise condition. 
 
Discussion 
 In Experiment 1 we varied the instructions and/or exposure to a motion 
stimulus to modulate the top-down expectations and/or familiarity with the stimulus. 
In all four conditions we observed elevated RTs associated with the first presentation 
of the motion cue indicative of surprise. Following the first presentation, the motion 
cue continued to produce RT interference, however the magnitude of this 
interference dissipated across presentations of the motion cue. Critically, 
interference by the irrelevant motion cue was observed despite the fact that 
participants adopted a feature specific attentional set for the colour red (reflected by 
the significant validity effect for the red cue and the lack of capture by the green cue; 
see Fig. 3). Thus, in the standard and exposed surprise conditions, the motion cue 
produced interference independent of any top-down strategy or goal to attend to 
motion or novel stimuli (Folk et al., 1992). 
 Moreover, the interference associated with the first presentation of the motion 
cue did not vary across conditions, at least not in the predicted direction. There was 
no attenuation of the RT interference associated with first presentation of the motion 
cue in the ‘exposed’ condition, the ‘expected’ condition or the ‘exposed & expected’ 
condition relative to the ‘standard surprise’ condition (see Figure 5). In fact, in the 
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‘expected’ condition we observed a trend towards an increase in the interference 
associated with the first motion presentation. That is, knowledge about the 
occurrence of an otherwise unknown event appears to have amplified the magnitude 
of the surprise response. However, this effect was evident only when participants 
knew to expect the “unexpected” stimulus but not what to expect. Even in the 
‘exposed & expected’ condition, where participants knew what to expect and roughly 
when to expect it, the interference effect was preserved.  
To summarise, in all four conditions we found RT interference associated with 
the first presentation of the motion cue. This interference persisted beyond the first 
presentation of the motion cue but was attenuated with repeated exposure to the 
motion cue. Contrary to our predictions, we found no attenuation of the RT 
interference associated with the first presentation of the motion cue when 
participants knew to expect something unexpected, were pre-exposed to the 
unexpected stimulus or were pre-exposed and knew what to expect. One possible, 
though admittedly unlikely explanation for this pattern of results is that the novelty 
signal we attempted to manipulate in Experiment 1 might not have been the source 
of the interference in Experiment 1. That is, it is possible that our results reflect a 
property of the motion stimulus itself and are unrelated to the novelty of the stimulus. 
In Experiment 2 we addressed this possibility by presenting the motion stimulus 
frequently.  
 
Experiment 2 
 Experiment 2 was a control experiment to ensure that the effects reported in 
Experiment 1 were indeed related to the presentation frequency of the motion 
stimulus and not the motion stimulus itself. To test this, in Experiment 2 we 
presented the motion stimulus in the same manner as the colour cues - frequently 
and at both valid and invalid locations. Under these conditions the motion stimulus is 
comparable to the green cue – frequently occurring and task irrelevant – and should 
not produce a validity effect when participants are searching for a red target (Folk et 
al., 1992; Folk et al., 1994).  
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Method 
Participants 
 Fifteen participants (8 female) aged 21 – 26 (M = 24.1, SD = 1.9) from an 
introductory psychology course at the University of Queensland participated for 
course credit. All reported normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus used in Experiment 2 was identical to that used in Experiment 
1. 
Stimuli, design and Procedure. 
 The stimuli, design and procedure of Experiment 2 were identical to the 
‘standard surprise’ condition in Experiment 1 with one critical exception: The motion 
stimulus in Experiment 2 was presented frequently – on one third of trials - and at 
both valid and invalid locations. As a result, in Experiment 2 there were 48 practice 
and 288 experimental trials.  
 
Results 
Mean RTs and error rates for Experiment 2 are shown in Figures 7 and Table 
1, respectively. RTs exceeding 1,800ms and errors were excluded from RT 
analyses. This led to a loss of 7.74% of experimental trials. 
A 3 (cue type: red vs. green vs. motion) x 2 (cue validity: valid versus invalid) 
repeated measures ANOVA of colour cue RTs revealed a main effect of cue validity, 
F(1, 9) = 5.33, p = .046, η2 = .37. This effect was qualified by a significant interaction 
between cue colour and cue type, F(2, 9) = 11.68, p = .004, η2 = .75. Follow up 
pairwise comparisons revealed a significant validity effect associated with the red 
cue, t(9) = 4.71, p = =.001. No validity effect was observed for the green cue, t(9) = -
1.15, p = .28 or the motion cue, t(9) = 0.02, p = .98. 
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Figure 7. Mean RTs as a function of cue type and validity for Experiment 2. Error 
bars depict the standard error of the mean. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 demonstrate that when the motion stimulus was 
presented frequently it had no effect on RTs relative to the task-irrelevant green cue. 
Consistent with the contingent capture hypothesis we observed a strong validity 
effect associated with the red cue but no effect of the green and motion cues when 
participants were searching for a red target (Folk et al., 1992). Additionally, the 
motion cue did not produce elevated baseline RTs that would be indicative of filtering 
costs or other forms of spatially non-specific interference (e.g., Becker, 2007; Folk & 
Remington, 1998). Instead, the results of Experiment 2 indicate that the motion cue 
produced no discernible evidence of capture or interference. Therefore, the effects of 
the motion stimulus reported in Experiment 1 relate to the infrequency of its 
presentation and are not the product of an inherent property of the motion stimulus 
per se.  
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General Discussion 
The experiments reported here explored the contributions of prior-exposure 
and explicit knowledge of an “unexpected” event to the surprise response in visual 
search. Our results suggest that the surprise response may be independent of both 
of these factors. In Experiment 1 we observed robust RT interference indicative of 
surprise to the first presentation of a task irrelevant motion cue that was not 
attenuated when participants were pre-exposed to the motion stimulus and/or when 
participants had explicit knowledge about the unexpected event. Even when 
observers had prior experience with the surprising stimulus and knew roughly when 
to expect it (‘exposed & expected’ condition), the motion stimulus still elicited a 
surprise response. Only in the ‘expected’ condition was there any evidence of a 
modulation of the surprise response; here though we observed a trend toward 
increased RT interference (see Figure 5). That is, when participants knew to expect 
something unexpected but not what is was, there was a trend toward a larger 
surprise response.  
The results of Experiment 2 demonstrated that stimulus presentation 
(in)frequency was indeed the source of the interference associated with the motion 
cue in Experiment 1, rather than some inherent property of the motion stimulus, such 
as salience or abrupt luminance transients. Consistent with the contingent orienting 
hypothesis (Folk et. al., 1994; Folk et. al., 1998), when the task-irrelevant motion cue 
was presented frequently in Experiment 2 we observed no effect of the motion cue 
relative to the green task-irrelevant cue. It could be argued that the elevation 
observed in the ‘expected’ and ‘exposed & expected’ conditions was obtained 
because subjects disengaged from the search task and actively searched for the 
surprising stimulus given they knew it was coming, consequently inflating RTs on the 
surprise trial. We suggest this is unlikely for two reasons: First, we employed a 
response deadline of 1,200ms throughout the experiment to encourage engagement 
with the task and fast responding. Secondly, performance on the trials between the 
blue fixation and the surprising stimulus did not differ across conditions (see Figure 
6). That is, there is no evidence that participants in either the ‘expected’ or the 
‘exposed & expected’ condition changed their search behaviour in response to 
information about the forthcoming novel stimulus. Thus, we suggest that the RT 
interferences associated with the first presentation of the motion cue in the 
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‘expected’ and ‘exposed & expected’ conditions reflects a reflexive redistribution of 
cognitive resources to the “unexpected” stimulus, which resulted in an increased 
surprise response. 
One possibility is that there was a lower rate of inattentional blindness (IB) in 
the ‘expected’ condition relative to the other conditions. It is well documented that 
under attentional demand observes can fail to perceive unexpected seemingly highly 
salient stimuli (Jensen, Yao, Street, & Simons, 2011; Mack & Rock, 1998; Most, 
Scholl, Clifford & Simons, 2005; Most et al., 2001). When observers are aware that 
an unexpected stimulus may occur IB rates are attenuated if not abolished (Jensen 
et al., 2011). This could account for why we observed large RT cost in the expected 
condition relative to the other 3 conditions; the expectation manipulation may have 
attenuated rates of IB and resulted in higher rates of surprise. However, it’s not clear 
why this would not also have been the case in the expected and exposed condition. 
Possibly here exposure had an effect, though this speculative and would warrant 
further investigation. In hindsight it may have been informative to have documented 
participants’ awareness of the first presentation of the motion cue in order to draw 
stronger links to the phenomenon of IB.  
In addition to finding a robust surprise effect to the first presentation of the 
motion cue, we also found RT interference associated with presentations 2-8 of the 
motion cue in all four conditions. These results are consistent with earlier findings 
showing that an infrequently presented salient distractor in visual search continues to 
interfere with performance on the task (e.g., Geyer, Mueller & Krummenacher, 
2008). In line with previous empirical work (Horstmann 2002, 2005, 2006; Kazmerski 
& Friedman, 1995; Retell, Becker & Remington, in press; Schűtzwohl, 1998; Asplund 
et. al., 2010) and theoretical accounts of surprise and novelty (Meyer, Reisenzein & 
Schűtzwohl, 1997; Sokolov, 1963; Sokolov & Vinogradova 1975), this interference 
dissipated as a function of exposure to the motion cue in all four conditions (see 
Figure 4). Critically, this pattern of results demonstrates that exposure to the motion 
cue, though infrequent, led to a reduction in the RT interference produced by the 
motion cue during the experimental task. However, exposure to the motion cue did 
not have this effect when it occurred prior to commencing the experimental task as a 
result of the exposure in the ‘exposed’ and ‘expected & exposed’ conditions.   
 93 
 
  Thus, the results reported here suggest that surprise is highly context 
specific. To attenuate the initial surprise response, it is apparently necessary to 
present an irrelevant stimulus inside the task, or as part of the ongoing task. More 
strikingly, the failure to obtain a decrease of the surprise response in the expected 
and exposed condition suggests that a reduction of the surprise response is in some 
sense independent of top-down knowledge. If we define the "unexpectedness value” 
of a stimulus as its propensity to elicit surprise then our manipulations show that 
being fully informed about the impending occurrence of the surprising stimulus did 
nothing to reduce the unexpectedness value of the stimulus. From previous work we 
know that for surprise to manifest it is not sufficient that a stimulus is novel and 
unannounced (Schűtzwohl, 1998; Horstmann, 2005). Our results indicate that it is 
also not necessary for a stimulus to be novel and/or unannounced to elicit surprise.  
This perhaps counterintuitive result is not inconsistent with classical theories 
of attention that assume that salient irrelevant stimuli are inhibited / filtered out 
through a process that depends on prior exposure to irrelevant stimuli and implicit 
learning about their relevance (Becker, 2007; Folk & Remington, 1998; Treisman & 
Sato, 1990). Note that our procedure may have provided participants only with 
explicit knowledge about the infrequent motion stimulus, whereas implicit learning 
may be highly context-specific and require that the to-be-inhibited stimulus is 
presented in the context of the task at hand. The implicit learning explanation of the 
results is also consistent with the finding that the effects of the motion cue were 
attenuated over the course of multiple presentations, but that it continued to produce 
interference. Of note, stimuli that occur infrequently provide few opportunities for the 
system to learn the necessary characteristics that require inhibiting. Consequently, 
they are not included in the formation of contextual expectations that describe the 
characteristics of irrelevant, to-be-inhibited stimuli.  
Whether or not the implicit learning account above is correct, the results 
provide new insights into the factors that determine the neuronal model, schemata or 
expectations which in turn determine orienting to surprising stimuli (e.g., Horstmann, 
2005; Meyer et al., 1991, Sokolov, 1963): First, the expectations determining the 
orienting response are apparently highly task specific or context-specific for 
exposure to show an effect. Secondly, explicit knowledge of an unexpected event or 
stimulus apparently does not alter the expectancies that ultimately determine the 
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surprise response, indicating that the neuronal model or schemata are based on 
implicit knowledge or predictions about upcoming events. In sum, the present results 
provide compelling reasons to re-define the notion of surprise – as reflecting the 
foreseeability of a stimulus or event according to inductive processes that operate 
largely automatically in the traditional sense (Posner & Snyder, 1975) and 
independent of other cognitive processes (Green, 1956). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 – Oculomotor Capture by New and 
Unannounced Colour Singletons During Visual 
Search
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Summary 
 In chapters 2 and 3 I discussed the possibility that the apparent sensitivity of 
visual selection mechanisms to stimulus novelty reflects a process whereby our 
ability to inhibit irrelevant stimuli is dependent on prior exposure and implicit learning 
about their relevance. In Chapter 4, I focus in more detail on the underlying 
mechanism by which novelty attracts visual attention. It has previously been noted in 
the literature that the temporal profile of capture by unexpected stimuli appears 
distinct from the temporal profile of capture by expected stimuli (Horstmann, 2002; 
2006; Horstmann & Becker, 2008). This observation is interesting because it 
suggests a distinct and dedicated mechanism of control for orienting toward 
unexpected stimuli. Previous attempts to characterise the temporal profile of capture 
by unexpected stimuli have done so using RT and response accuracy. However, 
these measures can be affected by decision and response related processes that 
may not be directly related to search performance per se. Given the constellation of 
physiological and cognitive changes that characterise our response to unexpected 
events, a more direct measure of search performance may provide further insight 
into the selection mechanisms that govern capture by unexpected events. In Chapter 
4, I take advantage of the well-documented coupling between eye-movements and 
visual attention (e.g., Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Peterson, Kramer, & Irwin, 2004) to 
investigate the temporal profile of capture by an unexpected stimulus. 
 
Abstract 
The surprise capture hypothesis states that a stimulus will capture attention to 
the extent that it is pre-attentively available and deviates from task-expectancies. 
Interestingly, it has been noted by Horstmann, (2002; 2005; 2006) that the time 
course of capture by such classes of stimuli appears distinct from that of capture by 
expected stimuli. Specifically, attention shifts to an unexpected stimulus are delayed 
relative to an expected stimulus (delayed onset account). Across two experiments 
we investigated this claim under conditions of unguided (Exp. 1) and guided (Exp. 2) 
search using eye-movements as the primary index of attentional selection. In both 
experiments we found strong evidence of surprise capture for the first presentation of 
an unannounced colour singleton. However, in both experiments the pattern of eye-
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movements was not consistent with a delayed onset account of attention capture. 
Rather we observed costs associated with the unexpected stimulus only once the 
target had been selected. We propose an interference account of surprise capture to 
explain our data and argue that this account can also explain existing patterns of 
data in the literature.  
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Mechanisms of selective attention allow us to prioritise the processing of a restricted 
number of events or objects in the visual world. Consequently, our conscious 
experience of the world is constructed primarily of visual input originating from 
information to which we have attended. How these selection mechanisms are 
controlled and the criteria by which (visual) input is selected for further processing 
versus input that is “discarded” earlier in the processing hierarchy has important 
consequences for how we interact with our environment. The decision of whether to 
attend to information that is relevant to our immediate goals or to prioritise signals 
that might be unexpected and signal a threat is one we often face. Thus, 
understanding what determines the events in the visual world to which we orient and 
attend has been a question of principal interest and importance to researchers in the 
field of cognitive psychology for decades.    
Models of attentional guidance distinguish between two forms of attentional 
control: endogenous control which is the ability to voluntarily allocate cognitive 
resources to processing task-relevant information, and exogenous control that 
directs attention involuntarily towards signals of potential importance - but not 
necessarily task-relevance - in the environment (Jonides & Yantis, 1988; Posner, 
1980; Remington, Johnston, & Yantis, 1992; Theeuwes, 1991; Yantis & Jonides, 
1984). Understanding the stimulus conditions to which the exogenous attentional 
system is sensitive has been a topic of much debate. Specifically, research has 
focused on understanding the extent to which exogenous shifts of attention are 
governed by bottom-up factors, namely stimulus saliency versus the extent to which 
they are modulated by top-down processes. Two broad schools of thought have 
emerged in the literature: proponents of bottom-up models of attentional guidance 
argue that the exogenous attentional system responds automatically to salient stimuli 
irrespective of top-down input. Under these models, modulation of attention by top-
down processes is thought to occur late in processing, only after attention has 
initially been deployed towards the stimulus with the highest saliency value (“de-
allocation hypothesis”; see Belopolsky, Schreij & Theeuwes, 2010; van Zoest, Donk, 
& Theeuwes, 2004). Conversely, according to top-down models of attentional 
guidance, such as the Contingent Capture hypothesis, shifts of attention are 
contingent on the goals of the observer. That is, a salient stimulus will only capture 
attention to the extent that it shares characteristics with the target of search (Folk, 
 98 
 
Remington, & Johnston, 1992; Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994). In their seminal 
paper, Folk, Remington & Johnston (1992) showed that a salient distractor 
presented immediately prior to the target in a spatial cueing paradigm produced 
differential effects according to its relationship with the target being searched for. 
When the target of search was a colour singleton only matching-colour distractors 
and not abrupt onset distractors had an effect on search performance. The opposite 
was true when the target of search was an abrupt onset. This result demonstrates 
that attention can be tuned to certain stimulus properties and that only those stimuli 
that share the defining features of the target will capture attention, seemingly 
irrespective of stimulus saliency. Subsequent research has explored this tuning 
mechanism across and within a range of stimulus dimensions. Greater capture by 
target-similar than target-dissimilar distractors has now been shown within the colour 
dimension (Folk, Remington & Johnston, 1998), as well as for onsets (Ludwig & 
Gilchrist, 2002), for size (Becker, 2010) and with a number of dependent measures 
(e.g., eye-movements: Becker, Ansorge & Horstmann, 2009; Ludwig & Gilchrist, 
2002; Wu & Remington, 2003; EEG: Eimer, Kiss, Press & Sauter, 2009; Lien, 
Ruthruff, Goodin, & Remington, 2008; Wykowska & Schuboe, 2009). 
 The fact that top-down selection mechanisms can act, in a sense, as a filter to 
counteract effects of bottom-up saliency raises the question of how we become 
aware of stimuli that are not directly relevant to our immediate tasks and/or goals. A 
commonality across almost all the research that informs the debate over attentional 
control is that distractors in these paradigms are presented repeatedly and frequently 
throughout the experiments, and thus, presumably contribute, and importantly, 
conform to task expectancies that develop over the course of an experiment (Gibson 
& Jiang, 1998). It is possible then that the top-down control of attention is limited to 
stimuli that conform to these task expectancies and that task expectancies 
themselves may in fact play a role in determining how spatial attention is allocated 
throughout a scene. Indeed, the notion that unexpected and novel events in the 
world demand the resources of our perceptual system is consistent with early 
theoretical accounts of orienting and surprise. According to Sokolov’s (1963) 
Orienting Reflex, a stimulus will elicit a reflexive orienting response to the extent that 
it violates expectations and generates a sufficient mismatch between the input from 
the environment and the established neuronal model or schema. Over repeated 
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expose to a novel stimulus the neuronal model is updated, consequently reducing 
the stimulus’ propensity to elicit an orienting response.   
Theoretical models of surprise are supported by experimental work 
demonstrating a number of physiological and cognitive changes in response to new 
and announced stimuli in the environment (Meyer, Niepel, Rudolph & Schutzwohl, 
1991, Horstmann, 2002; Horstmann, 2005; Horstmann, 2006; Horstmann & Becker, 
2008; Becker & Horstmann, 2011). Meyer et al. (1991) tested surprise 
experimentally by having participants respond to the location of a dot that appeared 
briefly (0.1secs) either above or below two vertically arranged words. In the 
experimental group, the words were present for the first 29 trials as black against a 
white background. On the 30th trial, the colour of one of the words and its 
background was inverted (white letters on a black background). In the control 
condition the experimental procedure was identical except that there was no 
inversion of the colours on the 30th trial. Participants were probed on their experience 
of the “surprising” trial with a series of questions. Notably, recall for the surprising 
word was significantly better in the experimental condition than in the control 
condition suggesting that the novel stimulus was attended to. In addition, RTs to the 
dot on the surprise trial were elevated relative to the control and pre-surprise trials. 
Meyer et al. (1991) argued that elevated RTs on the surprise trial reflected the 
recruitment of additional processing resources used for reconciling the discrepancy 
between the expected and the actual input that is generated by attending to a novel 
stimulus  
Further evidence that task expectancies can modulate shifts of spatial 
attention specifically comes from the surprise capture (Horstmann, 2002; 2005) 
literature. Horstmann (2005) had observers search for the letter L or R in a circular 
array of 4 or 12 (varied between subjects) different letters. After a series of 
expectation congruent trials, the target letter was unexpectedly presented in a 
different colour (e.g., red, among all-grey items). The logic of the design is as 
follows: if the target fails to capture attention then a serial search for the target must 
ensue and thus search latency will be dependent on the set size – as the set size 
increases it takes on average longer to locate the target, resulting in a steep RT x set 
size function. Alternatively, if the target captures attention then search latencies 
should be independent of set size, which ought to result in a flat RT x set size 
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function. Critically though, RT delays that are due to decision-level processes ought 
to be constant across set sizes and should not change the relationship between 
search efficiency and set size. Consistent with attentional capture, Horstmann (2005) 
found that RTs on the surprise trial were in fact independent of the number of non-
targets (3 or 11). Given that observers had no prior knowledge of the unexpected 
colour singleton, capture in this instance was, by definition, independent of any top-
down attentional set for the unexpected item and therefore is difficult to reconcile 
with strictly top-down models of attentional guidance.  
Interestingly, Horstmann, (2002; 2005; 2006) has noted that the temporal 
profile of capture by unexpected stimuli appears distinct from top-down mediated 
capture and reports of salience based capture in the absence of top-down filtering. In 
a test of the surprise capture hypothesis, Gibson and Jiang (1998) failed to find an 
effect of an unexpected colour singleton when it was presented for 86ms and onset 
with the target display. A critical difference between the Gibson and Jiang (1998) and 
Meyer et al. (1991) paradigms - noted by Horstmann (2002) - is the presentation 
duration of the surprising stimulus. Meyer et al. (1991) presented the surprising 
stimulus for 500ms prior to the onset of the target while the surprising stimulus was 
presented for only 86ms and onset with the target in the Gibson and Jiang (1998) 
experiments. Horstmann (2002) proposed that the orienting component of a surprise 
response might be slowed by additional processing that occurs in response to 
surprising stimuli and that the absence of a surprise effect reported by Gibson and 
Jiang (1998) was due to the insensitivity of their measure. That is, the presentation 
duration of the surprising stimulus was too brief for a surprise response to be 
observed. Indeed, using the same paradigm as Gibson and Jiang (1998), Horstmann 
(2002) found that when the surprising stimulus appeared 500ms prior to the onset of 
the target display, response accuracy was significantly improved on the surprise trial 
relative to pre-surprise trials - a pattern of results indicative of attentional capture by 
the surprising colour singleton. Subsequent research into the temporal profile of 
surprise capture suggests that it takes at least 200ms to manifest with pronounced 
effects observed 400ms post the surprise stimulus onset (Horstmann, 2006). That is, 
surprise capture appears to manifest slowly. Critically, the time course of surprise 
capture has been attributed, in part, to a delay in the onset of the attention shift and 
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this delay has been used to argue for distinct underlying mechanisms of control for 
expected and unexpected events (Horstmann, 2005; 2006).   
The present series of experiments 
In the following paper we used eye-movements to further investigate this 
apparent onset latency differential between capture by expected and unexpected 
events. To date, much of the work on surprise capture has quantified the effect using 
RTs and response accuracy; this includes the work suggesting its delayed onset. 
Disentangling the separate components of surprise using these methods is difficult 
though due the fact that RTs and response accuracy can be affected by decision and 
response level processes that are unrelated to search performance – a limitation that 
is of particular relevance in the study of surprise. More recently, research into 
attentional guidance has made use of the well-documented coupling between eye-
movements and attention shifts and used eye-movements as an index of attentional 
capture. Though attentional selection does not always result in the execution of an 
eye-movement (Juan, Shorter-Jacobi, & Schall, 2004; Wu & Remington, 2003), eye-
movements are preceded by shifts of attention (Deubel & Schneider, 1996; 
Peterson, Kramer, & Irwin, 2004.). Using eye-movements to measure search 
performance can provide insight into the spatial and temporal aspects of visual 
search that other measures such as RT and response accuracy are less sensitive to. 
As such, we used eye-movements to address whether the temporal profile of 
surprise capture reflects delays at an early attentional level – prior to shifting 
attention to the target; or at a later level – after attention has been shifted to the 
target. It remains an open question whether unexpected stimuli capture the eyes.    
 
Experiment 1 
The aim of Experiment 1 was to assess whether and to what extent surprise-
induced delays occur prior to shifting attention or the gaze to the target, and after 
selection of the target. As such, the design of Experiment 1 was similar to 
Horstmann (2002 exp. 3, 2005 exp. 1) with the exception of the set size 
manipulation. Since eye-movements may offer a more direct measure of how 
attention is allocated during search it was not necessary to manipulate set size here. 
Otherwise, the design was conceptually similar to previous studies: the experiments 
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consisted of a single block that was sub-divided into three phases; a pre-critical, a 
critical (surprise trial) and a post-critical phase. All three phases involved a visual 
search task in which participants were required to report the identity of a target letter 
(H or U) embedded amongst a circular array of heterogeneous non-target letters 
(difficult search). The critical and post-critical trials were identical to the pre-critical 
trials with the exception that a colour singleton (surprise stimulus in the case of the 
critical trial) was presented at the target location. The colour singleton was always 
presented at the target location to allow measuring the contributions of early and late 
processes to the RT delay on surprise trials (without interference from further eye 
movements that would be required if the colour singleton were presented at a 
distractor location).  
The predictions were as follows: first, if an unexpected colour singleton 
attracts the gaze then the target should be found significantly faster on the surprise 
trial than on the pre-critical trials. This should be reflected in a decrease in the 
number of saccades to find the target and a decrease in the time required to visually 
select the target (target fixation latency) on the surprise trial relative to the pre-critical 
trials. Finally, if the slow time course of surprise capture is the result of a delay in the 
orienting component (early stage) then we should expect to see evidence of this in 
the saccade latencies on the surprise trial (i.e., the time from the onset of the search 
display to the start of the saccade). That is, saccade latencies of the first saccade 
should be longer on the critical trial relative to the post-critical trials. Alternatively, if 
the delay occurs at a later stage – once attention has shifted to the surprising 
stimulus – then we should observe the delay once the eyes have selected the target.  
 
Method 
Participants 
Twenty-four participants (15 female) from Bielefeld University participated for 
course credit. All reported normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Apparatus 
Experiment 1 was conducted using the computer software package 
Presentation (Neurobehavioural Systems). Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch CRT 
monitor attached to a (Pentium 4) personal computer. Stimuli were presented with a 
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resolution of 1280 * 1024 pixels and a refresh rate of 75Hz. Responses were 
recorded using a two-button mouse. Participants’ eye-movements were measured 
using a video-based infrared eye-tracking system (Eyelink 1000, SR Research, 
Ontario, Canada) with a spatial resolution of 0.1 and a temporal resolution of 500 Hz. 
Stimuli 
Each trial consisted of a fixation display and a target display. The fixation 
display was comprised of a central fixation cross which subtended 0.3o of visual 
angle. The target display consisted of 8 grey disks (RGB = 150) presented on an 
imaginary circle equidistant – radius = 10 o of visual angle - from the central fixation 
cross. Each disk contained one of eight letters. The target letters were H and U and 
the non-target letters were C, E, F, L, O, P and S. All stimuli were presented against 
a white background and at a viewing distance of approximately 60cm.   
Design and Procedure 
Participants completed 24 practice trials followed by 49 experimental trials. 
The experimental trials were divided in 24 pre-critical trials, 1 critical trial (surprise 
trial) and 24 post critical trials though this structure was not apparent to participants 
and the experiment flowed continuously from one phase to the other. On the critical 
trial the otherwise grey disk at the target location was presented as red. The post-
critical trials were identical to the critical trial with the target appearing at the position 
of the red singleton. Practice trials were excluded from all analyses.  
Each trial began with the onset of a central fixation cross for 500ms. This was 
followed by the target which remained on the screen for a maximum of 3000ms or 
until a response was made (see Figure 1). Participants task was to saccade to the 
target and report its identity with a mouse click – left click for U and right click for H. 
The identity of the target and its location were randomised across trials with each 
target occurring equally often at each location. The locations of the seven non-
targets were also randomised across trials. Participants were instructed to saccade 
and respond as quickly and as accurately as possible. Following a response, 
participants were given feedback as to whether they were correct or not – ‘correct’ or 
‘incorrect’, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Example trial sequences from Experiment 1. A) Pre-critical trial. B) Critical 
and post-critical trial. The location of target and non-targets was randomised on each 
trial. The red colour singleton always appeared at the location of the target (H/U). 
The search display was presented for 3000ms or until a response was made.   
 
Results 
Mean RTs and accuracy for Experiment 1 are shown in Figure 2. RTs 
exceeding 4000ms and errors were excluded from RT and eye-movement and 
analyses. This criteria lead to a loss of 4.25% of trials. Averages for the pre and 
post-critical trials across all measures were computed over the 5 trials that preceded 
and succeeded the critical trial, respectively. All contrasts involving performance on 
the critical trial (RTs & Eye-movements) were computed using these averages. This 
was done in an attempt to reduce noise in our estimates of performance on the pre- 
and post-critical trials. Eye movements were parsed into saccades, fixations and 
blinks using the standard parser configuration of the Eyelink software, which 
classifies an eye movement as a saccade when it exceeds a velocity of 30º/s or an 
acceleration of 8000º/s. The first eye movement on a trial was assigned to the target, 
a non-target or the distractor if the gaze was within 100 pixels (1.0°) of the centre of 
the search item.  
Time
A B
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RT analysis 
To test for an effect of the unexpected colour singleton, we first contrast RTs 
on the critical trial with RTs on the pre-critical and post-critical trials. Planned 
pairwise comparisons revealed no RT difference between pre-critical trials and the 
critical trial, t(23) =.74, p = .47. Conversely, RTs on the critical trial were significantly 
slower than RTs on the post-critical trials, t(23) = -5.79, p <.001. As shown in Figure 
2, the RT delay for the critical trial was quite substantial (>300ms), consistent with 
previous reports (e.g., Horstmann, 2005). 
  
 
Figure 2. Mean response times for the pre-critical, critical and post-critical trials from 
Experiment 1. Error bars depict +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
Eye-movement analyses 
To assess whether the unexpected colour singleton attracted attention and 
the gaze, we compare the average number of fixations on the critical trials to that on 
the pre- and post-critical trials. A planned pairwise comparison between the critical 
and pre-critical trials revealed a significant difference such that there were fewer 
fixations on the critical trial than on the pre-critical trials, t(23) = 3.17, p = .004, 
consistent with the surprise capture view. Due to the lack of variability in the number 
of fixations on the post critical trials (i.e. floor effects - see Figure 4), a comparison 
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between the critical trial and the post-critical trials was performed using a Wilcoxon’s 
signed-rank test. This test revealed there to be significantly more fixations on the 
critical trial than on the post-critical trials, Z = -3.53, p<.001.  
These results would seem consistent with the view that attention shifts to 
unexpected singletons can be delayed, leading to more fixations on the surprise trial 
than on the post critical trials. However, as shown in Figure 4, 16 of the 24 
participants made only 1 saccade on the surprise trial. Furthermore, only 2 of the 24 
participants made more than 2 saccades on the critical trial. As will be further 
discussed later, this pattern of results shed doubt on the view that orienting to the 
unexpected events is necessarily delayed.       
 
 
Figure 3. Mean number of fixations per trial for the pre-critical, critical and post-
critical trials from Experiment 1. Error bars depict +/- one standard error of the mean.  
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Figure 4. Number of fixations for the pre-critical, critical and post critical trials for all 
24 participants.   
 
In addition to analyzing the number of fixations on the critical trial we looked at 
the percentage of first fixations which went to the target on the pre-critical, critical 
and post-critical trials. As is shown in Figure 5, 14.9% of first fixations went to the 
target location during the pre-critical trials (chance  = 12.5%). In contrast, 66.7% of 
first fixations went to the target location on the critical trial (see Figure 5). A 
Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test revealed this difference to be statistically significant, Z = 
3.57, p <.001. 
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Figure 5. The percentage of first fixations that went to the target location on the pre-
critical, critical and pos-critical trials.  
 
The data for target fixation latencies (i.e., the time measured from the 
presentation of the search display to the first fixation on the target) is highly 
consistent with the pattern of results observed for the number of fixations to the 
target (see Figure 6). Planned pairwise comparisons revealed that the target fixation 
latencies were significantly shorter on the critical trial relative to the pre-critical trials, 
t(22) = 2.66, p = .015, while simultaneously being significantly longer relative to the 
post-critical trials, t(22) = -2.54, p = .019. Interesting, inspection of the individual data 
(see Figure 7.) suggests that a very small increase in target fixation latencies on the 
critical trial relative to the post-critical trials was systematic and apparent even for 
participants who made only one saccade on the critical trial. 
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Figure 6. Mean target fixation latency per trial for the pre-critical, critical and post-
critical trials from Experiment 1. Error bars depict +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
Figure 7. Individual target fixation latencies for the pre-critical, critical and post 
critical trials. Note that the target fixation latency on the critical trial for one participant 
(5) was 2649ms. In the interest of preserving the scale, this data point was omitted 
from the figure. This data point was not omitted from any analyses.     
 
To test for delays in orienting associated with the unexpected colour singleton 
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pre- and post-critical trials. Saccade latencies were defined as the time taken for the 
participants gaze to leave the fixation region. Planned comparisons revealed a 
significant difference between the critical trial and the post-critical trials such that 
saccade latencies on the critical trial were significantly longer than saccade latencies 
on the post-critical trials, t(23) = -3.57, p = .002 (see Figure 8). We explored this 
effect further as a function the number of fixations to test whether this effect might be 
specific to observes who made fewer saccades on the critical trial i.e. observers who 
were surprised. Saccade latencies for participants who made only one saccade on 
the critical trial were compared to saccade latencies for participants who made 2 or 
more saccades. Though the interaction was non-significant (p = .12), the pattern of 
results suggest that the effect of saccade latencies reported above was largely 
driven by participants who made only one saccade on the critical trial. This pattern is 
illustrated in Figure 9. There was no difference in saccade latencies between the 
pre-critical trials and the critical trial, p = -.60.  
 
 
Figure 8. Saccade latencies for the pre-critical, critical and post critical trials. Error 
bars depict one standard error of the mean. 
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Figure 9. Difference in saccade latencies between the critical trial and post-critical 
trials as a function of the number of fixations on the critical trial. Error bars depict one 
standard error of the mean. 
  
Finally, to estimate the contributions of post-selection processes (i.e., decision 
and response level processes) to the large RT delay on the critical trial, we 
subtracted target fixation latencies for each participant from their RTs. We refer to 
this residual as the ‘post selection delay’ (PSD) and this data is plotted in Figure 10. 
Planned comparisons revealed that the PSD on the critical trial (777ms) was 
significantly longer than the PSD on both the pre-critical trials (523ms), t(22) = 4.28, 
p < .001 and the post-critical trials (476ms), t(23) = 4.73, p < .001.      
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Figure 10. Post Selection Delay (PSD) for the pre-critical, critical and post-critical 
conditions in Experiment 1. PSD was calculated by subtracting target fixation 
latencies from the RTs. Error bars depict one standard error of the mean. 
 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 1 demonstrate that the new and unannounced 
colour singleton induced surprise on its first presentation. Consistent with previous 
demonstrations of surprise, RTs on the critical trial were elevated relative to the post-
critical trials despite these trial types being identical with respect to their stimulus 
properties. Most notably, we observed a decrease in the number of fixations and 
target fixation latencies on the critical trial relative to the pre-critical trials and a large 
percentage of first fixations towards the target on the critical trial. These results show 
that search was more efficient on the critical trial than on the pre-critical trials – a 
hallmark of surprise capture.  
Interestingly, there was an increase in the number of fixations and an increase 
in target fixation latencies on the critical trial relative to the post-critical trials. With 
respect to the number of fixations, inspection of the data at the participant level 
revealed that 16 out of 24 participants made only one saccade on the critical trial – 
which is a hall mark of efficient search – while the remaining eight participants made 
two or more saccades (see Figure 4). Apparently the data reflects two populations of 
participants – those who were immediately attracted towards the unannounced 
colour singleton and those who were not, or for which guidance was delayed (six out 
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of the remaining eight participants made only two saccades on the critical trial). The 
significant difference that we observed between the critical trial and the post-critical 
trials seems mainly to result from the population of participants who did not saccade 
in the first instance to the unannounced colour singleton. However, given that the 
majority of participants immediately selected the colour singleton, the observed 
differences probably do not reflect a qualitative difference in search efficiency for 
expected and unexpected stimuli. Or to put it differently: it does not seem to be the 
case that there is necessarily a general delay in the orienting towards unexpected 
stimuli.  
With respect to target fixation latencies, we found a slightly different pattern of 
results. Inspection of the data at the participant level suggests that target fixation 
latencies were generally slightly slowed on the critical trial relative to the post-critical 
trials (see Figure 6). That is, participants were slower to fixate the target on the 
critical trial relative to the post-critical trials. This comes as no surprise for cases in 
which participants made multiple saccades on the critical trial; however, it’s 
noteworthy that this effect was observed for participants who made only one 
saccade on the critical trial. Interestingly, much of this effect can be accounted for by 
the saccade latencies. Saccade latencies on the critical trial were significantly longer 
than on the post-critical trials (see Figure 8). Moreover, this effect appeared to be 
driven by participants who made only one saccade on the critical trial, i.e. were 
surprised (see Figure 9), though the interaction was non-significant (p = .12).  
The delay in saccade latencies and target fixation latencies we observed on 
the critical trial is consistent with previous reports of surprise capture to the extent 
that it is a delay. However, the extent to which the magnitude of this delay is 
consistent with previous reports of surprise capture is unclear. Horstmann (2002, 
2006) and Horstmann and Becker (2008) have reported that surprise capture takes 
at least 200ms, but more likely closer to 400ms to manifest. Importantly, Horstmann 
argued that at least some component of this delay reflects a delay in the orienting 
component of the surprise response – “The results were clear-cut: stimulus duration 
was a powerful moderator of surprise capture. Apparently, the stimulus must be 
presented for a minimal duration to exhibit its full effect on the deployment of spatial 
attention” (Horstmann & Becker, 2008, .p 303). In Experiment 1 we observed a delay 
in saccade latencies on the critical trial of ~40ms, relative to the post-critical trials. 
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For participants who made only one saccade on the critical trial this delay was 
~55ms.  This delay cannot account for, in its entirety, the temporal profile of surprise 
capture previously reported in the literature. Nor can the delay in target fixation 
latencies, which for participants who made only one saccade, was ~115ms.  
Interestingly though, the PSD for the critical trial in experiment 1 was ~700ms. That 
is, once participants saccaded to the target, on average, they took another 700ms to 
respond to the target. The difference between the PSD on the critical trial and the 
post-critical trials (~400ms) was ~300ms. That is, we observed a non-spatially 
specific interference effect specific to the critical trial of ~300ms. Note that if we 
consider the delays associated with the spatial (saccadic latencies) and non-spatial 
components together (~40ms + ~300ms), the temporal profile of the surprise effect 
report in Experiment 1 begins to resemble the temporal profile of surprise capture 
previously reported in the literature.  
How might we explain the delay in spatial orienting on the critical trial? One 
possibility is that participant may have adopted a narrow attentional focus and pre-
programmed a saccade to a stimulus location prior to the appearance of the search 
display on the critical trial. This seems likely given the serial nature of the search 
task during the pre-critical trials where the target was not pre-attentively available to 
participants. We propose that the delay in saccade latencies and consequently the 
delay in target fixation latencies on the critical trial may reflect the suppression of a 
pre-programmed saccade and a switch from a narrow to a more diffuse attentional 
control setting on the critical trial. A failure to suppress the pre-programmed saccade 
could explain why some participants failed to orient in the first instance to the 
unannounced colour singleton and made multiple saccades on the critical trial. This 
could also explain the trend for saccade latencies to be slower for participants who 
made fewer saccades on the critical trial (i.e. these participants were able to 
suppress their pre-programmed eye-movement / switch from a focused to a more 
diffuse attentional set on the critical trial.)  
 
Experiment 2 
As mentioned above, one possible account for the delay in orienting observed 
in Experiment 1 is that it reflects a cost associated with switching from a serial 
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search strategy to a more diffuse attentional control setting, or from a narrow 
attentional focus to a wide attentional window that allows processing of all items in 
parallel. To test this hypothesis in Experiment 2 we investigated this saccade latency 
delay under conditions of parallel search. In Experiment 2, the target was 
consistently a shape singleton (diamond) that could be found efficiently, that is, 
without serially scanning the search items. Hence, a switch in search strategy on the 
critical trial was unnecessary, due to pre-attentive availability of both the target and 
the unannounced colour singleton.   
 Additionally, we were interested more broadly in the behavioural profile of 
surprise in the context of guided search. To date, studies of surprise capture have 
typically employed difficult search tasks such that the target itself could not guide 
attention. This raises the question whether an unexpected stimulus will attract 
attention and the gaze when the target is not pre-attentively available and does not 
(strongly) compete for attention with the unexpected singleton. There is some 
evidence to suggest that unexpected stimuli can still capture attention and the gaze 
even when the target is pre-attentively available and able to compete for early 
selection. For instance, Godijn and Kramer (2008) found oculomotor capture by an 
unannounced new onset distractor when participants had the task to saccade to a 
colour singleton in a visual search paradigm. Consistent with the view that capture 
can be modulated by stimulus expectancies, the rate of oculomotor capture declined 
across repeated presentations of the onset distractor. However, the effect on other 
aspects of the surprise response such as its temporal profile and signature RT 
increase were not explored. Furthermore, Godijn and Kramer (2008) used onsets as 
the surprising stimulus and there is evidence to suspect that the pattern of 
oculomotor capture associated with surprising stimuli may differ for different classes 
of stimuli (e.g. colour singletons vs. onsets; Wu & Remington, 2003). Hence, it is still 
an open question whether an unexpected colour singleton could elicit surprise and 
attract attention when it is forced to compete for selection with a pre-attentively 
available target. Thus, in Experiment 2 we tested the response to an unannounced 
colour singleton during guided search. 
In order to study surprise in the context of guided search, the design of 
Experiment 2 had to be modified from Experiment 1. Specifically, in Experiment 2 the 
surprising colour singleton was presented at a non-target location (invalid location). 
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This was necessary so that any guidance effects related to the unannounced colour 
singleton can attract attention and the gaze even when it competes with a pre-
attentively available target, then it should interfere with target selection on the critical 
trial, leading to an increase in RTs and an increase the number of fixations and 
target fixation latencies. Moreover, if the surprise-induced delay in orienting attention 
to the surprising item in Experiment 1 was due to participants having to switch from 
serial search to parallel search, then the saccade latencies of the first eye 
movements should not differ between the critical trial and the pre-critical trials, 
because in Experiment 2, no such switch was necessary. 
 
Method 
Participants 
Fifteen participants (9 female) from The University of Queensland participated 
in exchange for $10. All reported normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Apparatus 
Experiment 2 was conducted using the computer software package 
Presentation (Neurobehavioural Systems). Stimuli were presented on a 19-inch CRT 
monitor attached to a (Pentium 4) personal computer. Stimuli were presented with a 
resolution of 1280 * 1024 pixels and a refresh rate of 75Hz. Responses were 
recorded using a two-button mouse. Participants’ eye-movements were measured 
using a video-based 36 infrared eye-tracking system (Eyelink 1000, SR Research, 
Ontario, Canada) with a spatial resolution of 0.1 and a temporal resolution of 500 Hz. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli used in Experiment 2 were similar to those used in Experiment 1. 
The critical differences being that in Experiment 2 the targets (H or U) always 
appeared in the centre of a shape singleton (diamond) and the colours of the stimuli 
varied between participants; stimuli in the pre-critical trials were either all red (RGB = 
255 0 0) or green (RGB = 0 255 0) and the distractor in the critical trial and the post-
critical trials was always green or red, respectively. All other aspects of the stimuli 
were identical to Experiment 1 (see Figure 11).  
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Design and Procedure 
In Experiment 2 participants completed 55 trials in search for a diamond 
target among circle non-targets - 5 practice trials, 25 pre-critical, 1 critical and 24 
post-critical trials. On the critical trial a non-target was randomly presented as a 
colour singleton, i.e. a red distractor amongst otherwise green stimuli or vice versa. 
That is, on the critical trial and the post-critical trials, the colour singleton was always 
presented at an invalid location. All other aspects of the design and procedure were 
identical to Experiment 1. 
 
 
Figure 11. Example search displays from Experiment 2. A) Pre-critical trial. B) 
Critical and post-critical trial.  
 
Results 
Mean RTs and accuracy for Experiment 2 are shown in Figure 12. RTs 
exceeding 4000ms and errors were excluded from RT and eye-movement and 
analyses. This criteria lead to a loss of 4.5% of trials. Eye movements were parsed 
into saccades, fixations and blinks using the same criteria as Experiment 1. As with 
Experiment 1, averages for the pre and post-critical trials were computed over the 5 
trials that preceded and trailed the critical trial, respectively, to arrive at a safer 
estimate of performance on pre- and post-critical trials. All comparisons were 
computed using these averages.  
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RT analysis 
RTs on the critical trial were contrasted with RTs on the pre-critical and post-
critical trials. Planned pairwise comparisons revealed that RTs on the critical trial 
were significantly slower than RTs on the pre-critical trials, t(13) = -3.33, p = .005, 
and RTs on the post-critical trials, t(14) = -2.87, p = .01 (see Figure 12)  
 
 
Figure 12. Mean Response Times for the pre-critical, critical and post-critical trials 
from Experiment 2. Error bars depict +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
Eye-movement analyses 
Due to the distribution of number-of-fixations on the pre-critical trials, a 
comparison between the critical trial and the pre-critical trials was performed using a 
Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test - this revealed there to be significantly more fixations on 
the critical trial than on the pre-critical trials, (Z = 3.03, p=.002). A planned 
comparison between the critical trial and the post-critical trials revealed a 
significantly greater number of fixations on the critical trial relative to the post-critical 
trials, t(14) = -2.32, p = .04 (see Figure 13).  
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Figure 13. Mean Number of Fixations per trial for the pre-critical, critical and post-
critical trials from Experiment 2. Error bars depict +/- one standard error of the mean. 
 
First fixations data showed that participants were close to chance (12.5%) at 
selecting the target with their first fixation on the critical trial (see Figure 14). 
Additionally, 47% of first fixations went to the colour distractor on the critical trial. 
Two Wilcoxon’s signed-rank tests revealed there were fewer first fixations to the 
target on the critical trials relative to the pre-critical, Z = 2.62, p = .009 and the post-
critical trials, Z = 2.12, p = .034. These results indicate that the colour singleton 
interfered with search on its first unannounced presentation, despite the fact that the 
target was pre-attentively available and competed for attention with the distractor.  
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Figure 14. The percentage of first fixations that went to the target location on the 
pre-critical, critical and pos-critical trials. 
 
The target fixation latency data show a slightly different pattern of results. 
Planned comparisons revealed that target fixation latencies on the critical trial were 
significantly longer relative to the pre-critical trials, t(14) = 3.47, p = .004, however, 
there was no difference between target fixation latencies on the critical trial and the 
post-critical trials (p =.15) (see Figure 15). An analysis of saccade latencies found no 
significant differences between the critical trial and the pre-critical trials, (p = .37), or 
between the critical trial and the post-critical trials (p = .61).  
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Figure 15. Mean Target fixation latencies per trial for the pre-critical, critical and 
post-critical trials from Experiment 2. Error bars depict +/- one standard error of the 
mean. 
 
Finally, as was done in Experiment 1, we estimated the post-selection delay 
(PSD) by subtracting target fixation latencies for each participant from their RTs. 
Planned comparisons revealed that the PSD was significantly longer on the critical 
trial (852ms) than on both the pre-critical trials (577ms), t(13) = 2.56, p = .02 and the 
post-critical trials (575ms), t(13) = 3.11, p = .008 (see Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16. Post Selection Delay (PSD) for the pre-critical, critical and post-critical 
conditions in Experiment 2. 
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Discussion 
 In Experiment 2 we presented an unannounced colour singleton at a non-
target location during search for a shape singleton. Consistent with the view that 
unexpected stimuli can attract attention and interfere with search, RTs on the critical 
trial were elevated relative to both the pre-critical and post-critical trials as was the 
PSD. Importantly, there was an increase in the number of fixations and an increase 
in target fixation latencies on the critical trial relative to the pre-critical trials 
suggesting a spatial component to the observed increase in RTs. Furthermore, 
selection of the target with the first fixation was close to chance on the critical trial 
(13.3%) compared with 38% and 37% on the pre- and post-critical trials, 
respectively, and 47% of first fixations went to the distractor on the critical trial. With 
respect to the temporal profile of this spatial component, we found no evidence of a 
delay in orienting on the critical trial. Saccade latencies on the critical trial were no 
slower than saccade latencies on either the pre-critical or post-critical trials. The 
absence of an orienting delay on the critical trial during guided search is consistent 
with our hypothesis that the delay in saccadic latencies observed in Experiment 1 
may be related to switching of attentional control settings - from narrow to diffuse - 
as the task switches from an unguided to a guided search task.  
However, it must be pointed out that the shape target was a singleton in 
Experiment 2, and it’s possible that participants adopted a set for singletons or a set 
for the stimulus of highest contrast rather than the specific shape feature per se (e.g. 
Bacon & Egeth, 1994). Remembering that the surprising stimulus was a colour 
singleton of high feature contrast, it’s possible that the colour singleton in Experiment 
2 captured attention by virtue of its “fit” with the task set rather than a “miss-fit” with 
the task expectancies. That is, the surprising stimulus may have engaged (fast) top-
down selection mechanisms before any (slow) novelty detection mechanism could 
respond. This could also account for why we failed to observe a delay in the spatial 
component of the surprise response in Experiment 2. Thus, there remains some 
ambiguity as to whether the orienting delay (~40ms) observed in Experiment 1 is 
related to a changed in the search conditions, as we have suggested, or a feature of 
a distinct and dedicated novelty detection mechanism. However, regardless of the 
orienting mechanism at play, the decrease in RTs and number of fixations on the 
post-critical trials relative to the critical trial demonstrates that stimulus novelty was 
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critical to the effects observed in Experiment 2. These results demonstrate that 
oculomotor capture was modulated by the first presentation of an unannounced 
colour singleton, a result that has previously been demonstrated with onset 
transients (Godijn & Kramer, 2008) but not with colour stimuli.      
 
General Discussion 
According to the surprise capture hypothesis, a stimulus will capture attention 
to the extent that it is pre-attentively available and deviates from task-expectancies. 
Importantly, capture by unexpected stimuli is thought to be governed by a 
mechanism separate from the underlying mechanism that governs capture by 
expected stimuli (Horstmann, 2002, 2005, 2006; Horstmann & Becker, 2008). In the 
two experiments presented here we explored the phenomenon of surprise capture 
using eye-movements with the aim of disentangling the various components of the 
effect, namely the spatial, temporal and decision/response related components, to 
better understand the mechanisms underlying surprise capture.  
In Experiment 1 we presented an unannounced colour singleton at the 
location of the target during unguided search. Conceptually this experiment was very 
similar to previous designs employed to study surprise capture (Horstmann, 2002 
exp. 3, 2005 exp. 1). Consistent with surprise capture we found strong evidence of 
attentional capture on the critical trial that was accompanied by a non-spatially 
specific RT cost (~300ms) related to the engagement of higher order processes 
recruited to resolve the expectancy violation. However, regarding the temporal profile 
of the effect, we found evidence in the saccade latencies for only a modest delay in 
the orienting component of roughly 40ms. In Experiment 2 under conditions of 
guided search, we again found strong evidence of a shift of attention towards the 
unannounced colour distractor as well as a large RT cost; however, here we found 
no modulation of saccade latencies by the unannounced colour distractor. 
As discussed previously, surprise capture is thought to manifest relatively 
slowly.  Horstmann (2006) had participants perform an unguided search task for a 
series of trials before presenting an unannounced colour singleton at the target 
location. Between subjects the SOA between the presentation of the surprising 
stimulus and the target display was varied from 0 – 600ms. Only when the surprising 
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stimulus preceded the target by at least 400ms was an effect of surprise observed. 
Similar patterns of results have been observed in numerous other reports of surprise 
capture (Horstmann, 2002, 2005; Horstmann & Becker, 2008; Gibson & Jiang,1998; 
Meyer et al., 1991). Critically, this effect has been attributed in part to a delay in the 
onset of the spatial orienting component of the surprise response – delayed onset 
model - and used to argue for an underlying mechanism distinct from other forms of 
capture.  
In our view the results of the two experiments presented here are not 
consistent with a delayed onset model of surprise capture. In Experiment 1 we found 
a minimal delay in saccade latencies and target fixation latencies on the critical trial 
but a large RT cost once the target had been selected with the eyes. In Experiment 2 
under conditions of guided search we found a similar pattern of results for an invalid 
colour singleton; here though there was no delay in saccade latencies on the critical 
trial but again large RT costs once the target had been selected. This pattern of data 
seems more consistent with an interference model of surprise capture where by 
attention shifts rapidly to an unexpected feature and the RT delays that characterize 
surprise reflect computations at a later stage in the system – after attention has been 
shifted to an unexpected stimulus – dedicated to reconciling the expectation 
discrepancy (Gibson & Jiang,1998). It’s possible that the delay in orienting we 
observed in Experiment 1 reflects an additional operation that is required to detect 
and or trigger an attention shift towards an expectation discrepancy (Horstmann, 
2006). However, we suggest that this cost may reflect a suppression or inhibition of 
the existing/active serial search strategy on the critical trial as the task switches from 
an unguided to guided search. The fact that we did not observe the similar delays 
under conditions of guided search speaks to this account.  
Regardless, neither the ~40ms delay in saccade latencies nor the ~115ms 
delay in target fixation latencies we observed in Experiment 1 can account for time 
course of surprise capture currently proposed in the literature. What then is the 
source of the discrepancy between our results and previous reports of surprise 
capture? One possibility is that there are genuine inconsistencies between the data 
reported here and previous results, possibly attributable to subtle differences in the 
methodologies used. Specifically, time-course analyses of surprise capture have in 
the past used very brief target presentation durations - in the order of 80-90ms so as 
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to detect variances in accuracy - and looked at covert attention shifts. Here we 
presented the target display until a response was made and studied eye-movements 
– necessarily serial processes that take time to be executed. However, it is not clear 
to us how these methodological differences could produce seemingly different 
temporal profiles of surprise capture. A second possibility is that the discrepancy lies 
in our interpretation. We suggest the latter and argue that previous demonstrations 
of surprise capture can be accounted for by an interference model and that this is a 
more parsimonious and ecologically valid account of the phenomenon. We discuss 
this in depth below.       
As discussed, the majority of work addressing the time course of surprise 
capture has used very brief target presentation durations and a feature singleton 
presented at the location of the target to induce surprise (Horstmann, 2002, 2006; 
Gibson & Jiang, 1998). These studies invariably find that accuracy on the surprise 
trial remains close to chance unless the surprising stimulus is presented at least 
~300-400ms prior to the target presentation. A delayed-onset model accounts for 
some of this delay by proposing that the orienting component of the surprise 
response is slow and therefore, for SOAs of less than ~300-400ms, attention has not 
yet shifted to the location of the target and thus cannot facilitate identification of the 
target. On the other hand, an interference model proposes that orienting towards a 
surprising stimulus is fast, however, central processing resources are devoted to 
processing the expectation discrepancy ahead of the target. If the target presentation 
time is shorter than the time required to resolve the expectation discrepancy then 
target identification will likely be impaired. These two models are not mutually 
exclusive, however, note that in both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 we found a 
spatially non-specific interference effect specific to the critical trial of ~300ms and 
~280ms, respectively; a delay in responding that closely resembles the time course 
of surprise previously reported (Horstmann, 2002; 2006) but that only manifested in 
both instances once the eyes had shifted to the target. 
 We are not the first authors to point out that the delayed-onset account and 
the interference account make similar predictions with respect to accuracy for valid 
unannounced singletons. Horstmann and Becker (2008) recognized this and ran a 
study to distinguish between the two accounts. They argued that the delayed-onset 
account and the interference account make opposite predictions for an unannounced 
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distractor i.e. a singleton not presented at the location of the target. Specifically, they 
reasoned that the delayed-onset account predicts minimal costs at short SOAs (e.g., 
100 ms) and large costs at long SOAs (e.g., 400 ms). This is because at short SOAs 
(100ms) the distractor does not attract attention to its location (away from the target); 
the opposite is true at long SOAs. The interference account, however, predicts the 
opposite; large costs at short SOAs that should dissipate as SOA increases. Across 
two experiments they found results consistent with the delayed-onset prediction 
showing a minimal decrease in accuracy at the short (100ms) SOA and close to 
chance performance at the long (400ms) SOA. However, there is a notable 
difference between the experimental paradigm used by Horstmann and Becker 
(2008) and previous investigations of the time course of surprise capture 
(Horstmann, 2002; Horstmann, 2005; Horstmann, 2006; Meyer et al., 1991) which 
we believe is critical to understanding their results. Specifically, Horstmann and 
Becker (2008) presented the unannounced distractor for either 100ms or 400ms and 
offset it when the target display was presented. While in previous experiments, 
where the unannounced singleton was always valid (Horstmann, 2002; Horstmann, 
2005; Horstmann, 2006), the unannounced singleton was presented until a response 
was made, or until the target display offset but not beforehand. That is, the 
presentation duration of the surprising stimulus varies substantially across these 
experiments and we believe this is critical. Indeed so too did Horstmann and Becker 
(2008) as they went on to demonstrate in the same paper that stimulus duration is 
critical for surprise to manifest because surprise capture requires a “sufficiently 
stable stimulus representation” (Horstmann, 2008, .p 304). We suggest that the 
reason there is no effect of the unannounced colour distract at the 100ms duration in 
the Horstmann and Becker (2008) paper is not because attention is not allocated to 
the unannounced distractor, but because once attention has shifted to the 
unexpected stimulus 100ms is not sufficiently long enough for surprise to manifest 
and interfere with target identification. Finally, the cost observed at the 400ms 
duration condition can easily be reconciled with an interference account by referring 
to Horstmann (2006) where he shows that accuracy on the critical trial for a valid 
unannounced stimulus approaches ceiling at SOAs beyond 400ms (i.e. 600ms). The 
fact that there were accuracy benefits at an SOA of 600ms demonstrates that 
participants were continuing to attend to the stimulus at the onset of the target 
display. Thus based on this data we would not predict that the interference 
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associated with the unannounced colour distractor in Horstmann (2008) should have 
fully dissipated by 400ms. Thus, the interference they observe at the 400ms stimulus 
duration is, to us, not inconsistent with an interference account of surprise capture as 
Horstmann and Becker (2008) argue.  
In summary, the two experiments reported here demonstrate that 
unannounced colour singletons modulate oculomotor capture and elicit surprise on 
their first occurrence, both under conditions of guided and unguided search. 
Saccadic latency data across two experiments suggests there is a small delay in 
orienting to an unannounced stimulus during unguided search which we suggest 
may reflect a necessary suppression or inhibition of pre-existing serial search 
strategies before the unexpected stimulus will guide attention / the eyes. Given we 
did not observe a saccadic latency delay in Experiment 2 where search was guided 
to begin with supports this assertion. Interestingly, the temporal profile of saccadic 
latencies and target fixation latencies we observed is not consistent with accounts of 
surprise capture that posit a delay in orienting as the primary source of the reduced 
accuracy at short SOAs. Rather, our data are more consistent with an interference 
model where by attention shifts rapidly to the location of an unexpected stimulus and 
central processing resources are diverted to reconciling the expectation discrepancy 
at the cost of target identification. Distinguishing between these two accounts is 
important because as Horstmann (2005; 2006) points out, the delayed-onset account 
points to a separate underlying mechanism for capture by unexpected events while 
the interference model is not inconsistent with theories of attentional control that 
propose that salient irrelevant stimuli are filtered out through a process that is 
dependent on prior exposure to irrelevant stimuli and implicit learning about their 
relevance (Becker, 2007; Folk & Remington, 1998; Treisman & Sato, 1990).
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 – Conclusions
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In this thesis I have presented three empirical studies, each motivated by the central 
question of what determines the events and objects in the visual world to which we 
orient and attend. Answering this question has important consequences for theories 
of visual attention that seek to describe the perceptual and cognitive processes that 
determine visual selection; processes that ultimately contribute to our conscious 
experience of the world. As I have discussed, contemporary theories of visual 
attention model visual selection as the outcome of an interaction between bottom-up 
saliency driven processes and top-down processes that prioritize inputs in 
accordance with the goals or intentions of the observer (Cave & Wolfe, 1990; 
Duncan & Humphreys, 1989; Itti & Koch, 2000; Treisman & Sato, 1990). The extent 
to which either of these factors predominates over early visual selection has been a 
subject of debate. 
In response to the equivocal support for purely stimulus driven capture and 
the observation that task goals can prevent distraction from highly salient but 
irrelevant stimuli (e.g., Folk et al., 1992), I have proposed that task expectations play 
an important role in bringing to our awareness objects and events in the visual world 
that may initially be task irrelevant but that may be of potential importance to the 
observer. Of course I am by no means the first author to express this view; the 
notion that the human perceptual system is sensitive to the unexpected and novel is 
expressed by schema theories of perception and cognition (e.g., Meyer et al., 1991; 
Neisser, 1976; Rumelhart, 1984). These theories are supported by the observation 
that infrequent and novel stimuli evoke distinct patterns of neural activity (MMN: 
Näätänen, 1992; Ranganath & Rainer, 2003) and are associated with a number of 
well documented behavioural and perceptual phenomena (e.g., TSE: Tse et al., 
2004; surprise capture: Horstmann, 2002). My work adds to the existing literature on 
the role of task expectancies, by rigorously examining how stimulus novelty interacts 
with top-down feature specific processes. The work herein sheds light on the 
underlying mechanism by which novelty attracts visual attenuation and the factors 
that determine the formation of the neuronal model, schemata or task expectations. 
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Chapter 2: Novelty capture  
To date, several studies have shown that infrequent and unexpected salient 
stimuli can capture attention (e.g., Horstmann, 2002, 2005; Geyer et al., 2008; Neo & 
Chua, 2006), yet the extent to which top-down processes can modulate capture by 
this class of stimulus has until now been relatively unexplored. Folk et al., (1992) 
showed that a task irrelevant onset transient only affected search performance when 
participants’ task was to search for an onset defined target but not when the task 
was to search for a colour defined target. In Chapter 2, I showed that this 
contingency between the target of search and the stimuli that guide visual attention 
may only be true of stimuli that occur repeatedly and frequently, or that can be said 
to conform to a set of task specific expectancies. Using a variant of the spatial 
cueing paradigm of Folk et al., (1992), I found that an infrequently presented motion 
distractor produced a spatial validity effect despite participants adopting a top-down 
set for a specific feature (red). The fact that the same effect was not observed when 
the motion stimulus was presented frequently demonstrates that the infrequent 
motion distractor captured attention by virtue of its novelty, or presentation 
frequency, and not by virtue of its inherent saliency. Motion cues have previously 
been shown to capture attention in the spatial cueing paradigm when they are similar 
to the target but not when they are dissimilar to the target (e.g., Remington, Folk & 
McLean, 2001; Folk, Remington, & Wright, 1994). The observation that motion 
captures attention involuntarily when it is dissimilar to the target but infrequent and 
participants are set for an unrelated stimulus feature is strong support for the ability 
of novel stimuli to generate stimulus-driven capture.  
To explain this result, I have suggested that top-down control reflects more 
than just a set for specific target features. Rather, my results suggest that top-down 
control reflects the formation of contextually specific expectations that describe both 
the target defining properties and the to-be-ignored properties of distractors. This 
view draws from models of visual attention, specifically Treisman and Satos’ (1990) 
Feature Inhibition Hypothesis (see all Becker, 2007; Folk & Remington, 1998), that 
propose that salient irrelevant stimuli must be filtered out or inhibited in order to be 
ignored and disregarded during search. Indeed, Vatterott and Vecera (2012) showed 
that an irrelevant colour singleton interfered with search for a shape target in the first 
half of an experimental block but not in the second. This pattern was observed each 
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time the colour singleton changed colour across blocks. These results, together with 
those I presented in Chapter 2, are consistent with the view that effective top-down 
control involves suppression of salient irrelevant stimuli as well as a positive setting 
for a specific target feature. Moreover, they suggest that the filtering or inhibition of 
irrelevant features depends on prior exposure and presumably some learning about 
their (ir)relevance – whether exposure to irrelevant stimuli must occur within the 
context in which they are to be ignored for learning to occur (i.e., included in the 
task-set) and the specific nature of this learning was the focus of Chapter 3. 
Critically, the ability to ignore salient distractors likely depends on an active 
set for distractor properties that is maintained by repeated exposure to a stimulus. 
The fact that the motion cue here continued to capture attention after repeated but 
infrequent exposure suggests that task expectancies or the ‘inhibitory set’ is 
continuously updated across trials and that there is some window in which a stimulus 
must occur for it to be included in the next “iteration” of the task-set and effectively 
ignored. Perhaps another way to consider this is that inhibitory signals for a given 
irrelevant feature are strengthened by repeated and frequent exposure but decay 
otherwise. Thus, if the interval between successes presentations of a to-be-ignored 
stimulus is sufficiently great then the stimulus will not be inhibited effectively and will 
likely capture attention on its next occurrence. Decay of the inhibition signal may 
occur over time, some number of perceptual events or probably a combination of 
both of these factors (see Geyer et al., 2008; Sayim et al., 2012) and may depend on 
the properties of the to-be-ignored stimulus (e.g., stimulus saliency). The exact 
decay rate or the size of the ‘window’ in which a stimulus must occur for it to be 
effectively inhibited (i.e., included in the task set) is not clear and was not tested 
here. However, Sayim et al. (2012) have suggested that short-term memory 
processes, similar to those implicated in contextual cueing studies (see Chun, 2000; 
Chun & Jiang, 1998) may mediate the extraction of display probabilities, where 
‘display probabilities’ is synonymous with what I have proposed as the formation of 
‘task expectancies’. Additionally, the short-term memory processes implicated in 
feature priming studies may also mediate distractor inhibition and underpin the 
formation of task expectancies (Huang, Holcombe, & Pashler, 2004; Lamy, Antebi, 
Aviani, & Carmel, 2008; Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994; 1996; 2000).  
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Importantly, the account of distractor inhibition that I have proposed here is a 
passive one where the inhibitory processes that contribute to the formation of task-
expectancies, or the inhibitory-set operate autonomously. Alternative accounts of 
distractor inhibition such as the dimension weighting account (DMA) of Műller and 
colleagues posits a more active inhibitory mechanism. According to DMA observers 
can modulate the weights assigned to a particular stimulus dimension in a top-down 
manner. Modulation is used to enhance saliency signals at the level of the master 
map (see Chapter 1: guided search) that pertain to the target but also to attenuate 
those pertaining to distractors. According to this model, infrequent irrelevant stimuli 
capture attention because there is little incentive to strategically inhibit their inputs 
(Geyer et al., 2008; Müller, et al., 2009; Müller, Reimann, & Krummernacher, 2003). 
These accounts are of course not mutually exclusive, it’s possible that both explicit 
and implicit processes contribute independently to distractor inhibition and the 
formation of task expectancies (see though Chapter 3). If we accept that the function 
of a novelty detection mechanism is to facilitate adaptive action by bringing to 
awareness objects and events that may require immediate action, an implicit 
autonomous mechanism may serve as a more reliable, albeit possibly less flexible 
mechanism than an explicit one. However, one can possibly imagine a scenario 
where the negative consequences a prolonged response might be so severe that 
observes would indeed keep alive a set that was inefficient for the majority of 
responses. Such a scenario would presumably benefit from an explicit mechanism 
responsive to the strategies of the observer.   
Perhaps one of the more intriguing results reported in Chapter 2 was the 
under-additive pattern of RT interference associated with initial presentations of the 
infrequent motion cue (see Experiments 2 – 4). When the task was to search for a 
red feature singleton in a spatial cueing paradigm, initial presentations of the 
infrequent valid motion cue were associated with large RT costs which I referred to 
as ‘surprise’. The same RT costs were either not present or were attenuated for 
initial presentations of the invalid motion cue. Previous reports of capture by new and 
unannounced stimuli suggest that cueing effects ought to combine in an additive way 
with the non-spatially specific interference (surprise) that is characteristic of the 
response to unexpected stimuli (Horstmann, 2002; 2005). However, in Chapter 2 
there was clearly something about the initial presentations of a valid infrequent 
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motion cue that elevated RTs significantly more than initial presentations of the 
invalid motion cue. The results of Experiment 5 suggest that this under-additive 
pattern relates to the presence of a feature singleton that, when the cue is invalid, 
facilitates disengagement from the unexpected motion cue. Indeed when the target 
was not defined as a feature singleton but rather as a conjunction, we observed 
additivity. This result is important because it demonstrates that the ability to tune 
attention toward featural information can affect the response to an unexpected and 
irrelevant singleton. Specifically, the ability to locate the target appears to disrupt 
further processing of an unexpected stimulus and can lead to a fast recovery of 
search. This result is also consistent with the view that unexpected stimuli not only to 
capture attention, but also engage response and decision level processes 
(Horstmann, 2005; Meyer et al., 1991; Niepel et al., 1994). Importantly, the under-
additive effect reported here demonstrates that these two components can be 
dissociated. This dissociate is consistent with the results reported in Chapter 4 
where I observed large RT costs associated with an unexpected colour singleton 
only once the eyes had selected the target. I discuss this further below.  
 
Chapter 3: What constitutes the unexpected?    
It is clear from the work of Schűtzwohl (1998) and Horstmann (2005) that 
context plays an important role in shaping task expectancies, and consequently the 
stimuli that can violate them. The “unexpectedness” of a new and unannounced 
stimulus is related to the heterogeneity of the stimulus array in which it occurs. As 
stimulus heterogeneity increases, the extent to which a new and unannounced 
stimulus will capture attention and elicit surprise decreases (Horstmann, 2005; 
Schűtzwohl, 1998). As such, it is not sufficient that a stimulus be new and 
unannounced for it to be deemed “unexpected” by the perceptual system and 
capture attention. In Chapter 3, I presented results which suggest that not only is it 
insufficient, but it is also not necessary that a stimulus be new and unannounced for 
it to elicit a novelty response. Across four conditions I independently varied prior 
exposure to an infrequent invalid motion stimulus, with instructions to expect the 
motion stimulus. Using a modified spatial cueing paradigm participants were either, 
pre-exposed to the motion stimulus, told about the imminent occurrence of an 
“unexpected” but irrelevant stimulus or exposed to both of these manipulations. 
 134 
 
Relative to a standard condition in which participants received no information about 
the motion stimulus, there was no attenuation of the response to the infrequent 
motion distractor across any of the conditions. RT interference was observed for the 
first presentation of an infrequent motion distractor when observes had prior 
experience with the motion distractor, and when they had explicit knowledge about 
the likelihood of an unexpected event. Even when observes had prior experience 
with motion stimulus and knew roughly when to expect it, it still produced RT 
interference.  
It is intriguing to me that neither explicit knowledge nor prior exposure 
attenuated the response evoked by an otherwise “unexpected” stimulus. Indeed, as I 
highlighted in the discussion of Chapter 3, if the “unexpectedness” value of a 
stimulus or event is to be measured by the response it evokes on its first occurrence, 
then these results suggest that explicit awareness about an impending deviate 
stimulus has little bearing on how the stimulus is treated by perceptual processes 
that determine visual selection. This result is perhaps less surprising when 
considered in the context of models of visual attention that assume that salient 
irrelevant stimuli are inhibited via a process that depends on prior exposure to 
irrelevant stimuli and learning about their relevance (Becker, 2007; Folk & 
Remington, 1998; Treisman & Sato, 1990). The fact that there was no effect of 
explicit knowledge suggests that in some sense these effects are independent of 
top-down knowledge, and rather the ability of ignore task irrelevant stimuli seems to 
reflect a processes of learning that is implicit. 
 In summary, these results are consistent with the view expressed earlier that 
top-down control reflects the formation of contextually specific expectations that 
describe both the target defining properties and the to-be-ignored properties and 
adds to this view by demonstrating that learning of distractor relevance appears to 
be implicit and highly context specific. Based on these results I have proposed that 
the unexpectedness of a stimulus reflects the foreseeability of its occurrence 
according to inductive processes that operate largely automatically (Posner & 
Snyder, 1975) and independent of other cognitive processes (Green, 1956).  
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Chapter 4: What do the eyes tell us about capture by the unexpected? 
 In Chapter 4, I investigated the claim that shifts of attention to unexpected 
stimuli are delayed relative to expected stimuli. Addressing this claim is important as 
such a delay is not predicted by the inhibitory mechanism I have proposed to 
account for capture by novel and infrequent stimuli. Horstmann (2002; 2005; 2006) 
has shown that the first presentation of an unannounced valid colour singleton can 
capture attention in a visual search paradigm during search for a target letter 
amongst an array of non-target letters. An interesting aspect of this result is that the 
effect appears to be contingent on the timing of the onset of the unexpected colour 
singleton relative to the target display. When the colour singleton occurred at the 
location of the target less than 400ms prior to the onset of the target display, 
Horstmann (2006) found that it had no effect on search performance. However, 
when the colour singleton was presented 400ms or more prior to the onset of the 
target display, response accuracy significantly improved relative to when the colour 
singleton was not presented. Based on this observation Horstmann (2006) has 
argued that shifts of attention toward unexpected stimuli are delayed relative to 
expected stimuli. Critically, this delay is used to suggest an orienting mechanism for 
unexpected stimuli that is distinct from that which governs orientating toward 
expected stimuli.  
However, inferring the time course of attention shifts to unexpected stimuli 
from accuracy scores is problematic. As well as attracting visual attention, 
unexpected stimuli generate large RT costs during visual search which are thought 
to be largely separate from the orienting response (see Chapter 2). These RT costs 
are thought to reflect the engagement of decision level processes that are recruited 
to reconcile the discrepancy between expected input and the actual input that is 
generated by attending to a novel stimulus (Meyer et al., 1991). I have argued that it 
is these non-spatially specific effects that are reflected in the time course analyses 
reported by Horstmann (2006) and Horstmann and Becker (2008), and not an 
orienting delay. In Chapter 4, I used eye-movements as a proxy for attentional 
orienting (Deubel & Schneider, 1996; Peterson, Kramer, & Irwin, 2004) to examine 
whether in fact shifts of attention and the eyes are delayed when they are 
exogenously directed toward an unexpected colour singleton.  
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Consistent with previous reports of occuolmotor capture by infrequent stimuli 
(colour singletons: Geyer et al., 2008; onsets: Godijn & Kramer, 2008; Sayim et al., 
2012) I found oculomotor capture by the first presentation of an unannounced colour 
singleton under conditions of both guided and unguided search. In both instances 
oculomotor capture was accompanied by large RT costs, consistent with previous 
reports of surprise capture (Horstmann, 2002; 2005; Meyer et al., 1991) and other 
results presented in this thesis. However, these RT costs could not be explained by 
delays in orienting. In Experiment 1 where search was unguided, saccadic latencies 
were delayed by ~40-50ms and target fixation latencies by ~115ms, while there was 
an additional ~300ms RT delay that manifest once the eyes selected the target. 
Furthermore, in Experiment 2 where search was guided, there were no delays 
associated with either saccadic latencies or target fixations latencies despite large 
RT costs once the eyes had selected the target (~280ms). I have suggested that the 
delay in saccadic and target fixation latencies observed when search was unguided 
(Exp. 1) reflects the suppression of a pre-programmed saccade and a switch from a 
narrow to a more diffuse attentional control setting at the first presentation of the 
unexpected colour singleton. Thus, the delays in orienting associated with the first 
presentation of the unannounced stimulus during unguided search are not specific to 
stimulus novelty per se, but rather reflect costs associated with interrupting ongoing 
or planned behaviour. As such, I have proposed an interference model of capture 
whereby attention is rapidly deployed to unexpected features and central processing 
resources are recruited to resolve the expectation discrepancy. Due to capacity 
limitations, processing of the expectation discrepancy comes at the expense of 
target identification as seen by RT delays (Horstmann, 2005; Meyer et al., 1991) and 
impaired accuracy (Horstmann, 2002; 2006). Importantly, this view does not invoke a 
dedicated novelty orienting mechanism to explain visual sensitivity to the 
unexpected. Instead, I have argue that same underlying orienting mechanisms that 
guide visual attention to expected and task relevant stimuli  are involved in selecting 
novel and unexpected stimuli. Delays associated with unexpected stimuli arise once 
attention has been guided by early parallel processes to the location of an 
unexpected stimulus.   
Horstmann (2002; 2005) has labeled attentional capture by a new and 
unannounced stimulus as ‘surprise capture’. However, based on my results I suggest 
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that this label is perhaps misleading. ‘Surprise’ describes a certain psychological 
state that can be induced by attending to an unexpected event; it describes a 
constellation of physiological and cognitive phenomena that emerge as a 
consequence of attending to an unexpected event. However, the label ‘surprise 
capture’ would seem to imply that some separate ‘surprise’ process is instrumental in 
orienting attention to unexpected stimuli. I have argued that this is unlikely the case 
and therefore suggest that the label ‘surprise capture’ requires revision. A more 
appropriate label for these effects would be ‘novelty capture’ or ‘deviant capture’. 
These terms are useful in that they are descriptive statements about the stimulus 
conditions / contexts that can produce attentional capture.  
 
Concluding remarks 
The three empirical chapters presented in this thesis demonstrate a 
consistent effect of stimulus novelty on search performance. In Chapter 2, I showed 
that a task irrelevant motion cue captured attention involuntarily when observers 
were set for a specific feature value (red). This finding is significant as it represents 
the first demonstration of capture by an irrelevant stimulus under such search 
conditions and suggests that capture by the unexpected may represent a true form 
of stimulus driven capture. As well as this spatial component, initial presentations of 
the motion cue produced large non-spatially specific costs that dissipated across 
successive presentations on the rare motion cue. This effect was also observed in 
Chapter 3 and is consistent with theoretical accounts of surprise which propose that 
unexpected stimuli engage response and decision level processes as well as 
drawing attention to their location (Horstmann, 2002; 2005; Meyer et al., 1991; 
Schűtzwohl, 1998). Interestingly, when the target of search was a feature singleton 
(Chapter 2: Experiments 2 – 4), I observed RT costs that were specific to valid 
presentations of the rare motion cue. The fact the rare motion cue captured attention 
when it was invalid but did not produce non-spatially specific RT costs suggest that 
these two components of the surprise response can be dissociated. Furthermore, 
this result from Chapter 2 is consistent with those of Chapter 4 where we observed 
oculomotor capture by an unannounced colour singleton and large RT cost that 
manifested only once the eyes had selected the target. Based on this latter result, I 
have questioned the need to invoke a distinct mechanism of control for unexpected 
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stimuli (see Horstmann, 2005; 2006; Horstmann & Becker, 2008). Rather, I have 
proposed that visual sensitivity to the unexpected and novel reflects a process 
whereby irrelevant stimuli are inhibited over repeated and frequent exposure 
(Treisman & Sato, 1990). Sensitivity to stimulus novelty arises because infrequent 
salient stimuli cannot be inhibited effectively and consequently they are registered by 
guidance mechanisms that determined visual selection (GS4: Wolfe, 2007; FIT: 
Treisman & Gelade, 1980). According to this view, the top-down set reflects a set of 
contextually specific expectations that describe both the target defining properties 
and the to-be-ignored properties of distractors. Importantly, the results presented in 
Chapter 3 demonstrate that task expectancies are formed online and implicitly 
through repeated exposure to targets and distractors.  
In conclusion, top-down control of visual attention is critical for executing goal 
directed behaviours. Equally important is a mechanism that alerts an organism to 
salient objects and events in the visual world that may require rapid responding to 
but may not be directly related to ongoing tasks. In this thesis I have proposed an 
account of attention control whereby the very processes that enable an observer to 
prioritize task-relevant visual input results in sensitivity to the salient irrelevant stimuli 
but only when they occur infrequently and cannot be inhibited. This view is supported 
by three chapters of empirical work demonstrating robust and consistent effects of 
stimulus novelty on search performance. 
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